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This research aims at improving the robustness of electronic systems used-in high level 
radiation environments by combining with radiation-hardened (rad-hardened) design and 
fault-tolerant techniques based on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. A specific 
of the research is to use such systems for wireless post-accident monitoring in nuclear power 
plants (NPPs). More specifically, the following methods and systems are developed and 
investigated to accomplish expected research objectives: analysis of radiation responses, 
design of a radiation-tolerant system, implementation of a wireless post-accident monitoring 
system for NPPs, performance evaluation without repeat physical tests, and experimental 
validation in a radiation environment. 
A method is developed to analyze ionizing radiation responses of COTS-based devices and 
circuits in various radiation conditions, which can be applied to design circuits robust to 
ionizing radiation effects without repeated destructive tests in a physical radiation 
environment. Some mathematical models of semiconductor devices for post-irradiation 
conditions are investigated, and their radiation responses are analyzed using Technology 
Computer Aided Design (TCAD) simulator. Those models are then used in the analysis of 
circuits and systems under radiation condition. Based on the simulation results, method of 
rapid power off may be effectively to protect electronic systems under ionizing radiation.  It 
can be a potential solution to mitigate damages of electronic components caused by radiation. 
With simulation studies of photocurrent responses of semiconductor devices, two methods 
are presented to mitigate the damages of total ionizing dose: component selection and 
radiation shielding protection. According to the investigation of radiation-tolerance of regular 
COTS components, most COTS-based semiconductor components may experience 
performance degradation and radiation damages when the total dose is greater than 20 K Rad 
(Si). A principle of component selection is given to obtain the suitable components, as well 
as a method is proposed to assess the component reliability under radiation environments, 
which uses radiation degradation factors, instead of the usual failure rate data in the 
reliability model. Radiation degradation factor is as the input to describe the radiation 
response of a component under a total radiation dose. In addition, a number of typical 
semiconductor components are also selected as the candidate components for the application 
of wireless monitoring in nuclear power plants. 
On the other hand, a multi-layer shielding protection is used to reduce the total dose to be 
less than 20 K Rad (Si) for a given radiation condition; the selected semiconductor devices 
can then survive in the radiation condition with the reduced total dose. The calculation 
method of required shielding thickness is also proposed to achieve the design objectives. 
Several shielding solutions are also developed and compared for applications in wireless 
monitoring system in nuclear power plants. 
A radiation-tolerant architecture is proposed to allow COTS-based electronic systems to be 
used in high-level radiation environments without using rad-hardened components. Regular 
COTS components are used with some fault-tolerant techniques to mitigate damages of the 
system through redundancy, online fault detection, real-time preventive remedial actions, and 
rapid power off.  The functions of measurement, processing, communication, and fault-
tolerance are integrated locally within all channels without additional detection units. A 
hardware emulation bench with redundant channels is constructed to verify the effectiveness 
of the developed radiation-tolerant architecture.  Experimental results have shown that the 
developed architecture works effectively and redundant channels can switch smoothly in 500 
milliseconds or less when a single fault or multiple faults occur. 
An online mechanism is also investigated to timely detect and diagnose radiation damages in 
the developed redundant architecture for its radiation tolerance enhancement. This is 
implemented by the built-in-test technique. A number of tests by using fault injection 
techniques have been carried out in the developed hardware emulation bench to validate the 
proposed detection mechanism. The test results have shown that faults and errors can be 
effectively detected and diagnosed. For the developed redundant wireless devices under 
given radiation dose (20 K Rad (Si)), the fault detection coverage is about 62.11%.  This 
level of protection could be improved further by putting more resources (CPU consumption, 
etc.) into the function of fault detection, but the cost will increase.  
To apply the above investigated techniques and systems, under a severe accident condition in 
a nuclear power plant, a prototype of wireless post-accident monitoring system (WPAMS) is 
designed and constructed. Specifically, the radiation-tolerant wireless device is implemented 
with redundant and diversified channels. The developed system operates effectively to 
measure up-to-date information from a specific area/process and to transmit that information 
to remote monitoring station wirelessly. Hence, the correctness of the proposed architecture 
and approaches in this research has been successfully validated. 
In the design phase, an assessment method without performing repeated destructive physical 
tests is investigated to evaluate the radiation-tolerance of electronic systems by combining 
the evaluation of radiation protection and the analysis of the system reliability under the 
given radiation conditions. The results of the assessment studies have shown that, under 
given radiation conditions, the reliability of the developed radiation-tolerant wireless system 
can be much higher than those of non-redundant channels; and it can work in high-level 
radiation environments with total dose up to 1 M Rad (Si).  
Finally, a number of total dose tests are performed to investigate radiation effects induced by 
gamma radiation on distinct modern wireless monitoring devices. An experimental setup is 
developed to monitor the performance of signal measurement online and transmission of the 
developed distinct wireless electronic devices directly under gamma radiator at The Ohio 
State University Nuclear Reactor Lab (OSU-NRL). The gamma irradiator generates dose 
rates of 20 K Rad/h and 200 Rad/h on the samples, respectively. It was found that both 
measurement and transmission functions of distinct wireless measurement and transmission 
devices work well under gamma radiation conditions before the devices permanently damage. 
The experimental results have also shown that the developed radiation-tolerant design can be 
applied to effectively extend the lifespan of COTS-based electronic systems in the high-level 
radiation environment, as well as to improve the performance of wireless communication 
systems. According to testing results, the developed radiation-tolerant wireless device with a 
shielding protection can work at least 21 hours under the highest dose rate (20 K Rad/h).   
In summary, this research has addressed important issues on the design of radiation-tolerant 
systems without using rad-hardened electronic components. The proposed methods and 
systems provide an effective and economical solution to implement monitoring systems for 
obtaining up-to-date information in high-level radiation environments. The reported 
contributions are of significance both academically and in practice. 
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Rad-hardened, radiation hardened by design, commercial off-the-shelf, radiation-tolerant, 
radiation-tolerance assessment, fault-tolerant, triple module redundant, wireless post-accident 
monitoring system, nuclear power plant, severe accident, wireless sensor network, total dose 
test 
Acknowledgments 
I am grateful to my supervisor Dr. Jin Jiang for the opportunity to work on this exciting 
research, as well as his continuous guidance, inspiration, and patience throughout the entire 
duration of my Ph.D. studies. It would have been impossible without his support to complete 
this research. 
Also thanks a lot to all members of the CIES research group for the help that took from many 
fields. The management skills of Dr. Xinhong Huang have made the research a much 
smoother process and she also gave many comments on the papers. Dr. Atual Bari gave 
many suggestions in the design and commissioning of the developed wireless monitoring 
system. Dr. Quan Wang has shared a lot of experiences with wireless sensor networks. Dr. 
Jianping Ma and Dr. Drew Rankin also gave many suggestions in this research. Mr. 
Yongqiang Deng gave many helps in the total dose test. Dr. Dongqing Wang, Mrs. Xirong 
Ning, Mr. Binggang Cui, Mr. Ning Pan, and Mr. Long Ding have always been ready to lend 
a hand over the years – both technical and nontechnical. The friendship of all members of 
CIES group will be cherished for the rest of my life.  
The research has benefited from the generosities of many outside the research groups. The 
irradiation experimental test is set up in OSU-NRL by Dr. Lei R. Cao. I have also learned 
from many people in Canadian nuclear industries. 
This research is financially supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research 
Council of Canada (NSERC) and the University Network of Excellence in Nuclear 
Engineering (UNENE). 
I would like to express great appreciate to my wife Ying Zhang, my daughter Yisi, my son 
Ian, and my whole family in China. They always give their everlasting love, understanding, 
encouragement, and support in past years. They will continue to fill up my heart with 
happiness and hope under each period and all conditions in my life.   
Table of Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ i 
Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... v 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... vi 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... xiv 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. xix 
List of Appendices ......................................................................................................... xxvi 
List of Symbols ............................................................................................................. xxvii 
Nomenclature ................................................................................................................. xxxi 
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................. 1 
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Objectives ............................................................................................................... 5 
1.3 Investigated Methods and Systems ......................................................................... 6 
1.4 Research Scope ....................................................................................................... 9 
1.5 Contributions......................................................................................................... 11 
1.6 Organization of the Thesis .................................................................................... 12 
Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................................... 14 
2 Literature Survey .......................................................................................................... 14 
2.1 Background of Severe Accidents in NPPs ............................................................ 14 
2.1.1 Industry Standards for PAMS in NPPs ..................................................... 14 
2.1.2 Design Issues of Wireless Monitoring Systems for Severe Accidents in 
NPPs .......................................................................................................... 15 
2.1.3 Radiation Environment under a Severe Accident ..................................... 16 
2.2 Radiation Effects on Electronics ........................................................................... 17 
2.2.1 Composition of Monitoring Systems in Post-Accident Applications ....... 17 
2.2.2 Mechanism of Radiation Interaction with Matters ................................... 18 
2.2.3 Displacement Damage .............................................................................. 20 
2.2.4 Total Ionizing Dose................................................................................... 21 
2.2.5 Single Event Effect ................................................................................... 24 
2.2.6 Radiation Effects on Semiconductor Devices........................................... 27 
2.3 Rad-Hardened Design Techniques ....................................................................... 29 
2.3.1 Rad-Hardened by Device-Level Design ................................................... 30 
2.3.2 Rad-Hardened by Circuit-Level Design ................................................... 32 
2.3.3 Rad-Hardened by System-Level Design ................................................... 35 
2.3.4 Rad-Hardened by Shielding ...................................................................... 36 
2.3.5 Summary of Rad-Hardened Design Techniques....................................... 37 
2.4 Modeling and Simulation Techniques .................................................................. 39 
2.4.1 Simulation of Radiation Shielding ............................................................ 39 
2.4.2 Simulations of Radiation Effects .............................................................. 40 
2.4.3 Summary of Simulation Techniques ......................................................... 42 
2.5 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................. 44 
Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................................... 45 
3 Analysis of Radiation Responses of Devices and Circuits .......................................... 45 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 45 
3.1.1 Degradation Mechanism of Devices and Circuits .................................... 45 
3.1.2 Photocurrent Modeling of a p-n Junction ................................................. 49 
3.1.3 Problem Statement .................................................................................... 55 
3.1.4 The Framework of the Proposed Analysis Method .................................. 55 
3.2 Development of Device Models ........................................................................... 56 
3.2.1 Diode Model ............................................................................................. 56 
3.2.2 BJT Model ................................................................................................ 58 
3.3 Case Study: Radiation-Induced Responses of an Ideal p-n Diode in TCAD ....... 61 
3.3.1 Simulation Parameters .............................................................................. 61 
3.3.2 Simulation Results .................................................................................... 62 
3.3.3 Discussion ................................................................................................. 65 
3.4 Summary ............................................................................................................... 66 
Chapter 4 ........................................................................................................................... 67 
4 Design Part I: Component Selection ............................................................................ 67 
4.1 The Investigation of Radiation-Tolerance for COTS Components ...................... 67 
4.1.1 Radiation Damages Thresholds on Electronics ........................................ 67 
4.1.2 The Definition of Total Dose Limit .......................................................... 69 
4.2 The Method of Component Selection ................................................................... 70 
4.2.1 The Principle of Component Selection ..................................................... 70 
4.2.2 The Assessment Method of Component Selection ................................... 71 
4.3 Selected Candidate Components........................................................................... 73 
4.4 Summary ............................................................................................................... 75 
Chapter 5 ........................................................................................................................... 76 
5 Design Part II: Multi-Layer Radiation Shielding Protection ....................................... 76 
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 76 
5.1.1 Background ............................................................................................... 76 
5.1.2 Problem Statement .................................................................................... 78 
5.2 The Design of Multi-Layer Radiation Protection ................................................. 79 
5.3 Calculation of Shielding Thickness in Multi-Layer Radiation Protection............ 82 
5.3.1 Attenuation of Gamma Radiation ............................................................. 82 
5.3.2 Calculation of the Shielding Thickness .................................................... 83 
5.4 Case Study: Design of Shielding Protection for Application to a Wireless 
Monitoring System in Nuclear Power Plants ........................................................ 84 
5.4.1 Development of Radiation Shielding Protection for the Proposed WPAMS
................................................................................................................... 84 
5.4.2 Performance Evaluation ............................................................................ 86 
5.5 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 87 
Chapter 6 ........................................................................................................................... 89 
6 Design Part III: Radiation-Tolerant Architecture ........................................................ 89 
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 89 
6.1.1 Potential Solution Techniques .................................................................. 89 
6.1.2 Problem Statement .................................................................................... 90 
6.2 Techniques for Preventing Single Event Effects .................................................. 91 
6.2.1 Redundancy............................................................................................... 91 
6.2.2 Hardware Switch ....................................................................................... 92 
6.2.3 Diversity Techniques ................................................................................ 94 
6.2.4 Fault Detection and Diagnosis .................................................................. 96 
6.2.5 Prognostic for Lifespan of Components ................................................... 99 
6.3 Resulting System Architecture ........................................................................... 100 
6.3.1 Redundant-Tolerant Architecture ........................................................... 100 
6.3.2 Justification ............................................................................................. 101 
6.3.3 Analysis................................................................................................... 104 
6.4 Performance Evaluation of the Developed System Architecture ....................... 106 
6.4.1 Emulation of Radiation Damages ........................................................... 106 
6.4.2 Actual Evaluation and Results ................................................................ 108 
6.5 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 109 
Chapter 7 ......................................................................................................................... 110 
7 Design Part IV: Online Fault Detection Mechanism ................................................. 110 
7.1 Problem Statement .............................................................................................. 110 
7.2 The Framework of Detection Mechanism .......................................................... 111 
7.3 Analysis of Radiation-Induced Damages............................................................ 112 
7.3.1 Analysis Model ....................................................................................... 112 
7.3.2 Definition and Properties ........................................................................ 113 
7.3.3 Identification of Fault, Error, and Failure ............................................... 116 
7.4 Detection of Radiation Damages ........................................................................ 118 
7.4.1 Determination of  𝑈𝐹𝑖(𝑢) ....................................................................... 118 
7.4.2 Internal Detection.................................................................................... 119 
7.4.3 External Detection .................................................................................. 120 
7.5 Diagnosis of Radiation Damages ........................................................................ 121 
7.5.1 Fault Hypothesis ..................................................................................... 121 
7.5.2 Detection Function .................................................................................. 121 
7.5.3 Diagnosis Mechanism ............................................................................. 121 
7.6 Experimental Validation ..................................................................................... 123 
7.6.1 Experimental Results .............................................................................. 123 
7.6.2 Detection Coverage ................................................................................. 128 
7.7 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 128 
Chapter 8 ......................................................................................................................... 130 
8 Implementation: an Application of Wireless Monitoring System for Radiation 
Environments in NPPs ............................................................................................... 130 
8.1 Design Considerations ........................................................................................ 130 
8.2 Development of Wireless Monitoring System .................................................... 133 
8.2.1 Measurement and Transmission Unit ..................................................... 133 
8.2.2 Gateway .................................................................................................. 138 
8.2.3 Remote Monitoring Station..................................................................... 140 
8.3 Testing in a Normal Environment....................................................................... 143 
8.3.1 Accuracy of Parameters Measurement ................................................... 143 
8.3.2 Wireless Communication Performance .................................................. 143 
8.4 Summary ............................................................................................................. 144 
Chapter 9 ......................................................................................................................... 145 
9 Evaluation: Radiation-Tolerance Assessment............................................................ 145 
9.1 Problem Statement .............................................................................................. 145 
9.2 Evaluation of Radiation Shielding Protection ..................................................... 146 
9.3 Assessment of System Reliability ....................................................................... 146 
9.3.1 Reliability Assessment Model ................................................................ 146 
9.3.2 Radiation Degradation Factor ................................................................. 148 
9.4 Radiation-Tolerance of the Developed Wireless Device .................................... 149 
9.5 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 154 
Chapter 10 ....................................................................................................................... 155 
10 Experimental Validation ............................................................................................ 155 
10.1 Overview ............................................................................................................. 156 
10.1.1 Objectives of Experiments ...................................................................... 156 
10.1.2 Experimental Approaches ....................................................................... 160 
10.1.3 Radiation Level Considered in Experimental Validation ....................... 161 
10.1.4 Experimental Facility .............................................................................. 162 
10.1.5 Experimental Schemes ............................................................................ 163 
10.2 Part I: Investigation of Radiation Vulnerability with Diversified COTS 
Components ........................................................................................................ 165 
10.2.1 Introduction of Irradiated Circuits .......................................................... 165 
10.2.2 Experimental Setup ................................................................................. 169 
10.2.3 Experimental Results .............................................................................. 171 
10.2.4 Discussions ............................................................................................. 184 
10.2.5 Summary ................................................................................................. 187 
10.3 Part II: Evaluation of Six Industrial Wireless Transceivers and Networks in a 
Radiation Environment ....................................................................................... 188 
10.3.1 Introduction of Selected Industrial Wireless Systems ............................ 189 
10.3.2 Experimental Setup ................................................................................. 198 
10.3.3 Experimental Results .............................................................................. 200 
10.3.4 Discussions ............................................................................................. 205 
10.3.5 Summary ................................................................................................. 206 
10.4 Part III: Evaluation of Diversified Wireless Monitoring Devices in Radiation 
Environments at both High and Low Dose Rates ............................................... 207 
10.4.1 Introduction of Irradiated Devices .......................................................... 208 
10.4.2 Experimental Setup ................................................................................. 209 
10.4.3 Experimental Results .............................................................................. 213 
10.4.4 Discussions ............................................................................................. 223 
10.4.5 Summary ................................................................................................. 225 
10.5 Part IV: Evaluation of the Developed Radiation-Tolerant Wireless Device in a 
Radiation Environment ....................................................................................... 227 
10.5.1 Introduction of Irradiated Devices .......................................................... 227 
10.5.2 Experimental Setup ................................................................................. 230 
10.5.3 Experimental Results .............................................................................. 232 
10.5.4 Discussions ............................................................................................. 237 
10.5.5 Summary ................................................................................................. 237 
10.6 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 239 
Chapter 11 ....................................................................................................................... 241 
11 Summary, Conclusion, and Future Work ................................................................... 241 
11.1 Summary ............................................................................................................. 241 
11.2 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 243 
11.3 Future Work ........................................................................................................ 246 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 248 
Appendix ......................................................................................................................... 294 
Curriculum Vitae ............................................................................................................ 297 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1-1: Radiation hardness assurance categories for space systems ................................. 10 
Table 2-1: Energy-loss process as radiation interacting with matter ...................................... 19 
Table 2-2: Radiation effects on semiconductor devices ......................................................... 20 
Table 2-3: Total ionizing dose effects on semiconductor technologies and devices .............. 23 
Table 2-4: Single event effects on modern electronics ........................................................... 27 
Table 2-5: Summary of radiation effects on semiconductor devices (Homes-Siedle and 
Adams, 2002) .......................................................................................................................... 28 
Table 2-6: Potential approaches to achieve rad-hardened design at different levels .............. 38 
Table 2-7: Potential approaches of modeling and computer simulations ............................... 43 
Table 3-1: Definitions of constants and variables used for the simulation of ionizing radiation 
effects on semiconductor devices (Wirth & Rogers, 1964; Alexander, 2003) ....................... 50 
Table 3-2: Simulation parameters of an ideal p-n diode ......................................................... 61 
Table 3-3: Simulation results of photo-current response of an ideal p-n diode under forward 
bias .......................................................................................................................................... 63 
Table 3-4: Simulation results of photo-current response of an ideal p-n diode under reverse 
bias .......................................................................................................................................... 64 
Table 4-1: Radiation damages thresholds on electronics ........................................................ 68 
Table 4-2: The summary of selected candidate components and radiation degradation factors
................................................................................................................................................. 74 
Table 5-1: Characteristics of particles and effective shielding layer ...................................... 78 
Table 5-2: Summary of the Parameters of radiation shielding protection for different designs
................................................................................................................................................. 86 
Table 5-3: The performance evaluation for three shielding solutions (Sv/h) ......................... 87 
Table 6-1: The provider of the signals for reconfigurator suggestions ................................. 104 
Table 6-2: The analysis of faults and detection mechanism ................................................. 105 
Table 6-3: Summary of variables logic and experimental results in hardware emulation bench
............................................................................................................................................... 108 
Table 7-1: The summary of radiation-induced damages and emulation methods considered in 
this work................................................................................................................................ 124 
Table 7-2: The information of the developed radiation-tolerant wireless device ................. 127 
Table 8-1: Criteria variables and specifications considered in the design of wireless 
monitoring systems for nuclear power plants ....................................................................... 132 
Table 8-2: The implementation of radiation-tolerant wireless devices in this research ....... 137 
Table 8-3: The parameter measurement of the developed monitoring system in a normal 
environment .......................................................................................................................... 143 
Table 8-4: The performance of wireless communication in a normal environment ............. 144 
Table 9-1: Radiation degradation factors of the developed wireless device ........................ 151 
Table 10-1: Summary of experimental objectives and approaches in this total dose test .... 161 
Table 10-2: Testing equipment using in the experiment ...................................................... 164 
Table 10-3: The summary of the irradiated devices in Experiment Part I ............................ 170 
Table 10-4: Radiation responses of analog signal processing circuits during 390 minutes 
under a high dose rate condition ........................................................................................... 171 
Table 10-5: Status of the failed analog signal processing circuits ........................................ 173 
Table 10-6: Measurement conversion outputs of analog-to-digital converters during 390 
minutes under a high dose rate condition ............................................................................. 174 
Table 10-7: the drive capability of ADC’s output port during 390 minutes under a high dose 
rate condition ........................................................................................................................ 175 
Table 10-8: Output voltages of microcontroller’s GPIOs during 390 minutes under a high 
dose rate condition ................................................................................................................ 176 
Table 10-9: Performance of the memory in microcontrollers during 390 minutes under a high 
dose rate condition ................................................................................................................ 177 
Table 10-10: Program performance of microcontroller during 390 minutes under a high dose 
rate condition ........................................................................................................................ 178 
Table 10-11: PWM output of microcontrollers during 390 minutes under a high dose rate 
condition ............................................................................................................................... 178 
Table 10-12: UART function of microcontrollers during 390 minutes under a high dose rate 
condition ............................................................................................................................... 179 
Table 10-13: The status of typical functions in failed microcontroller circuits .................... 180 
Table 10-14: The output voltage of IO port of wireless transceivers during 390 minutes under 
a high dose rate condition ..................................................................................................... 181 
Table 10-15: Communication performance of wireless transceivers during 390 minutes under 
a high dose rate condition ..................................................................................................... 182 
Table 10-16: Radiation resistances of irradiated circuits under a high dose rate condition in 
Experiment Part I .................................................................................................................. 185 
Table 10-17: Selected wireless transceivers and networks to be irradiated in Experiment Part 
II ............................................................................................................................................ 190 
Table 10-18: Survival times and radiation resistances of irradiated wireless devices under a 
high dose rate condition in Experiment PART II ................................................................. 200 
Table 10-19: Experimental results of communication performance of ZigBee devices and 
network used in Experiment Part II ...................................................................................... 202 
Table 10-20: Summary of communication performance of ISA100.11a devices and network 
used in Experiment Part II .................................................................................................... 202 
Table 10-21: Experimental results of communication performance of WirelessHART devices 
and network used in Experiment Part I ................................................................................. 203 
Table 10-22: Experimental results of communication performance of LoRa devices and 
network used in Experiment Part II ...................................................................................... 203 
Table 10-23: Summary of communication performance of 433MHz devices and network 
used in Experiment Part II. ................................................................................................... 204 
Table 10-24: Experimental results of communication performances of 915MHz devices and 
network used in Experiment Part II. ..................................................................................... 204 
Table 10-25: Summary of irradiated monitoring devices used in Experiment Part III ........ 209 
Table 10-26: Results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for non-
redundant wireless devices under a normal condition .......................................................... 214 
Table 10-27: Results of experimental evaluation of communication performance for non-
redundant wireless devices under a normal condition .......................................................... 215 
Table 10-28: Results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for non-
redundant wireless devices under a high dose rate condition ............................................... 216 
Table 10-29: Results of experimental evaluation of communication performance for non-
redundant wireless devices under a high dose rate condition ............................................... 217 
Table 10-30: Results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for non-
redundant wireless devices under a low dose rate condition ................................................ 218 
Table 10-31: Results of experimental evaluation of communication performance for non-
redundant wireless devices under a low dose rate condition ................................................ 219 
Table 10-32: Survival times of non-redundant wireless monitoring devices under both high 
and low dose rate conditions ................................................................................................. 223 
Table 10-33: Wireless devices used in Experiment Part IV ................................................. 228 
Table 10-34: Summary of semiconductor components used in irradiated devices in 
Experiment Part IV. .............................................................................................................. 228 
Table 10-35: Survival time and radiation hardness of the irradiated wireless devices ......... 232 
Table 10-36: The status of each channel in the developed redundant device after irradiated 21 
hours under a high dose rate condition ................................................................................. 233 
Table 10-37: Comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-1 under 
different exposure and radiation conditions .......................................................................... 233 
Table 10-38: Comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-2 under 
different exposure and radiation conditions .......................................................................... 234 
Table 10-39: Comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-3 under 
different exposure and radiation conditions .......................................................................... 235 
Table A-1: The implementation of the hardware emulation platform .................................. 296 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1-1: A potential wireless monitoring system for high level radiation environments in a 
nuclear power plant ................................................................................................................... 2 
Figure 1-2: An overview of major aspects in this research ...................................................... 6 
Figure 1-3: The framework of investigated methods and systems in this research .................. 7 
Figure 1-4: The investigated radiation-tolerant techniques in this research ........................... 11 
Figure 2-1: Radiation effects on electronics devices. ............................................................. 19 
Figure 2-2: The effects of ionizing radiation in SiO2 (Adell and Scheick, 2013; Srour and 
McGarrity, 1988) ..................................................................................................................... 22 
Figure 2-3: The effect of ionizing radiation on the gate oxide in an n-channel MOSFET 
(Oldham and McLean, 2003) .................................................................................................. 22 
Figure 2-4: The physical mechanism of single event effects (Baumann, 2005) ..................... 24 
Figure 2-5: Abstraction levels of electronic system ............................................................... 29 
Figure 2-6: Methods of rad-hardened design techniques ........................................................ 30 
Figure 3-1: The layout of p-n geometry (Alexander, 2003) ................................................... 49 
Figure 3-2: Flow diagram of the developed analysis method ................................................. 56 
Figure 3-3: Companion model of diode for post-irradiation .................................................. 57 
Figure 3-4: Companion model of NPN BJT for post-irradiation ............................................ 59 
Figure 3-5: The simulation structure of the ideal p-n diode in TCAD ................................... 62 
Figure 3-6: Photo-current response of an ideal p-n diode under forward bias in TCAD ....... 63 
Figure 3-7: Photo-current response of an ideal p-n diode under reverse bias in TCAD ........ 65 
Figure 4-1: Radiation tolerance by a family of COTS components (Houssay, 2000) ............ 70 
Figure 4-2: Radiation degradation functions derived from Lauridsen, et al., 1996b .............. 72 
Figure 5-1: Reduction of total radiation dose by shielding protection ................................... 77 
Figure 5-2: Design framework for multi-layer radiation protection ....................................... 80 
Figure 5-3: The layout of the multi-layer shielding protection. .............................................. 81 
Figure 5-4: An attenuation of gamma radiation under conditions of narrow geometry 
(Gollnick, 2011) ...................................................................................................................... 82 
Figure 5-5: Gamma radiation attenuation under conditions of broad beam geometry 
(Gollnick, 2011) ...................................................................................................................... 83 
Figure 6-1: The schematic of reconfigurator (a) power reconfigurator (b) bus reconfigurator
................................................................................................................................................. 93 
Figure 6-2: Hierarchical fault model for electronic systems .................................................. 96 
Figure 6-3: The proposed radiation-tolerant architecture ..................................................... 100 
Figure 6-4: The flowchart of master selection mechanism ................................................... 101 
Figure 6-5: The block diagram of the decision making unit ................................................. 102 
Figure 6-6: The flowchart of the decision making in TMRi ................................................. 103 
Figure 6-7: The architecture of the developed hardware emulation bench .......................... 107 
Figure 7-1: The framework of the fault detection and diagnosis method ............................. 112 
Figure 7-2: Hierarchical fault model for electronic systems ................................................ 112 
Figure 7-3: The block diagram of detection logical allocation ............................................. 119 
Figure 7-4: Voltage levels of a circuit block under the fault state ........................................ 119 
Figure 7-5: The flowchart of fault detection loop ................................................................. 122 
Figure 7-6: The flowchart of fault diagnosis function .......................................................... 123 
Figure 8-1: A potential wireless monitoring system for high level radiation environments in a 
nuclear power plant ............................................................................................................... 133 
Figure 8-2: The framework of the developed radiation-tolerant wireless device ................. 134 
Figure 8-3: The TMR core of the proposed wireless communication system (Proakis and 
Salehi, 2008) ......................................................................................................................... 135 
Figure 8-4: Picture of radiation-tolerant wireless device developed in this work ................ 136 
Figure 8-5: Picture of radiation shielding protection developed in this work ...................... 136 
Figure 8-6: The block diagram of the gateway device developed in this research ............... 139 
Figure 8-7: Picture of gateway device developed in this research........................................ 140 
Figure 8-8: Picture of the shielding for gateway device developed in this research ............ 140 
Figure 8-9: The overview of remote monitoring station developed in this research ............ 141 
Figure 8-10: Picture of the remote monitoring station used in this research ........................ 141 
Figure 8-11: Picture of portable monitoring device used in this research ............................ 142 
Figure 8-12: Picture of a monitoring software tool developed in this research .................... 142 
Figure 9-1: The compassion of the reliability of the developed redundant system and no-
redundant channels under the given total doses (0, 10 K Rad (Si), 20 K Rad (Si), 50 K Rad 
(Si), and 100 K Rad (Si)) ...................................................................................................... 152 
Figure 9-2: Radiation assessment of the developed wireless device under various dose rates
............................................................................................................................................... 153 
Figure 10-1: Composition of a digital communication system (Proakis and Salehi, 2008) . 157 
Figure 10-2: A block diagram of the implementation of a typical wireless transmission 
system ................................................................................................................................... 157 
Figure 10-3: An overview of the experimental validation in this research ........................... 159 
Figure 10-4: The Co-60 gamma irradiator dose-rate curve (OSU-NRL, 2018) ................... 162 
Figure 10-5: Sample plate and shielding of 60Co gamma irradiator (OSU-NRL, 2018) ...... 163 
Figure 10-6: Schematic of the experimental setup inside 60Co irradiator ............................. 164 
Figure 10-7: Irradiated circuits of analog signal processing in Experiment Part I ............... 166 
Figure 10-8: Pictures of electronic circuit boards for analog signal processing used in 
Experiment Part I .................................................................................................................. 167 
Figure 10-9: Pictures of electronic circuits for microcontroller modules used in Experiment 
PART I .................................................................................................................................. 168 
Figure 10-10: Picture of electronic circuits for wireless transceiver modules using in 
Experiment Part I .................................................................................................................. 169 
Figure 10-11: Picture of experimental setup in Experiment Part I ....................................... 169 
Figure 10-12: Radiation responses of analog signal processing circuits during 390 minutes 
under a high dose rate condition ........................................................................................... 172 
Figure 10-13: Radiation responses of analog-to-digital converter modules during 390 minutes 
under a high dose rate condition ........................................................................................... 175 
Figure 10-14: Pictures of the developed devices to measure the performance of irradiated 
wireless transceivers using in Experiment Part I .................................................................. 181 
Figure 10-15: Comparison of wireless signal performance of three wireless devices used in 
Experiment Part I .................................................................................................................. 183 
Figure 10-16: Estimated radiation resistances for irradiated simples testing used in 
Experiment Part I .................................................................................................................. 186 
Figure 10-18: Irradiated wireless devices used in Experiment Part II .................................. 190 
Figure 10-19: Typical Star topology of ZigBee network for industrial application (Wang and 
Jiang, 2016) ........................................................................................................................... 191 
Figure 10-20: ZigBee devices used in Experiment Part II .................................................... 192 
Figure 10-21: WirelessHART network for industrial applications (Wang and Jiang, 2016) 192 
Figure 10-22: WirelessHART devices used in Experiment PART II ................................... 193 
Figure 10-23: Menu of displaying value of chosen sensor in HART Server........................ 194 
Figure 10-24: ISA100.11a network for industrial applications (Wang and Jiang, 2016). .... 194 
Figure 10-25: Pictures of ISA100.11a devices used in Experiment PART II ...................... 195 
Figure 10-26: Web application installed in ISA100.11a Gateway ....................................... 196 
Figure 10-27: Typical structure of LoRa network in industrial application (Centenaro et al., 
2016) ..................................................................................................................................... 196 
Figure 10-28: Pictures of gateway for LoRa, 433 MHz & 915MHz networks using in 
Experiment PART II ............................................................................................................. 197 
Figure 10-29: Typical structure of point-to-point network ................................................... 197 
Figure 10-29: Experimental setup for 2.4 GHz wireless networks used in Experiment Part II
............................................................................................................................................... 198 
Figure 10-30: Experimental setup for LoRa, 433MHz, and 915MHz wireless devices and 
networks used in Experiment Part II ..................................................................................... 199 
Figure 10-31: The developed software tool to collect wireless messages and analyze the 
communication performance used in Experiment PART II ................................................. 200 
Figure 10-32: Radiation resistances of six industrial wireless transceivers and networks used 
in Experiment Part III ........................................................................................................... 201 
Figure 10-33: Block diagram of three diversified single-channel wireless monitoring units208 
Figure 10-34: Picture of experimental setup used in Experimental Part III ......................... 210 
Figure 10-35: An overview of experimental setup used in Experimental Part III ................ 210 
Figure 10-36: Picture of the developed wireless receiver used in Experiment Part III ........ 211 
Figure 10-37: Interface of the developed software tool to receive and to record wireless data 
used in Experiment Part III. .................................................................................................. 212 
Figure 10-38: Pictures of the device before-irradiated and after-irradiated ......................... 213 
Figure 10-39: Comparison of measurement accuracy of non-redundant wireless devices 
under three different radiation conditions ............................................................................. 220 
Figure 10-40: Comparison of communication performance of non-redundant wireless devices 
under three different radiation conditions ............................................................................. 221 
Figure 10-41: Comparison of wireless signal performance of non-redundant wireless devices 
under different radiation conditions ...................................................................................... 222 
Figure 10-42: Top view of the shielding protection in Experiment Part IV ......................... 229 
Figure 10-43: Irradiated samples used in experiment part IV .............................................. 230 
Figure 10-44: Experimental setup for the non-redundant wireless devices used in Experiment 
Part IV ................................................................................................................................... 231 
Figure 10-45: Experimental setup for the redundant wireless device used in Experiment Part 
IV .......................................................................................................................................... 231 
Figure 10-46: Radiation resistances of irradiated wireless devices used in Experiment Part IV
............................................................................................................................................... 232 
Figure 10-47: Comparison of communication performance of Sample-1(S1) and Sample-
4(S4) under a high dose rate condition ................................................................................. 236 
Figure 10-48: Comparison of communication of Sample-2(S2) and Sample-4(S4) under a 
high dose rate condition ........................................................................................................ 236 
Figure A-1: The architecture of the developed hardware emulation bench. ......................... 294 
Figure A-2: Picture of the developed hardware emulation bench ........................................ 295 
Figure A-3: Screen shot of the software tool in the control computer .................................. 296 
 
List of Appendices 
Appendix A: Hardware Emulation Bench ............................................................................ 294 
 
List of Symbols 
Chapter 3: 
𝑞 : Electron charge = 1.602 × 10−19 
𝑘: Boltzmann constant = 1.381 × 10−23 
𝑔0: the uniform generation term = 4.3 × 10
13 
𝑢𝑛, 𝑢𝑝: electron and hole mobility  
𝜏𝑛, 𝜏𝑝: electron and hole lifetime  
𝑇: temperature 
?̇?: the ionizing dose rate 
𝐺: electron-hole generation rate 𝐺 = 𝑔0?̇? 
𝐸𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙: E field in the depletion region  
𝐸𝑛, 𝐸𝑝: E field in the n-side region and in the p-side region  
𝐷𝑛, 𝐷𝑝: the electron diffusion coefficient in n-side and the hole diffusion coefficient in p-side  
𝑈𝑛, 𝑈𝑝: recombination rate  𝑈𝑛 =
∆𝑛
𝜏𝑛⁄ , 𝑈𝑝 =
∆𝑝
𝜏𝑝⁄  
∆𝑛(𝑥, 𝑡): electrons generated by ionization per unit volume = 𝑛(𝑥, 𝑡) −  𝑛(𝑥, 0) 
∆𝑝(𝑥, 𝑡): holes generated by ionization per unit volume = 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑡) −  𝑝(𝑥, 0) 
𝑊𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙: the depletion region width  
𝐿𝑛, 𝐿𝑝: the diffusion length in n-side silicon and p-side silicon  
𝑥𝑛, 𝑥𝑝: the length of n-side, p-side  
Chapter 4: 
∆: radiation degradation factor under the total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 
𝑃0: the value of a characteristic parameter before exposure 
𝑃𝑡: the value of the characteristic parameter after a total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 
𝑃𝑓: the value of the characteristic parameter at failure with a total radiation dose 𝐷𝑓 
Chapter 5: 
𝑢: the attenuation coefficient of shielding material 
𝑝: the density of shielding material 
𝑑: the shielding material thickness 
𝐼: the intensity of the radiation after passing the shielding thickness 𝑑 
𝐼0: the original intensity 
𝐵: the build-up factor, is greater than 1 
𝐸: the energy of the gamma radiation 
Chapter 6: 
𝐴𝑖: the state of the ith channel, corresponding to its powered (active) state and no power state 
(no active) 
𝑆𝑖: the state of the ith spare channel, corresponding to its powered (active) state and no power 
state (no active) 
𝐹𝐴𝑖: the state of 𝐴𝑖 channel 
𝐹𝑆𝑖: the state of 𝑆𝑖 channel 
𝑅𝑆𝑖 , 𝑅𝑀𝑖: reconfigure suggestions 
𝐻: fault hypothesis 
𝐸𝑛(𝐻): detection function 
𝑃: prognostic hypothesis 
𝐸𝑛(𝑃): prognostic function 
Chapter 7: 
𝑑𝑖: the state of the ith component 
𝑐𝑗: the state of the jth circuit block of the electronic equipment 
𝑠𝑘: the state of the kth subsystem of the electronic equipment 
𝑅𝑑𝑐: the relation from set 𝐷 to set 𝐶 
𝑅𝑐𝑠: the relation from set 𝐶 to set 𝑆 
𝑋: the space of all inputs to an analog circuit 
𝑥: the input of an analog circuit, 𝑥 𝜖 𝑋 
𝑓(𝑋): the output of an analog circuit 
𝐹(𝑋): design goal of the analog circuit 
𝐸(𝑋): error of the under-design circuit with the input 𝑥 
𝑁: the sample number 
𝐾: Kth run of the algorithm 
𝑋𝑁: the sample space of 𝑋 
𝑖: redundant circuit i 
𝑗: redundant circuit j 
𝐶𝑜𝑟(𝑖, 𝑗): the correlation between redundancy circuits i and j 
Chapter 8: 
𝑅(𝑡): reliability of an item at time 𝑡  
𝑅𝑖𝑗(𝑡): reliability of the 𝑗th layer in the channel 𝑖 at time 𝑡  
𝑅𝐶𝑖(𝑡): reliability of the channel 𝑖 at time 𝑡  
𝑅𝑆(𝑡): reliability of the proposed system at time 𝑡  
𝑅′(𝑡): reliability of an item at time 𝑡 under total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 
𝑅′𝑖𝑗(𝑡): reliability of the 𝑗th layer in the channel 𝑖 at time 𝑡 under total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 
𝑅′𝐶𝑖(𝑡): reliability of the channel 𝑖 at time 𝑡 under total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 
𝑅′𝑆(𝑡): reliability of the proposed system at time 𝑡 under total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 
𝑚: the number of redundant channels in the system 
𝜆: the failure rate of an item 
𝜆𝑖𝑗: the failure rate of the 𝑗th layer in channel 𝑖 
𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑘: the failure rate of 𝑘th component of the 𝑗th layer in channel 𝑖 
∆: radiation degradation factor under total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 
𝑃0: the value of the characteristic parameter before exposure 
𝑃𝑡: the value of the characteristic parameter after a total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 
𝑃𝑓: the value of the characteristic parameter at failure under total radiation dose 𝐷𝑓 
 
Nomenclature 
ADC: analog-to-digital converter 
AMS: accident monitoring system 
ANN: artificial neutral network 
ATREE: analog transient radiation effect on electronics 
BCA: binary collision approximation 
BIST: built-in self-test 
BJT: bipolar junction transistor 
CBR: case-based reasoning 
CCD: charge-coupled device 
CMOS: complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor 
COTS: commercial of-the-shelf 
DAC: digital-to-analog converter 
DCC: differential charge cancellation 
DD: displacement damage 
DICE: dual interlocked storage cell 
DMR: dual modular redundancy 
EA: evolutionary algorithm 
ECC: error correcting code 
EDAC: error detection and correction 
EHPS: electron-hole-pairs 
EMI: electromagnetic interference 
ENCF: evolutionary negative-correlation framework 
EPRI: electric power research institute 
ERD: evolutionary-robust-design 
FDD: fault detection and diagnosis 
FET: field-effect transistor 
FH: fault hypothesis 
FinFET: fin field-effect transistor 
FIT: failure in time 
FPGA: field-programmable gate array 
GA: genetic algorithm 
GEANT: geometry and tracking 
GP: genetic programming 
HBT: heterojunction bipolar transistor 
HEMT: high electron mobility transistor 
IC: integrated circuit 
I&C: instrumentation and control 
IEAE: international nuclear and radiological event scale 
IEC: international electro-technical commission 
IGBT: insulated-gate bipolar transistor 
IRT: intel radiation tool 
JFET: junction field-effect transistor 
LET: linear energy transfer 
ML: machine learning 
MNA: modified nodal analysis 
MOS: metal-oxide-semiconductor 
MOSFET: metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistor 
MRAM: magnetic random access memory 
MRED: Monte Carlo radiative energy deposition 
MTJ: magnetic tunnel junction 
MULASSIS: multi-layered shielding simulation software 
MUSCA SEP3: multi-scale single event phenomena predictive platform 
NIEL: nonionizing energy loss 
NMOS: negative-channel metal-oxide semiconductor 
NPP: nuclear power plant 
NRC: nuclear regulatory commission 
OLM: online monitoring system 
PAMS: post-accident monitoring system 
PHITS: particle and heavy ion transport code system 
PMOS: positive-channel metal-oxide semiconductor 
RAM: random access memory 
RBR: rule-based reasoning 
RFI: radio frequency interference 
RHA: radiation-hardness assurance 
RHBD: radiation-hardened by design 
ROM: read-only memory 
SAM: severe accident management 
SDRAM: synchronous dynamic random-access memory 
SEB: single event burnout 
SEE: single event effect 
SEFI: single event functional interrupt 
SEGR: single event gate rupture 
SEL: single event latchup 
SES: single event snapback 
SET: single event transient 
SETTOFF: soft-error and timing-error-tolerant flip-flop 
SEU: single event upset 
SOI: silicon on insulator 
SOS: silicon on sapphire 
SRAM: static random access memory 
SRH: Shockley-Reed-Hall 
TCAD: technology computer aided design 
TIARA: tool suite for radiation reliability assessment 
TID: total ionizing dose 
TILL: triple inter-locked latch 
TMR: triple modular redundancy 
SRIM: stopping and range of ions in matter 
VHDL-AMS: VHSIC hardware description language 




Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In 2011, Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was triggered by a 9.0 magnitude earthquake 
and subsequent tsunami; and released a large quantity of radioactive substances to the 
environment because of multiple hydrogen explosions and fire damage to the 
containments of the facilities. One of the lessons learnt from the Fukushima disaster is 
the difficulty to obtain up-to-date information about the plant after the accident due to 
lack of monitoring systems, harsh radiation environment, and lose of on-site power. In the 
event of an accident in nuclear power plants (NPPs), essential information about the 
status of the plant is crucial to plant operators and emergency response teams to 
effectively manage and mitigate the effects of accident. The important variables of 
interests are temperature, humidity, hydrogen concentration, and radiation levels in the 
environment. It is also important to gather information about the conditions of protection 
systems, such as water level in a spent fuel pool, and coolant inventory, etc. However, it 
is very difficult and unsafe for plant operators to get such information manually since a 
high level of nuclear radiation can ionize molecules, interact with matter, and cause 
severe biological damage to humans. Moreover, conventional accident monitoring 
systems (AMSs) in nuclear power plants usually use wired networks, which may no 
longer be available after the accident, or require rewiring or reconfiguration. After 
Fukushima disaster, some military robots, such as PackBot, T-Hawk, and Moni-Robo, 
were eventually used to measure radiation levels, temperature, levels of radioactive 
material, and also to take some photographs to inspect the damage, but they cannot be for 
multipurpose use because of issues from radiation effects, mobility, and communication 
(Nagatani et al., 2012). The damage from Fukushima disaster is so severe that the special 
equipment and new technologies have to be developed to deal with the harsh 
environment conditions during decommissioning processes of the plant. 
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As an integral part of Severe Accident Management (SAM) systems, nuclear power plant 
regulatory bodies now request NPPs to have some forms of Post-Accident Monitoring 
Systems (PAMSs) available on-site. Considering scenarios of potentially losing on-site 
power and other wired communication channels, during a severe accident, a potential 
approach to deal with similar situations is to use wireless technologies to implement post-
accident monitoring system (PAMS), as shown in Figure 1-1, which can provide much 
needed information about the plant conditions, reactor integrity, and environment in the 
vicinity of the NPP without relying on likely damaged communication infrastructure. 
However, wireless systems are often made of semiconductor devices, which are 
particularly sensitive to high level ionizing radiation. A high level radiation can modify 
electrical parameters of a semiconductor device, and worsen its electrical characteristics, 
which may lead to functional failure and physical damage. Therefore, the operating 
environment has posed severe challenges for WPAMSs. Radiation-hardened (rad-
hardened) techniques have to be used to design and to protect electronic devices inside 
WPAMSs to make them more resistant to high level of radiation.  
 
Figure 1-1: A potential wireless monitoring system for high level radiation 
environments in a nuclear power plant 
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One approach to alleviate such a problem is to employ rad-hardened components in such 
systems. Preliminary investigation reveals, however, that this approach can be 
prohibitively expensive due to special semiconductor materials used, complexity in 
manufacturing processes, and most of all, small size of the market supporting such 
devices. Furthermore, these rad-hardened devices may not be able to meet the modern 
requirements for high speed processing, large memory storage, and ultra-low power 
consumption. Another approach is to rely on regular commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
devices, but to utilize rad-hardened techniques to reduce the vulnerability of radiation 
effects on electronics and to prolong the life of the system during the mission of the 
deployment. Despite tremendous progress of rad-hardened design techniques in the past 
few decades, to implement an effective wireless monitoring systems for a severe accident 
in a NPP can still face several issues, such as: 
(1) Analysis of radiation responses of devices and circuits is important also necessary 
to design circuits to be robust to ionizing radiation effects and to accurately 
analyze their behavior under high level radiation fields. However, modeling 
techniques may suffer from accuracy issues in those applications with a wide 
range of ionizing radiation intensities. On the other hand, numerical modeling 
techniques is too complicated extremely time consuming, and requires a large 
amount of engineering works to obtain sufficient information of technological 
features. 
(2) With simulation studies of photocurrent responses of semiconductor devices 
under different levels of ionizing radiation, if the power on the junction can be 
removed quickly in an event of radiation exposure, a semiconductor device might 
not be damaged permanently by the accumulated photocurrent. Fault-tolerant 
techniques, combined with error detection, timely fault detection, and rapid 
recovery/repair, have been used to protect safety-critical systems and applied to a 
range of situations. However, existing fault-tolerant techniques and systems 
usually have three redundant modules and/or the duplication of important circuits 
and subsystems to realize majority voters, or use additional detectors to diagnose 
faults. These additional units and voters not only increase system complexity, but 
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are themselves usually non-redundant and subject to damage by ionizing radiation 
also. Hence they represent a major weakness in the system and as such should 
also be protected. A radiation-tolerant architecture with independent redundancy, 
online fault detection, real-time preventive remedial actions, and rapid power loss 
/ recovery, as well as avoid the common-mode damage, is not only important, but 
also necessary for the design of COTS-based rad-hardened systems. Key issues to 
achieve this objective include:  
• How to protect the device against potential damages as a result of total 
ionizing dose;  
• How to achieve completely independent redundant architecture without 
additional detection units and/or hardware voters;  
• How to avoid common-mode damages and/or multi-damages on redundant 
channels;  
• How to implement mechanisms of online fault detection, real-time 
preventive remedial actions, and mechanisms of rapid power removal;  
• How to detect radiation damages in redundant systems timely without 
addition measurement units and hardware voters;  
(3) Radiation-tolerance assessment of the developed electronic system is a critical 
part in the design phase of rad-hardened electronic systems. In general, the 
performance of rad-hardened systems can be evaluated in two ways: physical tests 
and simulation with analysis. However, physical test is very precise but could be 
excessively complicated and expensive. On the other hand, limitations of 
simulation with analysis are that it is difficult to assess the radiation-tolerance of 
the whole system precisely. 
Therefore, it is not only important but also necessary to investigate new rad-hardened 
analysis and design methodologies to achieve rad-hardened electronic systems by using 
regular COTS components. It is also beneficial to use these new approaches to design 
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self-powered and rad-hardened wireless monitoring systems for high level radiation 
environments after an accident in NPPs. 
1.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this research are listed as follows:  
(1) To investigate alternative ways to analyze, design, evaluate, and validate 
radiation-tolerant electronic systems by using commercial off-the-shelf 
components; and  
(2) To apply the proposed methodologies to design, implement, and validate a 
wireless monitoring system for high level of radiation environments in nuclear 
power plants after a severe accident. 
An overview of major aspects dealt with in this research is given in Figure 1-2, which 
starts with top-level estimations of the radiation condition, and then after the considered 
radiation-level is defined, related defense techniques are proposed and designed, 




Figure 1-2: An overview of major aspects in this research 
1.3 Investigated Methods and Systems 
Based on major aspects in this research as illustrated in Figure 1-2, a possible framework 
of investigated methods and systems is illustrated in Figure 1-3, which includes literature 
survey, analysis of radiation responses, design of radiation-tolerant systems, 

































the developed radiation-tolerant devices, and irradiation experimental validation. It can 
be seen in Figure 1-3 that the framework has covered the previously discussed issues.  
 
Figure 1-3: The framework of investigated methods and systems in this research 
The following methods and systems are studied in this research to achieve the proposed 
objectives: 
(1) Survey: A great variety of radiation-hardened methods have been studied for a 
wide range of applications, such as in the aeronautics and space sectors, accident 
conditions in nuclear power plants, and military scenarios. Some techniques and 
methods related to this research have been investigated, which include radiation 
effects on electronics; rad-hardened design techniques from device-level, circuit-
level, and system-level; as well as modeling techniques and computer simulation 
methods. 
(2) Analysis: combining a semi-empirical technique and a numerical technique, a 
method is investigated to analyze ionizing radiation responses of devices and 
circuits, which can be separated into three steps: models of semiconductor devices 
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devices are calculated by using Technology Computer Aided Design (TCAD) 
simulator; radiation-induced circuit responses can be analyzed through the 
modified nodal analysis (MNA) circuit equations. 
(3) Design: several defense techniques are investigated to protect against radiation 
effects and to prolong the lifespan of electronic systems in this research. They are: 
• (Total ionizing dose hardening) A multi-layer protection and a method of 
component selection are designed to reduce the level of total dose and to 
allow regular commercial components to be used in high level radiation 
environments.  
• (Single event effect hardening) A radiation-tolerant architecture is 
investigated to mitigate damages of single event effects and to allow 
COTS components to be used in high level radiation environments. 
Redundancy, radiation-tolerant design techniques, and diversify 
techniques are also investigated. 
• (Single event effect hardening) An online detection mechanism is 
investigated to timely identify/locate radiation damages in redundant 
systems. 
(4) Implementation: using the proposed defense techniques, a monitoring system for 
radiation conditions in a nuclear power plant is developed to obtain up-to-date 
environment information. The system includes radiation-tolerant wireless 
detectors, gateway device, portable monitoring device, and remote monitoring 
station.  
(5) Evaluation: several emulation methods have been built to evaluate the correctness 
of the proposed radiation-tolerant methods and techniques through the techniques 
of fault injection. A hardware emulation test bench is developed to validate the 
proposed redundant architecture and the developed fault detection method 
through hardware- and software-implemented fault injection techniques. On the 
other hand, an assessment method is investigated to evaluate radiation-tolerance 
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of electronic systems without repeated physical tests. This can be separated to two 
parts: evaluation of radiation protection and reliability assessment. This method 
uses radiation degradation factors(∆), instead of the usual failure rate data of an 
item in the reliability model, as input to describe the radiation response of this 
item under a total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡. 
(6) Validation: a number of total dose tests are performed to investigate the radiation 
resistance of the developed wireless devices and to evaluate the performance of 
the developed wireless monitoring systems with 60Co gamma irradiator, as well as 
to validate the proposed radiation-tolerant design.  
1.4 Research Scope 
As previously mentioned, unlike other industrial accidents, accidents in a nuclear power 
plant can be associated with potential release of radioactive substances, which can cause 
severe damages to electronic devices at nearby site. One critical issue is therefore how to 
design wireless monitoring devices that can tolerate the strong radiation. In generally, a 
radioactive environment after a severe accident in a nuclear power plant can be 
characterized as follows: 
(1) Radiation environments: Alpha particles, Beta particles, Gamma rays, x-rays, and 
neutron particles (Adalja et al., 2011; Sharp and Decreton, 1996); 
(2) Radiation effects on electronics: total ionizing dose, single event effects, and 
displacement damage. 
The total dose is an important aspect consideration for electronic systems in radiation 
environments. Considering short-term radioactive release (less than 24 hours) in each 
stage of a nuclear accident (CODIRPA, 2012), it is assumed that the proposed WPAMS 
has to survive the first 24 hours of the accident. Taking the highest dose rate of radiation 
in the Fukushima accident (530 Sv/h) as the radiation rate (theguardian, 2017), the total 
radiation dose after the first 24 hours can be obtained as follows: 
).(0.12721272024/530 SiRadKSvhhSvR ===  
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In the field of radiation protection, Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) is often used to 
determinate the design specifications of electronics and materials of a space system, 
whose categories are presented on Table 1-1 (Hash et al., 1997). The RHA is an important 
reference as radiation level considered, which is also used in the current research. 
Table 1-1: Radiation hardness assurance categories for space systems 
RHA category M D P L R F G H 
TID (K Rad(Si)) 3 10 30 50 100 300 500 1000 
 
Combing with the estimation total dose (1.272 M Rad (Si)) in 24 hours and RHA 
specification, total radiation dose (1 M Rad (Si)) – Class H is therefore considered as the 
upper limit of radiation in this work. Those cases whose total radiation doses are more 
than 1 M Rad (Si) are not considered in this work. 
Investigations of rad-hardened design techniques in this research are limited within the 
following scopes: 
(1) This research only deals with damages by ionizing radiation, displacement 
damages are beyond of this research. 
(2) Total dose is limited as 1 M Rad (Si), those applications whose total doses are 
more than 1 M Rad (Si) are not considered. 
(3) This research focuses on rad-hardened by design by using regular COTS 
components. Using rad-hardened components (device-level) to achieve high 
radiation-tolerance is not considered. 
With knowledge of damage mechanisms, the current approach combines techniques of 
rad-tolerant design, multi-layer shielding, and diversified component selection to achieve 




Figure 1-4: The investigated radiation-tolerant techniques in this research 
1.5 Contributions 
The contributions of this research can be summarized as follows:  
(1) Investigation of a method to analyze and to emulate responses of semiconductor 
devices and circuit in high level radiation fields.  
(2) Development of a multi-layer radiation protection technique, which can reduce 
the given total dose from 1 M Rad (Si) to be less than 20 K Rad (Si). 
(3) Development of a radiation-tolerant architecture, which can be used to mitigate 
single event effects on electronic systems through redundancy, online fault 
detection, real-time preventive remedial actions, and rapid power off. 
(4) Development of an online detection and diagnostic approach to identify/locate 
damages in redundant systems timely in radiation environments. 
(5) Proposed method to assess the radiation-tolerance of electronic systems without 
going through repeated destructive physical tests. 
(6) Design and commissioning of a wireless monitoring system to obtain up-to-date 
information from a simulated NPP environment under radiation environments. 
Cumulative Effects Single Event Effects 
Non-destructive Effects Destructive Effects 
Beyond the 





diversified hardware  
 
Redundancy, system reset, 
fault detection  
Rapid power-off, redundancy, fault 
detection, prognostic for the component 
lifespan  
Rapid power-off, redundancy, fault-
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(7) Development of an irradiation test to validate the investigated radiation-tolerant 
methods and the designed systems. 
1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: 
• A literature survey on radiation effects on electronics, rad-hardened design 
techniques, and modeling and simulation techniques, is carried out in Chapter 2. 
• The method to analyze and emulate radiation responses of semiconductor devices 
and circuits is presented in Chapter 3. 
• The investigation of radiation-tolerance of regular COTS components and the 
principles of component selection used in this work are explained in Chapter 4. 
• The developed multi-layer radiation protection is described in Chapter 5, which is 
to reduce the level of total dose and to avoid the common-mode damage in 
redundant systems. 
• The proposed radiation-tolerant architecture is analyzed in Chapter 6 to mitigate 
damages of single event effects and to prolong the lifespan of the system. 
• The online method to detect and to diagnose radiation damages in devices and 
circuits is investigated in Chapter 7. 
• The implementation of a wireless monitoring system for radiation environments 
comparable to that of Fukushima accident is given in Chapter 8, which includes 
the development of wireless detectors, gateway device, portable monitoring 
device, remote monitoring station, and monitoring software. 
• An analysis method to evaluate the radiation resistance of electronic systems 
without going through physical tests is provided in Chapter 9. 
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• A number of total dose tests to investigate radiation tolerance of the developed 
wireless monitoring devices are carried out in Chapter 10, as well as to validate 
the proposed radiation-tolerant methods.  
• Conclusions are drawn in Chapter 11, alone with some directions for future 
works. 
• Details about the implementation of the hardware emulation bench are 
summarized in Appendix. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Literature Survey 
In the past several decades, a great variety of radiation-hardened methods have been 
studied for a wide range of applications, such as in aeronautics and deep space sector 
exploration, nuclear warfare, nuclear power plants in the event of an accident. Following 
the review of radiation-hardened methods and techniques, a survey of radiation effects on 
electronic devices is presented in this Chapter. Furthermore, rad-hardened design and 
analysis techniques are also discussed for enhancing in the survivability of electronic 
systems in strong radiation environments. More specifically, post-accident environments 
in nuclear power plants (NPPs) and industry standards and related regulatory guides for 
wireless post-accident monitoring system (PAMS) are also reviewed in this Chapter.   
2.1 Background of Severe Accidents in NPPs 
2.1.1 Industry Standards for PAMS in NPPs 
After the Three Mile Island accident, the following three main standards for accident 
monitoring systems have been developed in the United States: 
(1) ANSI/ANS-4.5-1980 “Criteria for accident monitoring functions in light-water-
cooled reactors”, which provides requirements on the selection and measurement 
variables (ANSI, 1980); 
(2) IEEE Std. 497-1981 “IEEE standard criteria for accident monitoring 
instrumentation for nuclear power generating stations”, which provides the design 
criteria for the relevant instrumentation (IEEE, 1981); 
and (3) Regulatory Guide 1.97 (rev. 3, May 1983) “Instrumentation for light-water-
cooled nuclear power plants to assess plant and environs conditions during and 
following an accident”, which prescribes a detailed list of measurement variables and 
provides a comprehensive list of design and qualification criteria (NRC, 1983). 
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The integration of the above three standards is done in IEEE Std. 497-2002 with more 
functions and the criteria for variable selections (IEEE, 2002). Subsequently, variable 
selection, design, performance, and qualification and display criteria for accident 
monitoring instrumentation in NPPs are established in IEEE Std. 497-2010 (IEEE, 2010). 
IEEE Std. 497-2016 is considered to be the most recent standard and it provides more 
current guidance by enhancing existing standards and guidance (IEEE, 2016). 
2.1.2 Design Issues of Wireless Monitoring Systems for Severe 
Accidents in NPPs 
The mission of the wireless post-accident monitoring system is to obtain essential 
information about the status of the plant, which is crucial to plant operators and 
emergency response teams to effectively manage and mitigate the effects of accident. To 
achieve this mission, the following issues may need to be considered and investigated: 
(1) EMI/RFI issues  
Under a normal condition, applications of wireless technologies have been restricted in 
existing NPPs partially because of the vulnerability of existing I&C systems to 
electromagnetic interference and radio frequency interferences (EMI/RFI) emitted 
wireless devices  (Ko and Lee, 2013). On the other hand, in the event of a severe 
accident, the plant is shut down; EMI/RFI is therefore no longer an issue. 
(2) Radiation hardness 
Unlike other industrial accidents, the levels of radiation after a severe accident can be 
high enough to cause severe damages to electronic devices. Therefore, the radiation-
tolerance of such monitoring devices needs to be considered (Nagatani et al., 2012). 
(3) Communication issues 
The reactor buildings constructed by concrete walls to shield radiation particles will also 
block wireless communication signals. Therefore, the quality of signal reception inside 
reactor buildings needs to be investigated and to ensure reliable communication 
(Nagatani et al., 2012). 
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(4) Variables of Interests 
The variables of interests under a severe accident are temperature, humidity, hydrogen 
concentration, and radiation levels of the environment, etc. It is also important to gather 
information about the conditions of protection systems, such as water level in a spent fuel 
pool, and coolant inventory, etc. Therefore, measurement variables need to be 
investigated according to IEEE 497 standard, as well as desirable locations of the related 
sensors (IEEE, 2016). 
(5) Other issues 
There are also several other crucial issues to considered in a harsh post-accident 
environment, such as high temperature, water damage, etc. Since this research mainly 
focuses on radiation-induced issues on electronic components used in wireless 
monitoring systems, their impacts will not be further explained. 
2.1.3 Radiation Environment under a Severe Accident 
In the event of a nuclear accident, a significant amount of radiation from the reactor core 
can be released due to failure of protection layers. Historically, there are three major 
nuclear accidents associated with nuclear power plants, Three Mile Island (1979), 
Chernobyl accident (1986) and Fukushima accident (2011). Luckily, there were no 
significant radioactive materials released to the environment in Three Mile Island 
accident, but the other two are very different. Chernobyl disaster exposed a significant 
fraction of core material into the environment. The total estimated release of radioactivity 
from the destroyed reactor is about 1018 Bq (Saenko et al., 2011). The exposed reactor 
created γ-radiation and the highest dose level was about 300 Sv/h (Kortov and 
Ustyantsev, 2013). Similarly, Fukushima disaster also released a large amount of 
radioactive substances to the environment due to hydrogen explosions and fire damage to 
the containment structures (Takahashi, 2014). On June 6th, 2011, the radiation released to 
the atmosphere was estimated to be about 700,000 trillion Bq (Eisler, 2012). In March 
2012, the level of radiation particles was estimated to be up to 73 Sv/h inside the 
containment of No.2 reactor (Eisler, 2012), and in Feb. 2017, it was up even further to 
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530 Sv/h (The Guardian, 2017). Under such post-accident conditions, electronic devices 
in the monitoring systems will not survive long time, if no special protection measures 
against radiation are taken.  Radiation-hardened (rad-hardened) design methodologies, as 
well as rad-hardened analysis techniques in such cases are not luxury, but necessary, to 
ensure their reliable operation. 
The principal types of radiation observed after a nuclear accident include alpha (α) 
particles, beta (β) particles, gamma (γ) rays, x-rays, and neutron particles (Adalja et al., 
2011; Sharp and Decreton, 1996). In general, neutrons are not a concern outside the 
reactor unless enough fissionable radioactive material is present to sustain a chain 
reaction. At Fukushima accident site, this has not happened and only alpha, beta, and 
gamma radiations have been detected outside the reactor (Adalja et al., 2011). 
2.2 Radiation Effects on Electronics 
2.2.1 Composition of Monitoring Systems in Post-Accident 
Applications 
Online monitoring systems (OLMs) have been used in nuclear power plants around the 
world to monitor several key plant conditions, such as detecting sensing-line blockages, 
testing the response time of pressure transmitters, monitoring the calibration of pressure 
transmitters, cross-calibrating temperature sensors in situ, assessing equipment condition, 
performing predictive maintenance of reactor internals, monitoring fluid flow, and 
extending the life of neutron detectors (Hashemian, 2011). The composition of those 
systems can be separated to several categories: sensors, electronic parts, other non-
electronic components, etc. In general, semiconductor-based electronic parts are more 
sensitive to radiation than other components (Holmes-Siedle and Adams, 2002). The type 
of semiconductor electronic parts used in those systems varies widely, e.g., 
microcontrollers/microprocessors, memory chips (RAM/ROM), analog-to-digital 
converters (ADC), digital-to-analog converters (DAC), operational amplifiers, 
multiplexers, logic chips (TTL or CMOS), voltage references, transistors, diodes, etc. 
Moreover, these electronic components may be built with various different 
semiconductor technologies and different materials. Radiation effects on those 
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components and materials can be therefore different. The understanding of their 
responses to radiation is a significant part in the design of radiation-hardened system, 
which will be further discussed in the following Sections. 
2.2.2 Mechanism of Radiation Interaction with Matters 
The nature of interactions between radiation particles and target materials 
(semiconductors in this case) depends on properties of the particles (mass, charge, and 
kinetic energy) and the target (mass, charge, and density) (Srour, 1982). Radiation 
particles can be classified into three categories according to the way they interact with the 
materials: (1) photons, which interact through photoelectric effect, Compton scattering, or 
pair production; (2) charged particles, which interact through Rutherford scattering and 
nuclear interactions; and (3) neutrons, which interact through elastic scattering, inelastic 
scattering, and transmutation reactions (Srour, 1982; McLean and Oldham, 1987). 
In general, radiation particles lose their energy through non-ionization processes 
(displacement) and/or ionization processes when they interact with semiconductor 
materials. Non-ionization processes are associated with neutrons, protons, alpha particles, 
heavy ions, and very high-energy photons. They can cause displacements in atoms in the 
target materials and/or change the arrangement of the crystal lattice’s target atoms, 
resulting in adverse (often catastrophic) effects to electronic devices (Srour and 
McGarrity, 1988). On the other hand, ionization processes are primarily associated with 
charged particle interactions, such as electrons, protons, x-rays, and γ-rays (Gregory and 
Gwyn, 1974). They generate electron-hole pairs (ehps) when they pass through a 
semiconductor device. They usually cause glitches, abrupt changes, transient behavior, 
and soft errors (Gregory and Gwyn, 1974) in the device. Ionization processes can also 
result in permanent damages and destructive effects to devices if the accumulated dose or 
particle fluence has exceeded certain tolerance limits of particular device.  Furthermore, 
all these two type of interactions can coexist.  For example, a neutron can first collide 
with a nucleus to generate displacement damage, and then create secondary charged 
particles that can further impose ionization related damage (Makowski, 2006). The 
probability of component damage depends on radiation type, radiation energy, radiation 
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flux, and exposure duration. A list of existing publications on energy-loss processes as 
radiation interacting with matter is summarized in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1: Energy-loss process as radiation interacting with matter 
Energy-loss processes References 
Basic mechanisms 
Barbottin and Vapaille, 1999; Srour, 1982; McLean and 
Oldham, 1987; Robinson, 1994 
Ionization processes 
Foster, 2003; McLean and Oldham, 1987; Oldham, 2011; 
Srour and McGarrity, 1988 
Non-ionization processes 
Foster, 2003; Gergory and Gwyn, 1974; McLean and 
Oldham, 1987; Oldham, 2011; Srour and McGarrity, 1988 
 
Radiation effects on electronics can generally be categorized as: displacement damage 
(DD), total ionizing dose (TID), and single event effect (SEE) (Foster, 2003). 
Displacement damage and total ionizing dose exposure are long term cumulative effects, 
while single event effect, as its name implies, is short-term one-time event. Those effects 
can be illustrated in Figure 2-1. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Radiation effects on electronics devices. 
A list of representative publications above radiation effects on semiconductor devices is 
provided in Table 2-2. Details of different radiation effects are discussed further in 






electrons, β-particles, x-rays, 
γ-rays, protons, heavy ions 
electrons, β-particles, x-rays, 
γ-rays, protons, heavy ions 
Single Event Cumulative 
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Table 2-2: Radiation effects on semiconductor devices 
Radiation effects References 
Displacement damage 
Arutt et al., 2015; Barnaby et al., 2017. Fernandez-Martinez 
et al., 2013; Foster, 2003; George, 1992; Messenger and 
Spratt, 1958; Oldham, 2011; Srour et al., 2003; Srour and 
Palko, 2013; Summers et al., 1998; Wigner, 1946 
Total ionizing dose effect 
Barnaby, 2006; Cellere and Paccagnella, 2004; Chen et al., 
2017; Fleetwood, 2013; Foster, 2003; Galloway and 
Schrimpf, 1990; Hughes and Benedetto, 2003; Johnston et 
al., 1994; Nichols, 1980; Oldham, 2011; Oldham and 
McLean, 2003; Pease, 2003; Re et al., 2006; Re et al., 2008; 
Schwank, 1994 
Single event effects 
Baumann, 2005; Buchner and McMorrow, 2006; Cellere and 
Paccagnella, 2004; Dodd, 2005; Dodd et al., 2007; Dodd and 
Massengill, 2003; Ferlet-Cavrois, 2013; Gadlage et al., 2004; 
Koga et al., 1997; Munteanu and Autran, 2008; Sexton, 
2003; Soliman and Nichols, 1983; Titus, 2013; Troutman, 
1986; Veronique et al., 2013 
Displacement damage & 
Total ionizing dose effect 
& Single event effects 
Adell and Scheick, 2013; Bagatin and Gerardin, 2015; 
Barbottin and Vapaille, 1999; Chen et al., 2017;  Claeys and 
Simoen, 2013; Cressler, 2013; Gregory and Gwyn, 1974; 
Gover, 1984; Holmes-Siedle and Adams, 2002; Hughes and 
Benedetto, 2003; Iniewski, 2010; Lv et al., 2017; Makowshi, 
2006; Messenger and Ash, 1986; Oldham, 2011; Pearton et 
al., 2016; Polyakov et al., 2013; Raoul, 2007; Schrimpf, 
1994;  Schrimpf and Fleetwood, 2004; Rathod et al., 2011; 
Schwank et al., 2008; Schwank et al., 2013; Sexton, 1996; 
Simoen et al., 2013; Srour and McGarrity, 1988 
 
2.2.3 Displacement Damage 
Displacement damage to an electronic device is caused by a long-term non-ionizing 
effect, and it occurs when an incident particle has enough energy to knock an atom free 
from its normal lattice site in the semiconductor and onto an interstitial site (Foster, 
2003). As a result, it will change the properties of the electronic device due to minority 
carrier lifetime reduction, decreased carrier mobility, carrier transport, increased leakage 
current, and thermal charge generation (Srour et al., 2003). 
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Ever since Wigner and his collaborators performed theoretical analysis and experimental 
verification of displacement damage in irradiated materials in the early 1940s (Wigner, 
1946), numerous researchers have studied various aspects of displacement damage and its 
effects on various semiconductor devices and materials. A comprehensive review of 
displacement damage can be found in (Srour and Palko, 2013), as well as several review 
papers, books, and short course notes about its various aspects and effects. Srour and 
Palko also summarized the research history on investigation of displacement damage: (1) 
the first decade of the NSREC (1963-1972), focusing mainly on its effects in various 
semiconductor materials and devices; (2) the second decade (1973-1982),  investigating 
its effects on more advanced devices and circuits, integrated-injection logic circuits, and 
charge-coupled devices (CCDs); (3) the third decade (1983-1992), concentrating on 
studies its effects on MOS devices and circuit technologies, as well as solar cells, GaAs 
devices, particle detectors, photodiodes, and bipolar transistors; (4) the fourth decade 
(1993-2002), addressing a broad variety of semiconductor devices and materials, as well 
as the nonionizing energy loss (NIEL), damage correlation, and synergistic effects; and 
(5) the most recent decade (2003-2012), continuously addressing the similar topics of 
previous decades and examining its effects in SDRAMs and memory devices, as well as 
conducting computational analysis of the process and the effects (Srour and Palko, 2013). 
2.2.4 Total Ionizing Dose 
Total ionizing dose refers to the total amount of energy deposited by radiation particles 
passing through a semiconductor material. It is an important consideration for strong 
radiation environments, where the dose is typically in the range of 104-108 rad (Si) 
(Foster, 2003). When ionizing particles strike silicon oxide, interactions at the physical 
level can be described in four steps, as illustrated in Figure 2-2 (1) electron-hole-pairs 
(ehps) are formed by energy deposited in the semiconductor material and a fraction of the 
generated electron-hole-pairs recombine; (2) free carriers which escape the 
recombination are transported into the oxide; (3) hole trapping at the SiO2/Si interface; 
and (4) the interface traps (or interface states) are produced at the SiO2/Si interface (Adell 
and Scheick, 2013; Srour and McGarrity, 1988). Considering an example of a MOSFET 
exposed to ionizing radiation, the positive charges are trapped at the Si/SiO2 interface or 
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at the metal/SiQ2 interface, which is illustrated in Figure 2-3. As a result, a shift in the 
threshold voltage is generated and the device could not be turned off if this voltage shift 
is high enough for turn-off threshold value (Oldham and McLean, 2003). 
 
Figure 2-2: The effects of ionizing radiation in SiO2 (Adell and Scheick, 2013; Srour 
and McGarrity, 1988) 
 
Figure 2-3: The effect of ionizing radiation on the gate oxide in an n-channel 
MOSFET (Oldham and McLean, 2003) 
For MOS devices, such as transistors and integrated circuits (ICs), ionizing radiation will 
affect their functionalities and performance characteristics, which include threshold 
voltage shifts, mobility degradation, increased leakage currents, enlarged on-resistance, 
high-level of gate charge, and reduction in breakdown voltage (Adell and Scheick, 2013; 
Hughes and Benedetto, 2003). On the other hand, for bipolar devices, the recombination 
current will be increased and common-emitter current gain will be reduced due to 
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probably two reasons: increased density of interface traps at the surface of the extrinsic 
base region; and positive charge buildup (Johnston et al., 1994). A list of publications for 
total ionizing dose effects on various semiconductor technologies and devices is provided 
in Table 2-3. 







Adell and Scheick, 2013; Cardoso et al., 2014; Hughes and 
Benedetto, 2003; Re et al., 2006; Re et al., 2008 
Bipolar Adell et al., 2012; Johnston et al., 1994 
SOI Alles et al., 2015; Simoen et al., 2004 
Semiconductor devices 
AD Lee et al., 1994; Pease et al., 2007; Lee  and Johnston, 1998 
HBT 
Inanlou et al., 2014; Praveen et al., 2012; Sutton et al., 2006; 
Zhang et al., 2016 
HEMT 
Hu et al., 2004; Ives et al., 2015; Kalavagunta et al., 2008; 
O’Loughlin, 1987; Sun et al., 2013 
BJT 
Adell et al., 2012; Kosier et al., 1995; Schmidt et al., 1995; 
Schmidt et al., 1996 
FET Cardoso et al., 2013; Gaillardin et al., 2006 
FinFET Duan et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2017 
JFET 
Flament et al., 1996; McGarrity et al., 1992; Zuleeg et al., 1977; 
Zuleeg and Lehovec, 1980 
NAND 
Cellere et al., 2007; Bagatin et al., 2011; Kay et al., 2012; 
Gerardin et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 1999; Oldham et al., 2006 
MOSFET 
Hao et al., 2017; Park et al., 2008; Pizanoa et al., 1998; Ren et 
al., 2017; Schrimpf et al., 1988; Simoen et al., 2004; Zhang, et 
al., 2013 
NOR Cellere et al., 2007; Gerardin et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 1999 
RAM Bernacki, et al., 2000; Massengill et al., 1986 
Voltage regulator 
Adell et al., 2004; Beaucour et al., 1994; Kelly et al., 2007; Pease 
et al., 1998; Ramachandran et al., 2006 
FPGA Citterio et al., 2016 
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2.2.5 Single Event Effect 
The physical mechanisms of a single event effect can be divided into three steps, as 
illustrated in Figure 2-4. The first step involves two types of charge deposition: (1) direct 
ionization caused by inelastic interactions that transmit a large amount of energy to the 
struck atoms and generates electron-hole-pairs; and (2) indirect ionization caused by 
secondary particles between the incident particles and the atoms of materials that the 
microelectronic devices are made of.  The second step is charge transport, where the 
released carriers are quickly transported and collected by elementary structures (e.g., p-n 
junctions). The third step is charge collection, where the parasitic current will create 
disturbances in the semiconductor devices and can cause permanent damage to the gate 
insulators or a latch-up of the device if the current is sufficiently high (Munteanu and 
Autran, 2008). 
 
Figure 2-4: The physical mechanism of single event effects (Baumann, 2005) 
Furthermore, depending on how the semiconductor reacts charge deposition leading to a 
failure, single event effects can further be separated into two types: non-destructive effect 
and destructive effect, which are explained in the following Sections. 
➢ Non-destructive effects 
25 
 
If the semiconductor can be recovered from a failure caused by a single event effect 
through a system reset and/or data re-initialization, those effects are called non-
destructive effects. They could include one of the following scenarios. 
(1) Single Event Transient (SET)  
A single event transient can be triggered by a short-term current caused by the generated 
electron-hole pairs, which may change the logic state of a circuit (Ferlet-Cavrois et al., 
2013). The short-term pulse can be eliminated if the deposited charges are removed by 
providing an alternative conducting path. The pulse may also propagate through 
subsequent circuit stages and induce a voltage transient (leading to reverse in logic states) 
(Ferlet-Cavrois et al., 2013). 
(2) Single Event Upset (SEU)  
A single event upset can be triggered by the generated transient current and the charge 
collected at the struck electric node when a charged particle passes through a reverse-
biased junction (Dodd and Massengill, 2003). Such effects on several circuits have been 
summarized (Dodd and Massengill, 2003). In case of a storage cell, this may lead to a 
cell upset.  For an SRAM cell or a flip-flop, the state of the memory can be inverted. For 
a DRAM cell, the charge stored can be modified and interpreted as an invalid value. 
Furthermore, in logic circuits, SEUs can occur when a SET propagates through a 
combinational logic, and is then captured by a latch or a flip-flop. 
(3) Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI)  
A single event functional interrupt is a complex failure mode when a heavy ion particle 
strike triggers an abnormal mode, such as test mode, or reset mode, which can cause ICs 
to lose their intended functionalities temporarily (Koga et al., 1997). Complex devices 
are more likely to exhibit SEFIs. For example, SDRAM has a built-in self-test (BIST) 
mode and a self-repairing boot sequence, which could be triggered inadvertently after a 
heavy ion strike leading to an unintended reset or idle state (Dodd and Massengill, 2003). 
➢ Destructive effects 
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As the name implies, failures induced by destructive effects are catastrophic and the 
devices are permanently damaged. Such situations can be due to one of the following 
events. 
(1) Single Event Latchup (SEL)  
A single event latchup may be triggered in ICs by a pnpn four layer structure when any 
sources with excess carriers could turn on a thyristor-like device. A latchup creates a low 
resistance path between the power supply and the ground. Consequently, destructive 
current of a high magnitude may be produced in such a path, which can damage the 
device permanently (Sexton, 2003). 
(2) Single Event Snapback (SES)  
A single event snapback is caused by drain-to-source breakdown in NMOS transistors. 
Their effect is similar to SEL, but a pnpn four layer structure is not necessary. When 
heavy ions strike a semiconductor near the drain junction, the induced current can be high 
enough to cause an avalanche multiplication. If this condition stays long enough, a 
sufficiently high amplitude current pulse will be produced and the transistor will be 
turned ON inadvertently. The resulting high amplitude current can cause permanent 
damage to the device (Sexton, 2003). 
(3) Single Event Burnout (SEB)  
A single event burnout may occur if the drain-to-source voltage is higher than the second 
breakdown voltage due to high current caused by large volume of ionizing particles 
passing through a bipolar power transistor or an MOSFET. The device will suffer from 
overheat locally, and failure can occur if the current is not removed quickly (Sexton, 
2003). 
(4) Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR)  
A single event gate rupture is usually caused by SEB in power MOSFETs when heavy 
ions hit the gate region simultaneously. A SEGR can cause a short circuit between the 
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drain and the gate, which results in local overheating and causes irreversible damage in 
the gate region (Sexton, 2003). 
A list of available publications for single event effects on semiconductor devices is 
provided in Table 2-4. 
Table 2-4: Single event effects on modern electronics 
Single event effects References 
Non-destructive effects 
Single event transient 
Buchner and McMorrow, 2006; Dodd et al., 2004; Ferlet-
Cavrois et al., 2013; Gadlage et al., 2004; Wang, 2011; Wirth 
et al., 2008 
Single event upset 
Dodd and Massengill, 2003; Dodd et al., 2007; Karnik et al., 
2004 
Single event functional 
interrupt 
Dodd and Massengill, 2003; Koga et al., 1997; Koga et al., 
2001 
Destructive effects 
Single event latchup 
Becher et al., 2002; Gregory and Shafer, 1973; Johnston et 
al., 1990; Johnston et al., 1997; Kolasinsky et al., 1979; 
Leavy and Poll, 1969; Sexton, 2003; Soliman and Nichols, 
1983; Troutman, 1986 
Single event snapback 
Dodd et al., 2000; Koga and Kolasinski, 1989; Ochoa et al., 
1984; Sexton, 2003; Stassinopoulos et al., 1992 
Single event burnout 
Hohl and Galloway, 1987; Hohl and Johnson, 1989; Johnson 
et al., 1992; Kuboyama et al., 1992; Liu et al., 2006; Oberg 
and Wert, 1987; Sexton, 2003; Titus, 2013; Titus et al., 1991 
Single event gate rupture 
Allenspach et al., 1996; Brews et al., 1993; Borulta et al., 
2001; Johnson et al.,1998; Sexton, 2003; Sexton et al., 1998; 
Sexton et al., 1997; Titus, 2013 
 
2.2.6 Radiation Effects on Semiconductor Devices 
Radiation effects on modern semiconductor devices are briefly described in Table 2-5 
(Holmes-Siedle and Adams, 2002). 
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Table 2-5: Summary of radiation effects on semiconductor devices (Homes-Siedle 
and Adams, 2002) 




The mean reverse leakage current will be increased by 
small radiation-induced alterations in the surface charge. 
High-power rectifier Serious degradation in the forward voltage drop. 
Zener diodes 
Zener breakdown voltages do not change much, the 
transient current is reduced. 
Microwave diodes Inherently ‘hard’ to both total dose and neutron irradiation. 
Opto-
electronics 
Phototransistors The output current degrades. 
LEDs and lasers 
Neutron damage reduces the minority-carrier lifetime in the 
active regions; particles produce new defects to reduce the 
light output efficiency. 
Opto-couplers 




Threshold voltage shift on CCD gates due to TID effects, 
displacement damage reduces the CTE, increases the dark 
current, produces dark current nonuniformities and 
generates random telegraph noise in individual pixels. 
Solar cells Solar cells 
Cell efficiency can be seriously affected by radiation-
induced defects by degradation of diffusion length. 
Power 
semiconductors 
Bipolar power transistors 
A low doping level for the collector and a high base width 
which can lead to high sensitivity to neutron irradiation. 
Thyistors 
Triggering parameters degrade suddenly as the neutron dose 
is increased; can suffer from single-event effects. 
Power MOSFETs 
Parameter changes under radiation: threshold voltage shift, 
transconductance degradation, reduction in breakdown 
voltage, burn-out induced by transients. 
Insulated-gate bipolar 
transistor (IGBT) 
BiMOS power switching device with high input impedance 
and low drive requirements; can suffer from the low total-







Be tolerant of the effects of heavy ionization and bulk 
damage, special silicon JFET devices are even more 
tolerant to neutrons. 
Heterojunction bipolar 
transistor (HBT) 





The electrical effects of total-dose do not have any effects 
until a dose about 107 rad. 
Resistors and conductors 
Discrete resistors have been irradiated at very high radiation 
environments with no problems; conduction in metals is not 
affected by radiation particles. 
Quartz crystals 
Permanent shifts in frequency and changes the responsivity; 
‘swept’ quartz is less susceptible to radiation. 
Vacuum tubes 




Reduction in majority-carrier concentration by bulk 
displacement damage; transient increase in majority carriers 




gaskets, O-rings, switches 
Depend on the properties of the component materials, the 
mechanical properties of plastics show the onset of damage 
in the range 107 to 109 rad. 
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As can be seen, radiation effects on semiconductor devices can be a complex process. 
The outcomes depend on many factors. These include materials used, structures chosen, 
manufacturing processes, domain of usages, and the surrounding environment conditions. 
All these factors should be considered when selecting devices in the design and 
construction of monitoring systems for severe accident monitoring systems for nuclear 
power so that higher tolerance to radiation can be achieved. 
2.3 Rad-Hardened Design Techniques 
From a pure physical composition point of view, any electronic systems can be 
decomposed bottom up in several levels: device-, circuit-, and system-levels. During 
system design, both hardware design and software development, rad-hardened techniques 
should be adopted at each level to minimize the impacts of potential radiation effects. 
This concept can briefly be illustrated in Figure 2-5. Rad-hardened design techniques at 
different levels are summarized in Figure 2-6, which will be further described in 
subsequent Sections. 
 





Circuit Level Architecture Firmware Application 
Hardware mitigation Software mitigation 




Figure 2-6: Methods of rad-hardened design techniques 
2.3.1 Rad-Hardened by Device-Level Design 
Rad-hardened techniques at device-level typically focus on increasing the radiation 
resistance of a design by fundamentally changing and improving the fabrication 
processes (Garg et al., 2009). In general, the devices which have undergone such special 
process are often known as rad-hardened components, which indeed have higher 
resistance to ionizing radiation. However, because of the special process involved, as 
well as the small volume production to feed the small market demand, these devices turn 
to be excessively expensive. Nevertheless, the techniques used can be summarized as 
follows: 
(1) Rad-hardened by sizing 
Rad-hardening by increasing the aspect ratio (W/L) of the transistor to improve the 
radiation tolerance, as a larger gate area has higher current carrying capability and higher 
node capacitance than a smaller area. Moreover, increasing the size of the transistor can 
Radiation shielding 
Shielding against γ –rays 
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Differential charge cancellation 
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Self-healing circuits 
Pipeline protection 
Magnetic-based storage logic 
System-level design 
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effectively lower the magnitude and shorten the duration of the transient voltage pulse. If 
the transistor size is sufficiently large, such transient voltage pulse can even be eliminated 
(Zhou and Mohanram, 2004). 
(2) Special layout design for transistor  
One can also improve the radiation tolerance of transistors through special layout design. 
For example, in annular transistors, one can enclose the source or the drain in transistors 
to prevent charge buildup in isolation oxides (Wallden, 2014). It has been noted that the 
lifespan of annular MOSFET with reduced drain electric field is three times more than 
that of a conventional device with the same technology under radiation conditions (Mayer 
et al., 2004). Using H-gate and ringed-source layouts can also increase drain leakage 
current and make the threshold voltage higher, which can enhance the radiation tolerance 
capability of the transistors (Liu et al., 2010). 
(3) Silicon on insulator (SOI) / Silicon on sapphire (SOS)  
Insulating substrates can also be used to reduce the sensitivity of bulk devices to ionizing 
radiation. This can be accomplished by using an insulator layer to separate the active 
region and the inactive substrate, which is named Silicon on Insulator (SOI). This 
approach results in lower parasitic capacitance and increases resistance to latchup. Silicon 
on Sapphire (SOS) is a hetero-epitaxial technique of the SOI family for IC 
manufacturing, which consists of a silicon film grown on a sapphire (Al2O3) substrate. It 
has been found that the space grade SOI/SOS IC chips are many orders greater than those 
of ordinary commercial grade IC chips (Yu et al., 2011) as far as radiation-tolerance is 
concerned. For example,  their sensitive volume for dose rate effects is typically two 
orders of magnitude lower than that of bulk-silicon devices (Schwank et al., 2003). 
(4) Guard rings  
Guard rings can be designed around p-wells and n-wells to prevent SEL and to reduce 
inter-device leakage. p+ diffusion or n- diffusion ring surrounding adjacent NMOS and/or 
PMOS devices will generate a higher voltage threshold and prevent leakage between 
them (Camplani et al., 2014; Irani et al., 2017). 
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2.3.2 Rad-Hardened by Circuit-Level Design 
Special circuit design techniques can also be used at the circuit-level to improve fault 
avoidance capabilities and to reduce the vulnerability to radiation damage (Garg et al., 
2009). These techniques as well as the associated references can be summarized as 
follows: 
(1) Critical circuits redundancy  
Within the overall system design, critical circuits in the system should be duplicated 
using redundancies to enhance the reliability and fault-tolerance (Aydos and Fey, 2017; 
Li et al., 2014; Lu et al., 2014; Rajaei et al., 2015; and Smith and Mostert, 2007). 
Furthermore, the concepts of local space and time redundancy can be effective to prevent 
soft-error latches (Nicolaidis and Zorian, 1998; Mavis and Eaton, 2002; and Hazucha et 
al., 2004). As an example, a triple inter-locked latch (TILL) is presented in (Li et al., 
2014), where the irradiation tests have shown that the TILL has a SEU threshold of LET 
over 42 MeV-cm2/mg, which is much higher than that of conventional latches. 
Furthermore, the cross section of the TILL is at least one order of magnitude lower than 
that of a conventional latches. 
(2) Guard gate  
Guard gate can be used to prevent SETs from a latch. An example is presented in 
(Balasubramanian et al., 2005), where a buffer circuit with two inputs and one output has 
been considered. Both inputs are connected to the output of a combinational logic block; 
however, one input has been delayed. If the output of the combinational logic block 
encounters a SET pulse, the delayed signal will not change the logic status immediately 
and will become different from the other input. Hence, the guard gate output will become 
float and will maintain the previous voltage value to prevent SETs from happening. 
(3) Temporal filtering  
Temporal filtering is a technique that generates multiple versions of the same signal, but 
separates them by delayed elements. These elements are then put through a majority voter 
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to produce the desired output. For example, a SET-hardened latch with temporal filtering 
is described in (Lacoe, 2008), where the data input is connected to three separate edge-
triggered D-flip-flops in parallel. If a transient signal is induced at the input, it will arrive 
at all the flip-flops at the same time, but the clock signals will not arrive at the same 
moment because two clock signals are delayed by Δt and 2Δt at the flip-flops separately. 
Therefore, only one clock signal will arrive with the transient, and the other two inputs 
will produce the correct signal (Mavis and Eaton, 2002). 
(4) Differential charge cancellation (DCC) layout  
Differential charge cancellation layout leverages the inherent common-mode rejection of 
differential circuits to mitigate voltage transients induced by heavy ion strikes. One 
experimental verification of a circuit hardened through DCC layout technique has been 
given in (Blaine et al., 2012). It has been shown that DCC layout can provide more than 
an order of magnitude reduction in sensitive area across all tested energies with two-
photon absorption (TPA) laser facility (Blaine et al., 2012). Another TPA testing is also 
presented in (Atkinson et al., 2013) to demonstrate the effectiveness in the mitigation 
SETs through DCC layout. The conclusion is that the DCC layout can significantly 
mitigate SETs at low levels of charge deposition, as well as diminish charge sharing in 
the baseline layout (Atkinson et al., 2013). 
(5) Dual interlocked storage cells (DICE)  
Dual interlocked storage cell uses a four node redundant structure to mitigate SEUs 
(Blum and Delgado-Frias, 2006; Zhao, 2015). DICE can be applied to replace latches and 
flip-flops distributed within logic blocks in CMOS devices and also used to implement 
SEU-hardened SRAMs. Some solutions of DICE can be found in  (Calin et al., 1996; 
Lacoe, 2008; Gorbunov  et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015; and Hui et al., 2015). A 
comparison of different radiation-hardened by design techniques for SRAM blocks 
manufacture of two IC chips with similar functionalities is given in (Gorbunov et al., 
2014). It demonstrates that DICE cells can achieve about 2-3 orders of magnitude lower 
than cross-sections for 6T-cells. 
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(6) Self-healing circuits  
Self-healing circuits make use other circuit blocks to monitor the behaviors of the main 
circuit. In a simple team, it contains some feedback to tune circuit parameters in a closed-
loop fashion to detect any change in the main circuit (Howard et al., 2012; Inanlou et al., 
2013; and Rajaei et al., 2013). For example, a method using chopper stabilization is 
presented to improve the precision of voltage references in ionizing radiation 
environments (Shetler et al., 2015). The tests have shown that adoption of the chopper 
stabilization can lead to 96% reduction in radiation-induced shift. A rad-hardened sensing 
circuit is also proposed to reduce the radiation-induced currents for protecting the 
Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ) in conventional magnetic random access memory 
MRAMs (Chabi et al., 2014). The simulation results have shown that the SEU probability 
can be reduced to as low as 0.01% for more than 50 fC of the injected charge. 
(7) Pipeline protection  
Pipeline protection techniques use self-checking register architecture to combat both 
SEUs inside a register and SETs captured by the register (Das et al., 2009; Lin et al., 
2016). For example, a radiation-hardened pipeline is proposed in (Lin et al., 2016) by 
incorporating soft-error- and timing-error-tolerant flip-flop (SETTOFF)-based self-
checking cells into the sequential cells in the pipeline. The gate-level injection results 
have shown that a SETTOFF-based self-checking technique requires more than 30% less 
area and 80% less power overhead than the triple modular redundancy does. 
(8) Magnetic-based storage logic  
Static random access memory (SRAM) is very susceptible to radiation-induced soft 
errors (Rajaei et al., 2015). Due to its inherent characteristics, magnetic tunnel junction 
(MTJ) will have relatively higher resistance to radiation-induced soft errors, some 
radiation-hardened magnetic random access memory (MRAM)-based field-
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are proposed in (Goncalves et al., 2013; Rajaei 2016; 
and Rajaei and Mamaghani, 2017) to achieve advantages of non-volatility, low power 
consumption, high performance, and high tolerance to soft errors. 
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2.3.3 Rad-Hardened by System-Level Design 
Rad-hardening techniques at the system-level typically use fault detection approaches and 
tolerance mechanisms to enhance the radiation resistance of the system (Garg et al., 
2009). Some of these techniques can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Redundant element  
Redundant elements can take one of the four forms: hardware redundancy (Mahmood and 
McCluskey, 1988; Mukuherjee et al., 2002), information redundancy (Samson et al., 
2001), time redundancy (Nicolaidis, 1999), and software redundancy (Lindoso et al., 
2012; Rebaudengo et al., 2004). Hardware redundancy relies on duplication of 
subsystems to detect and to correct single error, and to achieve fault tolerance to single 
event effects, such as dual modular redundancy (DMR), triple modular redundancy 
(TMR) (Brinkley et al., 2000; Clark et al., 2011; and Li et al., 2000). Information 
redundancy uses error correcting codes (ECC) techniques, and error detection and 
correction (EDAC) methods by re-assigning corrected values to avoid error accumulation 
(Shirvani et al., 2000). Examples of this techniques include parity checking (Tiwari and 
Tomko, 2005), rectangular codes (Patel and Hong, 1974), hamming codes (Morelos-
Zaragoza, 2002; Shooman, 2003), and reed-Solomon codes (Neuberger et al., 2005). 
Time redundancy uses slack-time in the system schedule to improve transient-fault 
tolerance capability by performing recovery executions whenever fault occurs (Ejali et 
al., 2000). Finally, software redundancy relies on multiple versions of independently 
developed software to tolerant faults in software operational environments (Eckhardt et 
al., 1991), such as N-version programming (Avizienis, 1985), and recovery blocks 
(Randell, 1975). 
(2) Re-initialization recovery  
Re-initialization recovery utilizes an external timer circuit, acting as a watchdog, to 
perform a forced reset for the system when other rad-hardening methods deemed 
ineffective (Yu et al., 2011). The watchdog timer can be implemented in hardware or 
software or through a combination of both at several levels, such as subsystem-to-
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subsystem, box-to-box, board-to-board, and device-to-device (LaBel and Gates, 1996). 
The multiple watchdog time-out solution is demonstrated in (LaBel et al., 1992) and the 
developed system has successfully been tested for SEL for BNL (LaBel and Gates, 1996). 
(3) Scrubbing  
Scrubbing can be used to avoid accumulation of errors and to reduce the probability of 
multiple errors (Nidhin et al., 2017). There are two different types scrubbing algorithms: 
preventive and corrective. A preventive algorithm will perform scrubbing periodically 
regardless whether this is an error. On the other hand, a corrective scrubbing will read 
back configuration memory periodically and trigger scrubbing only when the algorithm 
has detected an error (Herrera and Lopez-Vallejo, 2013). 
2.3.4 Rad-Hardened by Shielding 
Radiation shielding is an effective way to mitigate radiation effects and to increase the 
reliability and prolong the life of electronic systems. The shielding can be applied to 
package and/or relevant IC chips. The effectiveness of shielding depends on the 
properties of shielding materials, and radiation type, and radiation tolerance level of 
semiconductor (Shultis and Faw, 2005). The type and required thickness and mass of the 
shielding material, uniformity of shielding capability, permanence and availability of 
shielding depends on radiation levels to be attenuated, resilience of the devices to 
radiation exposure (Shultis and Faw, 2005). Shielding characteristics can be determined 
numerically based on a linear attenuation coefficient, the total mass attenuation 
coefficient for γ-rays, and the effectiveness in removal of cross-section for fast neutrons 
(Yilmaz et al., 2011). 
Shielding properties of many materials have been investigated and reported in the 
literature. For example, these include concrete (Gencel et al., 2011; Kharita et al., 2008; 
Korkut et al., 2010; and Yilmaz et al., 2011), concrete mixed with mineral additives 
(Akkurt et al., 2010; Damla et al., 2010; Kharita et al., 2008; Kharita et al., 2011; and 
Kurudirek et al., 2009), alloys (Abdao, 2002), aluminum and tungsten (Mangeret et al., 
1996), fly-ash brick materials (Singh and Badiger, 2014), conlemanite and epoxy resin 
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(Okuno, 2005), and a reusable shielding material with high density of desired nuclei 
(iron, hydrogen, and boron) (Calzada et al., 2011). Even though concrete and concreate 
related materials might not be suitable for protecting electronic systems directly, the 
information is still very relevant when determining the plant locations for installation for 
such systems. For completeness, the relevant references are also included herein. A 
comparative study of radiation shielding for some shielding concretes and glass systems 
can be found in (Kurudirek, 2014). Because electronic components have different 
susceptibility to radiation, shielding materials have also been used directly on 
components level. e.g., a depleted boron is studied in (Kern and Smeltzer, 1986) to 
protect the integrated circuits directly. 
2.3.5 Summary of Rad-Hardened Design Techniques 
Existing rad-hardened design techniques for mitigation radiation effects are summarized 










Transistor sizing TID, SEE Zhou and Mohanram, 2004; Zhou and Mohanram, 2006 
Transistor layout TID, SEE Liu et al., 2010; Mayer et al., 2004; Seixas et al., 2017 
Insulating substrates TID, SEE Schwank et al., 2003; Vizkelethy et al., 2005 
Guard rings SEL Camplani et al., 2014; Irani et al., 2017 
Circuit-level design 
Redundancy SEE 
Aydos and Fey, 2017; Li et al., 2014; Lu et al., 2014; Rajaei 
et al., 2015; Smith and Mostert, 2007; Yan et al., 2017 
Guard gates SET Balasubramanian et al., 2005; Qi et al., 2015 
Temporal filtering SET Lacoe, 2008 
Differential charge 
cancellation 
SET Atkinson et al., 2013; Blaine et al., 2012 
Dual interlocked storage 
cells 
SEU 
Calin et al., 1996; Hui et al., 2015; Lacoe, 2008; Gorbunov  
et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015 
Self-healing circuits TID, SEE 
Adell  et al., 2018; Chabi et al., 2014; Howard et al., 2012; 
Inanlou et al., 2013; Rajaei et al., 2013; Shetler et al., 2015 




Goncalves et al., 2013; Rajaei 2016; Rajaei and Mamaghani, 
2017; Wang et al., 2018 
System-level design 
Redundant elements & 
Co-design approach 
SEE 
Brinkley et al., 2000; Ciani et al., 2014;  Clark et al., 2011; 
Clark et al., 2015; Cuenca-Asensi et al., 2011; Eftaxiopoulos 
et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2015; Li et al., 2000; Siegle et al., 
2015; Sterpone et al., 2013 
Error detection and 
correction 
SEU, SET 
Morelos-Zaragoza, 2002; Neuberger et al., 2005; Patel and 
Hong, 1974; Shirvani et al., 2000; Tiwari and Tomko, 2005; 
Shooman, 2003 
Re-initialization recovery SEU, SET Lopez-Morillo et al., 2018; Makowski, 2006 
Scrubbing TID, SEE Herrera and Lopez-Vallejo, 2013; Nidhin et al., 2017 
Radiation shielding 
Shielding against γ-rays TID Abdao, 2002; Akkurt et al., 2010; Calzada et al., 2011; 
Damla et al., 2010; Gencel et al., 2011; Kern and Smeltzer, 
1986; Kharita et al., 2008; Kharita et al., 2011; Korkut et al., 
2010; Kurudirek et al., 2009; Kurudirek, 2014; Mangeret et 
al., 1996; Okuno, 2005; Shultis and Faw, 2005; Singh and 
Badiger, 2014; Yilmaz et al., 2011 




In a specific circuit design, multiple of these techniques can be used concurrently to 
provide greater protection for the designed system. However, one does have to consider 
the complexity of the resulting design and other practical constraints, such as size, 
weight, and cost. 
2.4 Modeling and Simulation Techniques 
At the system design phase, it is important to develop different techniques to evaluate 
various rad-hardened techniques. Of course, the most reliable technique is known as 
radiation-hardness assurance (RHA) which is a physical test using radiation source. RHA 
evaluate whether a system, a subsystem, or a component can operate correctly in the 
given radiation environment. The radiation environment is created by using external 
perturbation sources to perform natural or accelerated particle radiation, laser beam, etc. 
(Quinn et al., 2013; Uznanski et al., 2014; Shaneyfelt et al., 2008). The results from these 
tests are very precise, but the procedure/process can be very complicated and expensive 
(Gorbunov et al., 2011). To achieve relatively quick feedback in the design iteration, 
evaluation of the radiation protection can also be accomplished using modeling and 
computer simulations. Modeling techniques for radiation shielding and simulation of 
radiation effects (TID, DD, and SEEs) are reviewed in following Sections. 
2.4.1 Simulation of Radiation Shielding 
Several modeling and simulation packages have been developed to study radiation 
transport problems by using the Monte Carlo method (Shultis and Faw, 2005), such as 
FLUKA (Ballarini et al., 2007; Fasso et al., 2005; Fasso et al., 2003; Korkut et al., 2012; 
Yue et al., 2009), GEANT4 (Allison, 2006; BAK et al., 2010; Santina et al., 2003; Titt 
and Newhaser, 2005; Zeynali et al., 2012), PHITS (Iwase et al., 2002), SHIELD 
(Dementyev and Sobolevsky, 1999), and MULASSIS (Lei et al., 2002). The solutions 
from some of these packages have been validated with experimental data (Beskrovnaia et 
al., 2008; Fernandez-Hernando et al., 2006; Tessa et al., 2009). There has been a good 
match in the estimates of energy deposition for various materials between the Monte 
Carlo predictions and measurements. In general, all the above packages are potential 
tools for shielding simulation ((Beskrovnaia et al., 2008; Tessa et al., 2009). However, 
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the verification results in  (Beskrovnaia et al., 2008) show that the Monte Carlo 
calculations with FLUKA can be used to estimate the beam stopper thickness in the beam 
direction, GEANT4 code is better for the design of the nuclotron upper shielding, 
shielding of beam transport channel and the transverse size of the beam stopper, and 
SHIELD code is good for both areas but it needs the long period of calculation. 
2.4.2 Simulations of Radiation Effects 
1) Displacement damage simulation 
Accurate prediction of displacement damage is an important step towards the prediction 
of radiation effects. Several special modeling and computation methods have been 
developed (Carter et al., 1975; Chang et al., 2013; Deng et al., 2003; Gittus, 1978; 
Norgett et al., 1975; Marcelot et al., 2015). On the other hand, some solutions have been 
developed by using simulator tools, such as SPECTER and SRIM (Lee and Farnum, 
1995; Ziegler, 2004), the Monte Carlo modeling (Khorsandi, 2007), Monte Carlo 
Radiative Energy Deposition (MRED) code (Reed et al., 2015), ATREE (Roig et al., 
2014b), Technology Computer Aided Design (TCAD) (Wang et al., 2015), and GEANT4 
(Weller et al., 2004). Those solutions are all potential candidates for displacement 
damage simulation. 
A summary of displacement damage simulation is presented in (Srour and Palko, 2015), 
the simulation elements mainly include: particle transport, energy deposition of damage, 
and material response. With respect to these simulation elements, Monte-Carlo 
techniques can be used in the calculation of particle transport and energy deposition, 
while BCA codes work wells for light particles and for heavier particles with energies 
above a few keV; Molecular dynamics approaches are the most suitable to study the 
production of damage in displacement cascades; but there have two difficulties to analyze 
device responses: complex damage structures to the result change in electronic properties 
of the semiconductor material, and the determination of changes in defect structures 
within short time (Srour and Palko, 2015). 
2) Total ionizing dose simulation 
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Several simulations and models for total ionizing dose effects on different devices and 
systems are investigated in (Aguirre and Wirth, 2013; Esqueda, 2007; Esqueda et al., 
2015; Huang et al., 2014; Mikkola, 2008; Schlenvogt et al., 2013; Zebrev and Gorbunov, 
2009; Zebrev et al., 2014; Nasr-Storey et al., 2015; Ding et al., 2014; Marcelot et al., 
2015). Software packages are also proposed to analyze and calculate TID effects, such as 
3D_SPACE software (Specialized Electronic Systems) (Akhmetov et al., 2014), TCAD 
techniques (Passei et al., 2015; Patrick et al., 2015; Petrosjanc et al., 2009; Turowsky et 
al., 2004; Wang et al., 2015), Analog Transient Radiation Effects on Electronics 
(ATREE) (Roig et al., 2014a), Monte Carlo Radiative Energy Deposition (MRED) code 
(Reed et al., 2015), and ECORCE (Etude du COmportement sous Radiation des 
Composants Electroniques) ( Michez et al., 2013, and Michez et al., 2015). 
These computer tools are very useful. However, to get accurate results, the simulation 
tools require sufficient information about technological features of the devices and 
system configurations (Gorbunov et al., 2011). Moreover, it is generally difficult to 
integrate physical models to a circuit-level simulation. Several solutions of transferring 
parameters between physical-level and circuit-level are presented with help of behavioral 
modeling using VHSIC hardware description language (VHDL-AMS) or other Analog-
HDL (Cock et al., 2009; Gorbunov et al., 2011; Jagannathan et al., 2010; Mikkola et al., 
2007a; Mikkola et al., 2007b). All those simulations are more than hundred times faster 
than conventional SPICE-based method and still can achieve a good simulation accuracy. 
3) Single event effects simulation 
Several papers (Dodd, 1996, 2005; Dodd and Massengill, 2003; Reed et al., 2013) have 
provided complete descriptions of the modeling and simulation of single event effects 
and reviewed its history and the evolution. Significant amount of research has been 
focused on the simulation of SEUs and SETs (Aguirre et al., 2007; Artola et al., 2015a; 
Inguimbert and Duzellier, 2004; Tang and Cannon, 2004; Truscott et al., 2004; Warren et 
al., 2008; Reed et al., 2015). Several models are presented for device-level and circuit-
level simulations (Munteanu and Autran, 2008; Song et al., 1988), and different tools are 
applied to calculate and simulate SEEs, such as, the multi-scale single event phenomena 
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predictive platform (MUSCA SEP3) from a system level down to a semiconductor target 
(Artola et al., 2015b; Hubert et al., 2011; Hubert et al., 2014; Velazco et al., 2014), 
TIARA transport tool (Roche et al., 2014), Intel Radiation Tool (IRT) (Seifert, 2015), 
Monte Carlo Radiative Energy Deposition (MRED) code (Weller et al., 2010)and TCAD 
(Huang et al., 2017; Jung et al., 2014; Michez et al., 2015; Rezzak and Wang, 2015; 
Song et al., 2014). In addition, an approach named “mixed-mode” or “mixed-level” 
simulation combines physical-level and circuit-level models to predict the ionizing 
responses is also developed (Davinci, 2003). On the other hand, some approaches 
through software fault injections have also been applied to study, simulate, and analyze 
SEEs (Ruano et al., 2007; Sterpone et al., 2006, Tsiligiannis et al., 2014). 
Those simulation methods can be separated to several levels for the analysis of the 
interaction of ionizing particles with matter: physical-based device models, 
multidimensional device simulations, circuit simulations, and mixed device/circuit 
simulations (Dodd and Massengill, 2003). Physical device simulators focus on the 
prediction of the response of devices to incident radiation, circuit simulators concern the 
modeling of circuit response to a single event, and codes consider the error rate (Dodd 
and Massengill, 2003). 
2.4.3 Summary of Simulation Techniques 
The software tools and modeling techniques to simulate radiation shielding and radiation 
effects on electronics are summarized in Table 2-7, as well as a list of existing 
publications based on modeling and simulation techniques. 
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Table 2-7: Potential approaches of modeling and computer simulations 
Potential approaches References 
Radiation shielding simulation 
Monte Carlo method Shultis and Faw, 2005 
FLUKA 
Ballarini et al., 2007; Fasso et al., 2005; Fasso et al., 2003; Korkut et al., 
2012; Yue et al., 2009 
GEANT4 
Allison, 2006; BAK et al., 2010; Santina et al., 2003; Titt and Newhaser, 
2005; Truscott et al., 2000; Zeynali et al., 2012 
PHITS Iwase et al., 2002 
SHIELD Dementyev and Sobolevsky, 1999 
MULASSIS Lei et al., 2002 
Simulation of displacement damage 
Modeling and computation 
methods 
Chang et al., 2013; Deng et al., 2003; Gittus, 1978; Norgett et al., 1975; 
Marcelot et al., 2015 
SPECTER & SRIM Lee and Farnum, 1995; Ziegler, 2004 
MRED Reed et al., 2015 
ATREE Roig et al., 2014b 
TCAD Wang et al., 2015 
GEANT4 Weller et al., 2004 
Simulation of total ionizing dose effects 
Modeling and computation 
methods 
Aguirre and Wirth, 2013; Esqueda, 2007; Esqueda et al., 2015; Huang et 
al., 2014; Mikkola, 2008; Schlenvogt et al., 2013; Zebrev and Gorbunov, 
2009; Zebrev et al., 2014; Nasr-Storey et al., 2015; Ding et al., 2014; 
Marcelot et al., 2015 
3D_SPACE Akhmetov et al., 2014 
TCAD 
Passeri et al., 2015; Patrick et al., 2015; Petrosjanc et al., 2009; Turowsky 
et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2015 
ATREE Roig et al., 2014a 
MRED Reed et al., 2015 
ECORCE Michez et al., 2013, and Michez et al., 2015 
Multi-level simulation 
Cock et al., 2009; Gorbunov et al., 2011; Jagannathan et al., 2010; Mikkola 
et al., 2007a; Mikkola et al., 2007b 
Simulation of single event effects 
Modeling and computation 
methods 
Artola et al., 2015a; Baumann, 2005; Dodd, 1996, 2005; Dodd and 
Massengill, 2003; Reed et al., 2013 
MUSCA SEP3 
Artola et al., 2015b; Hubert et al., 2011; Hubert et al., 2014; Velazco et al., 
2014 
TIARA Roche et al., 2014 
IRT Seifert, 2015 
TCAD 
Huang et al., 2017; Jung et al., 2014; Michez et al., 2015; Rezzak and 
Wang, 2015; Song et al., 2014 
Mixed-level simulation Davinci, 2003 
Fault injection simulation Ruano et al., 2007; Sterpone et al., 2006, Tsiligiannis et al., 2014 
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Even those simulation results have a good agreement with results from physical test. 
However, it is important to mention that those modeling and simulation methods and 
techniques cannot replace physical tests all-together. It should be viewed as a 
complementary to physical tests. In addition, it can also be used to select electronic 
components and to evaluate radiation-tolerance in the design phase of the system. 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this Chapter, the background of a potential wireless post-accident monitoring system 
in nuclear power plants is briefly discussed. A technical review of radiation effects on 
electronics is presented and existing rad-hardened design techniques are surveyed. In 
addition, Simulation techniques to investigate radiation effects and rad-hardened designs 
are also explained.  
The conventional approach to design electronic equipment with high radiation tolerance 
is based on radiation-hardened components, which has high resistance to ionizing 
radiation but could be excessively expensive. They are only applied in those applications 
where the cost is not a primary concern, such as space exploration, military applications, 
etc. Using ordinary commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components but utilizing rad-
hardened design techniques can also achieve high level of radiation tolerance. 
Furthermore, many new designs have the higher design requirements on speed, storage, 
functions, which are only available through using COTS components.  
Based on those studies, using COTS components combing with rad-hardened design 
techniques and fault-tolerant techniques may provide an effective and economical 
solution to design and to implement the potential wireless monitoring systems for nuclear 
power plants under a severe accident condition. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Analysis of Radiation Responses of Devices and 
Circuits 
To design circuit robust ionizing radiation damages and to accurately analyze their 
behavior under radiation conditions are not only important, but also necessary in the 
design of rad-hardened systems. Unfortunately, conventional electronic simulators, such 
as SPICE, do not consider radiation effects on electronic components so they have no 
capability to simulate radiation responses of devices and circuits. On the other hand, 
physical radiation tests need real radiation environments and are also extremely 
expensive.  
This Chapter starts with the understanding of the mechanism of radiation-induced 
damages on semiconductor devices and circuits, a method is presented to analyze and to 
model responses of semiconductor devices and circuits in strong radiation environments 
by combining with the semi-empirical technique and the numerical technique. It can be 
applied to design circuits and electronic systems against radiation effects in the design 
phase and to evaluate the effectiveness of those circuits and systems without repeated 
destructive tests. Some device models are also described for the post-irradiation 
condition. Finally, a simulation of radiation-induced responses on an ideal p-n junction is 
given as a case study by using Sentaurus Technology Computer-Aided Design (TCAD) 
simulator. 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Degradation Mechanism of Devices and Circuits 
The type of semiconductor electronic components in an electronic system varies widely, 
e.g., microcontroller/microprocessor, memory (RAM/ROM), transceiver, analog-to-
digital converter (ADC), digital-to-analog converter (DAC), operation amplifier, 
multiplexer, logic chips (TTL or CMOS), voltage reference, transistor, diode, etc. 
Moreover, these electronic components may be made by various semiconductor 
technologies, such as Metal-oxide-semiconductor (MOS), bipolar technology, or other 
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technologies. The understanding of the mechanism of radiation effects on various devices 
and circuits are a critical part in the radiation-hardened design. Degradation mechanism 
and radiation effects on MOS/Bipolar devices and circuits are summarized as follows. 
1) MOS devices and circuits 
Due to charges are trapped between the interface and oxide when ionizing radiation 
interacts with semiconductor material of the device, major degradation of MOS device 
and circuit characteristics can be summarized as: (1) threshold voltage shift in MOS 
transistor, then loss of on/off control; (2) mobility degradation; (3) increase in leakage 
currents; and (4) reduction of breakdown voltage (Galloway and Schrimpf, 1990; Michez, 
et al., 2013). 
(1) Threshold voltage shift 
Taken MOSFET device as an example, it usually uses a field oxide to isolate transistor 
channel regions and electrically isolate adjacent transistors. As a result, MOSEFET 
device is sensitive to ionizing radiation due to charge buildup in the field oxide regions. 
The primary effect is a large threshold voltage shift due to radiation-induced positive 
charge (Witczak et al., 2005; Wahle et al., 1990). The shift of N-MOSFETs is usually 
negative due to the buildup of positive trapped charge in the gate oxide, which can be 
partially compensated by the buildup of negative interface trapped charge; and the charge 
in interface traps of P-MOSFETs is predominantly positive (Galloway and Schrimpf, 
1990). 
(2) Mobility degradation 
When radiation-induced charges scatter in interface traps, except the shift of the threshold 
voltage, it also significantly degrades the channel mobility in MOSFETs, and mobility 
degradation can result in the significant reduction in transconductance and current-drive 
capability. Then a loss of drive capability can be encountered due to increasing the 
threshold voltage and/or reducing the mobility (Galloway and Schrimpf, 1990). 
(3) Leakage currents 
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Radiation-induced charge also has significant effects on the subthreshold characteristics 
due to it decreases the sensitivity of surface potential to gate voltage and results in the 
change in the gate voltage. This degradation leads to that subthreshold current increases 
at a given gate voltage below threshold (Galloway and Schrimpf, 1990). For N-
MOSFETs, the subthreshold leakage current increases at a given gate voltage meanwhile 
the threshold voltage reduces. In addition, the surface recombination velocity at SiO2-Si 
interface increases, it also leads to the increasing of the junction leakage current 
(Galloway and Schrimpf, 1990). 
(4) Breakdown voltage 
For power DMOS devices, in general, ionizing radiation leads to the reduction of its 
breakdown voltage. The change of high voltage DMOS devices is much more than that of 
low voltage device (Galloway and Schrimpf, 1990). 
Major effects on MOS integrated circuits can be summarized as: (1) the increasing of the 
static power supply current because of the increasing of the leakage current; (2) the 
generation of leakage paths between circuit nodes due to the change of the surface 
potential; (3) the issue of the power supply because of the increase in leakage current; 
and (4) propagation delay and/or the change of circuit timing parameter which depend on 
the mobility of the charge carriers and the threshold voltage (Galloway and Schrimpf, 
1990). 
2) Bipolar devices and circuits 
When ionizing radiations pass through bipolar device, due to an increase in the density of 
interface traps at the surface of the extrinsic base region and positive charge buildup, the 
degradation of bipolar transistor include two aspects: the increase of recombination 
current, and the reducing the common-emitter current gain (Johnston et al., 1994). 
As a result, when a device includes p-n junctions, photocurrent will be generated due to 
the transport of generated carriers within the oxide when it is exposed to ionizing 
radiation. The total photocurrent (𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙) is the sum of the prompt photocurrent from the 
depletion region (𝐽𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙), the diffusion photocurrent from n region (𝐽𝑝), and the diffusion 
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photocurrent from p region (𝐽𝑛). The prompt photocurrent is caused by electron-hole-
pairs generated in the depletion region, which are immediately swept out and appear a 
photocurrent flowed from n-side to p-side (Alexandr, 2003). The amplitude is determined 
by the electron charge times (𝑞), the generation coefficient (𝑔0), the dose rate (?̇?), and the 
volume of the depletion region (Wirth and Rogers, 1964; Alexandr, 2003). On the other 
hand, the diffusion photocurrent is caused by excess minority carriers reached the edge of 
the depletion region, which are swept across the p-n junction and generate a photocurrent 
under the steady state condition. If carriers are further away than the diffusion 
length (𝐿𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑝), they do not contribute to the photocurrent (Alexandr, 2003). 
Taking a diode as an example, major radiation-induced effects are the increase of the 
reverse current and the changes of the forward voltage (Aguirre and Wirth, 2013). The 
radiation response is represented a linear current source (𝐼𝑝) in the model of diode. 
Semiconductor materials, three dimensional structures, and radiation dose rate can affect 
this current source. 
The physical construction of BJTs consists of a pair of p-n junctions close together. When 
they are exposed to ionizing radiation, the density of interface traps increases at the 
surface of the extrinsic base region; and positive charges build up in the emitter-base 
depletion region (Schlenvogt et al., 2013). The typical response is a large increase of base 
current (𝐼𝑏) and a slight change of the collector current(𝐼𝑐). As a result, the primary 
ionizing response of BJTs is the degradation of the current gain β (𝐼𝑐/𝐼𝑏), particularly at 
the low dose-rates (Gorbunov et al., 2009; Jagannathan et al., 2010). Generally, NPN 
BJTs are more sensitive than PNP BJTs because NPN BJTs have a much lower doping 
level in p-doped base region than the p-emitter region of PNP BJTs, which easily leads to 
the inversion (Ruano et al., 2007). The photocurrents of ionizing radiation responses are 
represented by two linear current sources in parallel with base/emitter and base/collector 
in the NPN BJT model. 
Due to total dose damage in bipolar devices is not self-scaling, it depends on the 
perimeter-to-area ratio, and oxide properties and current density, there are therefore no 
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simple parameters that can be used to characterize the general behavior of bipolar devices 
with widely differing designs and geometries (Johnston et al., 1994). 
3.1.2 Photocurrent Modeling of a p-n Junction 
1) Overview 
When a silicon device consists of one or more p-n junctions, whose geometry is 
illustrated in Figure 3-1 (Alexander, 2003), photocurrents are generated due to the 
transport of generated carriers in device depletion regions and/or within diffusion regions, 
which are named the prompt photocurrent and the diffusion photocurrent.  
 
Figure 3-1: The layout of p-n geometry (Alexander, 2003)  
For p-n junctions, the total photocurrent (𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙) is the sum of the prompt photocurrent 
from the depletion region (𝐽𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙), the diffusion photocurrent from n region (𝐽𝑝), and the 
diffusion photocurrent from p region (𝐽𝑛), which is indicated in Eq. (3-1) (Wirth & 
Rogers, 1964). 
.npdepltotal JJJJ ++=    (3-1) 
The analytical and experimental solutions of photocurrents in semiconductor devices 
have been developed since mid-1960s in (Gleason et al., 2013; Wirth & Rogers, 1964; 
Wunsch & Axness, 1992; Dierking, 1969; Raymond & Willis, 1965; Enlow & 
Alexander, 1988; Ishaque, et al., 1991; Alexander, 2003; Ishaque, 1989; Fjeldly et al., 
2001; Kerr et al., 2012; Gwyn et al., 1967). This section provides a summary of those 













The prompt photocurrent is caused by electron-hole-pairs generated in the depletion 
region, which are immediately swept out and appear a photocurrent flowed from n-side to 
p-side (Alexander, 2003). The amplitude is determined by the electron charge times (𝑞), 
the generation coefficient (𝑔0), the dose rate (?̇?), and the volume of the depletion region 
(Wirth & Rogers, 1964; Alexander, 2003). Assuming a carrier starts at a distance 𝑥0 from 
the depletion edge, the velocity is a constant and can be expressed as (Wunsh & Axness, 
1992). 
Table 3-1: Definitions of constants and variables used for the simulation of ionizing 
radiation effects on semiconductor devices (Wirth & Rogers, 1964; Alexander, 2003) 
Symbol Definition Unit 
𝑞 electron charge = 1.602 × 10−19 𝐶 
𝑘 Boltzmann constant = 1.381 × 10−23 𝐽/𝐾 
𝑔0 the uniform generation term = 4.3 × 10
13 1/𝑐𝑚3 · 𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝑆𝑖) 
𝑢𝑛,  𝑢𝑝 electron and hole mobility 𝑐𝑚2/𝑉 · 𝑠 
𝜏𝑛, 𝜏𝑝 electron and hole lifetime 𝑠 
𝑇 temperature 𝐾 
?̇? the ionizing dose rate 𝑟𝑎𝑑 (𝑆𝑖)/𝑠 
𝐺 electron-hole generation rate 𝐺 = 𝑔0?̇? 1/𝑠 · 𝑐𝑚
3 
𝐸𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙 E field in the depletion region 𝑣/𝑐𝑚 
𝐸𝑛, 𝐸𝑝 E field in the p-side region and in the n-side region 𝑣/𝑐𝑚 
𝐷𝑛 , 𝐷𝑝 
the electron diffusion coefficient in p-side and the 
hole diffusion coefficient in n-side 
(𝑘𝑇 𝑞⁄ )𝑢𝑛 
𝑈𝑛 , 𝑈𝑝 recombination rate  𝑈𝑛 =
∆𝑛
𝜏𝑛⁄ , 𝑈𝑝 =
∆𝑝
𝜏𝑝⁄  1/𝑠 · 𝑐𝑚
3 
∆𝑛(𝑥, 𝑡) 
electrons generated by ionization per unit volume 
= 𝑛(𝑥, 𝑡) −  𝑛(𝑥, 0) 
𝑐𝑚−3 
∆𝑝(𝑥, 𝑡) 
holes generated by ionization per unit volume = 
𝑝(𝑥, 𝑡) −  𝑝(𝑥, 0) 
𝑐𝑚−3 
𝑊𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙 the depletion region width 𝑐𝑚 
𝐿𝑛, 𝐿𝑝 
the diffusion length in p-side silicon and n-side 
silicon 
𝑐𝑚 












𝑢 : the minority carrier mobility  
𝑥 : the carrier position at time 𝑡 , 𝑥 = −𝑢𝐸𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑡 + 𝑥0  













J   (3-3) 
On the other hand, the diffusion photocurrent is caused by excess minority carriers 
reached the edge of the depletion region, which are swept across the p-n junction and 
generate a photocurrent under the steady state condition. If carriers are further away than 
the diffusion length (𝐿𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑝), they do not contribute to the photocurrent (Alexander, 
2003). According to the current flow equations, the diffusion photocurrent includes both a 















−=   (3-5) 
According to electron and hole continuity equations, the time rate of changed excess 
carriers is depended on the generated carriers, the recombined carriers, and the 
divergence of the carrier flow within the volume, which are indicated in Eq. (3-6) and Eq. 




























   (3-7) 
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Combining Eq. (3-4) to Eq. (3-7), the behavior of excess electrons and holes generated by 







































































   (3-9) 
According to the number of excess carriers generated by radiation particles, applications 
can be separated into two categories conditions: low injection level and high injection 
level. At low injection level, the number of carriers is much less than the doping 
concentration. On the other hand, as the dose rate increases or in heavily doped p-n 
junctions, the density of excess generated carriers may approach or surpass the density of 
majority carriers in p-side and/or n-side.  The analysis results of photocurrent modeling 
may therefore not accurate. (Alexander, 2003; Fjeldly et al., 2001).  
2) Low injection level 
At low injection level, the diffusion length (𝐿𝑛, 𝐿𝑝) depends on the minority carrier 
diffusion coefficient (𝐷𝑛, 𝐷𝑝) and minority carrier lifetime (𝜏𝑛, 𝜏𝑝), which are indicated in 
Eq. (3-10) and Eq. (3-11). The minority carrier lifetime is a constant, which can be 
obtained from Shockley-Reed-Hall (SRH) recombination statistics for semiconductors. 
The minority carrier diffusion coefficient is determined by the minority carrier mobility 
(𝑢𝑛, 𝑢𝑝) and 
𝑘𝑇
𝑞⁄ . 
.nnn DL =  (3-10) 
.ppp DL =  (3-11) 
Wirth-Rogers provided a solution for infinite p-n junctions with negligible electric fields 
based on several assumptions of one-dimensional geometry, uniformly doping, and 
constant across voltage (Wirth & Rogers, 1964). For example, for a pulse function with 
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magnitude 𝐺 and duration 𝑇, the solution of Wirth-Rogers for the n-side region is 
indicated in Eq. (3-12) (Wirth & Rogers, 1964). 
( ) ( )





















    (3-12) 
Enlow-Alexander presented an approximate solution in (Gleason et al., 2013), which use 
Laplace transform techniques for a lightly doped p-n diode with a constant E-field. 
However, it is inaccurate if ohmic fields are greater than about 10 V/cm (Wunsch & 
Axness, 1992). Wunsch-Axness also provided a time domain solution for the lightly 
doped p-n diode, which is appropriate for many modern device structures, whose solution 
for the n-side region is indicated in Eq. (3-13) (Wunsch & Axness, 1992). The steady 
state solution is indicated in Eq. (3-14) (Wunsch & Axness, 1992). 
( ) ( )
( ) 
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    (3-14) 
where 
Г : the gamma function 
𝛾 : the incomplete gamma function 
𝑐𝑚 = (𝑚𝜋 𝐿𝑝 𝑥𝑛⁄ )
2







𝜁𝑝 = 𝑥𝑛 𝐿𝑝⁄   
3) High injection level 
At high injection level, the concept of the depletion region loses validity and boundary 
conditions are difficult to define. The following assumptions in the condition of low level 
injection are inappropriate for the high injection level (Alexander, 2003): 
(1) As the dose rate increases, the excess carrier density increases until the traps 
saturate, and the lifetime reaches the saturated Shockley-Reed-Hall (SRH) 
lifetime. For the very high ionizing dose rates, the recombination process changes 
from trap assisted to direct band-to-band and the lifetime decreases significantly 
(Alexander, 2003). 
(2) When the density of excess carriers approaches the density of majority carriers, 
electrons and holes do not move respectively, the movement generates an 
imbalance in charge and an internal electric field (Alexander, 2003). 
(3) The diffusion coefficient and mobility of minority carriers may approach the 
ambipolar diffusion coefficient and mobility if the density of excess carriers is 
high enough (Alexander, 2003). 
(4) The effective diffusion length will be increased due to the effect of the ambipolar 
diffusion (Alexander, 2003). 
In consequence, the complete transport equations for the high injection level are very 
difficult to solve analytically (Ishaque et al., 1989; Fjeldly et al., 2001). Gleason-
Schlenvogt developed a transient physics and equivalent circuit model for the high 
injection level, which was examined with TCAD simulations and the experimental data 
of physical radiation test (Gleason et al., 2013). The limitation is that the steady-state 
current is determined by analytical solutions, which are also limited to the scope of their 
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assumptions. Fjeldly-Ytterdal presented the stationary and dynamic model to simulate the 
photocurrents of semiconductor devices for a wide range of ionizing radiation intensities 
(Fjeldly et al., 2001), whose transient photocurrent (𝐼𝐺) is indicated in Eq. (3-15). 
( ) .ndnpdpdepltotal LGLGGWqJ ++=   (3-15) 
Effective e-h generation rates (𝐺𝑝, 𝐺𝑛) are related to the dynamic voltages 𝑉𝐺𝑝 and 𝑉𝐺𝑛, 
which are represented by RC equivalent delay circuits (Fjeldly et al., 2001). However, 
this solution is depended on the choice of parameters and delay times are difficulty to 
determine. 
3.1.3 Problem Statement 
In general, the purpose of modeling photocurrent is to predict the ionizing responses of 
semiconductor devices and to analysis the response of a circuit or a system. As previously 
discussed, accurate predictions of photocurrent must consider 3-D structures and the 
appropriate formulations for different radiation dose rates (Alexander, 2003). However, it 
is very complicated and also difficult to resolve to those equations for general 
applications due to it depends on the selection of boundary conditions and assumptions 
for different radiation dose rates and/or different doped silicones. As a result, the major 
issue is the determination of photocurrents in different applications, particularly those 
applications in the high injection level.  
On the other hand, existing solutions is usually implemented with Gummel-Poon 
transistor models. The appropriate current sources are inserted into devices models to 
simulate the responses of photocurrents. However, Gummel-Poon transistor models are 
non-linear and needs high computational costs. Hence, they are usually only used in 
circuit simulators, e.g. SPICE, and not suitable for low-cost online algorithm. 
3.1.4 The Framework of the Proposed Analysis Method 
This work combines the semi-empirical technique and the numerical technique to 
investigate a method for the analysis of ionizing radiation responses of devices and 




Figure 3-2: Flow diagram of the developed analysis method 
Photocurrents of semiconductor devices can be calculated in TCAD. Then, the results are 
integrated into the modified nodal analysis (MNA) circuit equations to analyze radiation-
induced responses of circuits.  
(1) Device modeling for post-irradiation: linear mathematical models of 
semiconductor devices can be established for post-irradiation based on radiation 
responses, which can be calculated in TCAD. 
(2) Sub-circuit analysis: based on device models, the proprieties of sub-circuit for 
post-irradiation can be calculated by the using of MNA equation. 
(3) Large system analysis: a whole system can be separated into a number of sub-
circuit blocks, whose radiation responses can be obtained through Step 2. Then, 
radiation response of the whole system can be analyzed by the integration of all 
sub-circuit blocks. 
3.2 Development of Device Models 
3.2.1 Diode Model 
1) Diode response 
Mathematical modeling of semiconductor 
devices for post-irradiation 
Determination parameters of radiation 
responses for semiconductor devices in TCAD  
Sub-circuits analysis for post-irradiation with 
MNA equations 
Large system analysis for post-irradiation 





As previously discussed, photocurrent will be generated due to the transport of generated 
carriers within the oxide when diodes are exposed to ionizing radiation. Major radiation-
induced effects in diodes are a general increase of the reverse current and the changes of 
the forward voltage (Snow et al., 1967). The Companion model of diode for post-
irradiation in this work is illustrated in Figure 3-3. The radiation response is represented 
as a linear current source (𝐼𝑝) in the model of diode, which is determined by 
semiconductor materials, three dimensional structures, and radiation dose rate. 
 
Figure 3-3: Companion model of diode for post-irradiation 
2) Diode modeling 
















   (3-20) 
where 
𝐼𝑠𝑎𝑡 is the reverse saturation current, 
 𝑣𝑑 is the applied bias,  
𝑉𝑇 ≜ 𝑘𝑇/𝑞  is the thermal voltage, 
 𝜂 ≈ 1 is the ideality factor 
Assuming the diode is biased at 𝑣𝑑
𝑘  and 𝑖𝑑
𝑘. The diode element stamp for before- and post-
irradiation can be expressed in Eq. (3-21). 
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  (3-21) 
where 
𝐺𝑒𝑞
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3.2.2 BJT Model 
1) BJT response 
The physical construction of BJTs consists of a pair of p-n junctions closed together. 
When they are exposed to ionizing radiation, the density of interface traps increases at the 
surface of the extrinsic base region; and positive charges build up in the emitter-base 
depletion region (Johnston et al., 1994). The typical response is a large increase of base 
current (𝐼𝑏) and a slight change of the collector current(𝐼𝑐). As a result, the primary 
ionizing response of BJTs is the degradation of the current gain β (𝐼𝑐/𝐼𝑏), particularly at 
the low dose-rates (Zhao et al., 2015; Montagner et al., 1998). Generally, NPN BJTs are 
more sensitive than PNP BJTs because NPN BJTs have a much lower doping level in p-
doped base region than the p-emitter region of PNP BJTs, which easily leads to the 
inversion (Johnston et al., 1994). Some models for ionizing radiation responses of BJTs 
have been developed in (Fjeldly et al., 2001; Zhao et al., 2015; Montagner et al., 1998; 
Kleiner and Messenger, 1982). In those models, photocurrents are represented as linear 
current sources to insert into each junction in BJT devices. 
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The Companion model of the NPN BJT for post-irradiation in this work is illustrated in 
Figure 3-4. The photocurrents of ionizing radiation responses are represented by two 
linear current sources (𝐼𝑝𝑒𝑏 and 𝐼𝑝𝑐𝑏) in parallel with base/emitter and base/collector in 
the NPN BJT model. Different responses may be generated when BJTs are the part in 
different circuits. To accurately model the radiation response of BJTs, both the forward 
and inverse parameters have to involve into the model (Alexander, 2003). 
 
Figure 3-4: Companion model of NPN BJT for post-irradiation 
2) BJT modeling 
The element equations of the NPN BJT with Ebers-Moll model for before-irradiation are 


























































  (3-23) 
( ) .ceb iii +−=  (3-24) 
where 
𝐼𝑒𝑠 is the emitter junction saturation current, 𝐼𝑐𝑠 is the collector junction saturation 
current, 





































 is typically in the range 0.1 and 0.5 for the reverse active region. 
The element stamp of NPN BJT for before- and post-irradiation is expressed in Eq. 3-25. 
( )
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𝑒𝑣𝑏𝑒/𝑣𝑇𝑒  , 𝑔𝑒𝑐 ≜ 𝑎𝑅
𝐼𝑐𝑠
𝑉𝑇𝑐
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==     (3-26) 
3.3 Case Study: Radiation-Induced Responses of an Ideal 
p-n Diode in TCAD 
3.3.1 Simulation Parameters 
The radiation-induced responses of an ideal diode with constant doping are performed in 
TCAD. For simplicity, only one-dimensional geometry is considered in the calculation 
and simulation. Simulation parameters of the ideal diode are summarized in Table 3-2, 
which are taken from the references (Fjeldly et al., 2001; Kerr et al., 2012). 
Table 3-2: Simulation parameters of an ideal p-n diode 
Parameter Value 
Radiation source 
Pulse width 5e-8s 
Pulse dose-rate 0, 2, 1E4, 1E9 Rad (Si)/s 
p-n junction n-side p-side 
𝑊𝑛, 𝑊𝑝 2.8875e-6m 2.8875e-6m 
𝐷𝑛, 𝐷𝑝 1.036e-3 m
2/s 2.59e-3 m2/s 
𝜏𝑝 2e-5 s 2e-5 s 
Doping 1e16 m-3 1e16 m-3 
Depletion region 
𝑊𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙 1.225e-6 m 
 




Figure 3-5: The simulation structure of the ideal p-n diode in TCAD 
3.3.2 Simulation Results 
Two cases with different biases are considered in this simulation. One is to obtain photo-
current with forward bias and another one is reverse bias. 
1) Photo-current with forward bias 
Under various voltages, simulation results of photo-current response of an ideal p-n under 
forward bias are listed in Table 3-3 and shown in Figure 3-6. 
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1.0E9 Rad (Si) /s 1.0E9 Rad (Si) /s 2 Rad (Si) /s 0 
0 -9.97777 -14.9778 -18.5881 -19.3842 0.00 
1 -10.2184 -11.5074 -11.5073 -11.5073 0.30 
2 -6.49530 -6.49528 -6.49528 -6.49528 0.60 
3 -3.91851 -3.91851 -3.91851 -3.91851 0.90 
4 -3.40214 -3.40214 -3.40214 -3.40214 1.20 
5 -3.17658 -3.17658 -3.17658 -3.17658 1.50 
6 -3.17658 -3.17658 -3.17658 -3.17658 1.50 
7 -3.17658 -3.17658 -3.17658 -3.17658 1.50 
8 -9.97775 -14.2648 -14.3579 -14.3579 0.00 
9 -9.97777 -14.9778 -18.6548 -20.0148 0.00 
10 -9.97777 -14.9778 -18.6487 -20.0454 0.00 
 
 








































1.0E9 Rad (Si)/s 1.0E4 Rad (Si)/s 2 Rad (Si) /s 0 Rad (Si) /s Voltage
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2) Photo-current with reverse bias 
Under various voltages, simulation results of photo-current response of an ideal p-n under 
reverse bias are listed in Table 3-4 and shown in Figure 3-7. 





1.0E9 Rad (Si) /s 1.0E9 Rad (Si) /s 2 Rad (Si) /s 0 
0 -9.97777  -14.9777  -18.7234 -19.7953 0.00 
1 -9.83609 -14.6456  -15.0951 -15.0953 0.30 
2 -9.73038 -14.5716 -15.0854 -15.0855 0.60 
3 -9.64705 -14.5141 -15.0927 -15.0930 0.90 
4 -9.57802 -14.4502 -15.0436 -15.0439 1.20 
5 -9.51878 -14.3934 -14.9939 -14.9943 1.50 
6 -9.51878 -14.4415 -15.2293 -15.2296 1.50 
7 -9.51878 -14.4415 -15.2293 -15.2296 1.50 
8 -9.97779 -14.5096 -14.3825 -14.3824 0.00 
9 -9.97777 -14.9778 -18.7234 -19.5144 0.00 





Figure 3-7: Photo-current response of an ideal p-n diode under reverse bias in 
TCAD 
3.3.3 Discussion 
Based on simulation results and studies in this work, the following discussions apply to 
this simulation results: 
• Under the condition of both forward bias and reverse bias, simulation results have 
shown that photo-current increases when total dose rate increases under both 
forward bias and reverse bias. However, it is more intense than that of reverse 
bias. 
• Under the condition of the variable voltage, the results have shown that photo-
currents under different conditions, such as forward or reverse biases, or low/high 
















































In this Chapter, a method is proposed to analyze radiation responses of MOS/Bipolar 
devices and circuits, as well as two device models are investigated for the post-irradiation 
condition. Some simulations in TCAD have been also performed to obtain radiation-
induced responses of an ideal p-n diode. The simulation results show that photo-current 
under different radiation conditions decreases significantly if the bias voltage is reduced 
to zero. Therefore, the damage to the semiconductor device by the accumulated photo-
current may be averted if the device is de-energized quickly. 
In fact, destructive single event effects, such as SEL, SES, SEB, and SEGR, are all 
caused by accumulated current and their effects can be mitigated if the current is quickly 
removed.  Moreover, non-destructive single event effects, such as SET, SEU, and SEFI, 
can be recovered by using data re-initialization and/or system recovery, which can also be 
accomplished by rapid power off. Methods of rapid power off are therefore highly 
effectively in protecting electronic systems under ionizing radiation.  It can be a potential 
solution to mitigate the damages of single event effects. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Design Part I: Component Selection 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, an electronic system built with regular commercial off-the-
shelf components will definitely be damaged when cumulative total dose is 1 M Rad (Si) 
(Messenger and Ash, 1991). Radiation effects on various devices, circuits and systems 
are different, depending on their unique materials, structure, manufacturing technologies, 
and applications, where the dose range is typically in the range of 104-108 rad (Si) 
(Foster, 2003). Therefore, some techniques have to be used to reduce total dose then to 
make electronic device more resistant to the effects of total ionizing dose. Two 
approaches are involved in this research to mitigate damages of total ionizing dose: (1) 
component selection, which is to select regular commercial components with high 
radiation resistance for the give total dose limit; and (2) radiation shielding protection, 
which is to use shielding materials for the reduction of total dose to be less than the given 
level. The former is discussed in this Chapter and the latter will be explained in the next 
Chapter.  
Component selection is a significant step in the design phase of COTS-based radiation-
tolerant systems. This Chapter starts with the investigation of radiation-tolerances of 
various regular COTS components are investigated. Based on the result of the 
investigation, the total dose limit in this work is defined as 20 K Rad (Si) in this work. 
Subsequently, the principle of component selection is given. Then, a method is proposed 
to assess radiation resistance through using a radiation degradation factor. Finally, a 
number of component candidates for the implementation of the proposed wireless 
monitoring system are given. 
4.1 The Investigation of Radiation-Tolerance for COTS 
Components 
4.1.1 Radiation Damages Thresholds on Electronics 
Selecting COTS components with high radiation resistances is the significant step to 
achieve a radiation-tolerant system. Therefore, the understanding of radiation effects on 
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these devices and technologies and the investigation of their radiation-tolerances are vital 
in the design of the radiation-tolerant system. Radiation damages thresholds on 
electronics are summarized in Table 4-1 (Houssay, 2000). 
Table 4-1: Radiation damages thresholds on electronics 
Device Type/Comments Threshold level (Gy) 
Digital IC 
Bipolar logic 100-106 
JFET, MESFET logic 105 





Bipolar linear circuit 10-104 
MOS linear circuit 10-100 
Operational amplifiers and comparators 50-106 
Voltage regulator 103-106 
Analog-to-digital converter 100-104 




Rectifying diode 103 
Switching diode 105 
Zener and avalanche diode 105-106 
Schottky diode 106 
Microwave diode 106 
Varactor diode 105 
Transistor 






Light emitting diode 106 
Opto-coupler 103-106 
Laser diode 100-104 
Vacuum tube  106 
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Device Type/Comments Threshold level (Gy) 
Crystal 
Synthetic quartz crystal 104 
Natural quartz 100 
Resistors 
Precision wire-wound ceramic bobbin 106-1010 
Metal film 105-109 
Precision wire-wound epoxy bobbin, carbon film 104-107 
Other film 104-107 
Composition 103-105 











Depends on the hardness of the former and the 
insulator materials 
10-106 
Cables  at least 106 
Connector  
Polystyrene – dose to produce 25% damage 6*107 
Polyethylene – dose to produce 25% damage 9*105 
Duroc ceramic – dose to produce 25% damage 3*106 
Melamine plastic 3*106 
Relay 
Switch based, asbestos filled phenolformald 1*107 
Switch based, unfilled phenolformald 1*105 
 
4.1.2 The Definition of Total Dose Limit  
According to radiation damage thresholds on electronics summarized in Table 4-1, 
semiconductor devices are more sensitive to ionizing radiation than other electronic 
devices. Radiation-tolerance by a family of regular commercial semiconductor 
components is shown in Figure 4-1, which can also be used as a reference in the 
component selection.  




Figure 4-1: Radiation tolerance by a family of COTS components (Houssay, 2000) 
According to radiation damages thresholds in Table 4-1 and radiation tolerance in Figure 
4-1, as well as radiation test data in the literature (Boutte et al., 2013; Cochran et al., 
2008; Cochran et al., 2006), most semiconductor components will experience device 
degradation and radiation damages when the total dose is more than 20 K Rad (Si) (1 Gy 
= 100 Rad (Si)) (Messenger and Ash, 1991).  Therefore, the total dose limit is defined as 
20 K Rad (Si) in this work. The radiation-resistances of selected candidate components 
should be more than this total dose limit. 
4.2 The Method of Component Selection  
4.2.1 The Principle of Component Selection 
Referring to radiation test data from the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the 
principles of component selection in this work are listed as follows: 
Linear ICs (Si-bipolar) 
Total dose (Gy) 
1000000 100000 1000
0 
1000 100 10 1 
Digital ICs (GaAs) 




Digital ICs (Si-bipolar) 
Bipolar transistors 
Power transistors (bipolar) 
Digital ICs (SOS/SOI) 
Digital ICs (Si-CMOS) 
MOSFET transistors  
Digital ICs (Si-MOS)  
Linear ICs (Si-MOS)  
No degradation Minor damage Major damage 
20 K Rad (Si) 
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• To implement redundant channels and their spares with diversity semiconductor 
technologies, e.g., One channel uses bipolar components, second channel uses 
CMOS components, and third channel uses hybrid components; 
• To select semiconductor component with higher radiation resistance by the 
calculation of its radiation degradation factor based on radiation test data, the 
selected component should work normally under the condition of total dose 20 K 
Rad (Si); 
• To improve the radiation resistance of each channel by the assessment of 
reliability under the given radiation conditions. 
4.2.2 The Assessment Method of Component Selection 
To take radiation effects in consideration in system reliability analysis, a new method for 
electronic systems has been developed (Lauridsen et al., 1996a; Lauridsen et al., 1996b). 
This method uses radiation degradation factors(∆), instead of the usual failure rate data 
of an item in the reliability model, as input to describe the radiation response of this item 
under a total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡, which will lie in the interval [0, 1] and can be defined as 
follows: 
( ) ( ) .1,/min 00 ft PPPP −−=     (4-1) 
A detailed description of the radiation degradation factor can be found in Lauridsen et al., 
1996b. 























  (4-2) 
Previous research (Lauridsen, et al., 1996a; Lauridsen, et al., 1996b) has derived the 
parameter values of radiation degradation from real radiation test data; with radiation 
degradation functions which are used to describe how the material and/or components 
change their properties under given radiation conditions. Radiation degradation functions 
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are separated into three categories in (Lauridsen, et al., 1996b), as shown in Figure 4-2 
(Lauridsen, et al., 1996b). 
(1) Piece-wise linear radiation degradation function, with logarithmic dose values and 
linear parameter values; 
(2) Linear radiation degradation function in the entire range of exposure; and 
(3) Constant radiation degradation function. The value 1 is up to 𝐷𝑓, and the value 0 
is assumed to fail abruptly at the threshold dose. 
 
Figure 4-2: Radiation degradation functions derived from Lauridsen, et al., 1996b 
Due to the fact that semiconductor components may have a number (𝑛𝑝) of critical 
parameters, in this study, the radiation degradation factor is defined as the mean value of 
those degradation factors of all critical parameters, which can be described as follows. 
log (Dose) 
Df Dt 0 
P0 
Parameter value 
f: “at failure” 
t: “at time t” 
(c)     Simple radiation degradation function 
log (Dose) 





f: “at failure” 
t: “at time t” 
(b) Linear curve in the entire range of exposure 
log (Dose) 





f: “at failure” 
t: “at time t” 
(a) Piece-wise linear radiation degradation function 
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=      (4-3) 
4.3 Selected Candidate Components  
The difficulty of the assessment lies in determining the degradation factors for 
semiconductor devices. Most of radiation degradation factors under different radiation 
doses in this study come from NASA Goddard Space Flight Center radiation test data, 
which are available from online resources; others are derived from the existing literature 
(Messenger and Ash, 1991; Houssay, 2000; Kulkami and Agarwal, 2003). Specifically, 
𝑃𝑓 of some components are not easy to obtain from the NASA database and literature, 
and are instead derived from specification limits of electronic parameters. Selected 
candidate components for the proposed wireless monitoring system and their radiation 
degradation factors for various total doses are summarized in Table 4-2.  
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Table 4-2: The summary of selected candidate components and radiation 
degradation factors 
Device Type Device Δ10K Δ20K Δ50K Δ100K 
BJT 2N2222 0.1940 0.3201 0.4267 0.4591 
Voltage reference 
LT1021 0.0774 0.1010 0.2104 0.3432 
LT1009 0.0642 0.1099 0.5158 0.5786 
MP5010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AD580 0.1510 0.0181 0.0087 0.0094 
REF-10 0.1408 0.3371 0.3204 0.3846 
AD780 0.0039 0.0229 0.0246 0.0209 
TL431 0.0055 0.0269 0.0238 0.0646 
LM117HVK 0.1639 0.2916 0.2933 0.2464 
LP2951 0.1226 0.1737 0.3277 0.5699 
UDS2983 0.3607 0.2557 0.2472 0.2541 
OP amplifier 
CLC502 0.0208 0.0365 0.0383 0.0365 
PA51M 0.0409 0.0770 0.2989 0.2168 
LM108 0.2377 0.3964 0.6620 0.6537 
LM136 0.0098 0.0186 0.2431 0.2593 
MC35181 0.0689 0.1551 0.3673 0.5151 
LM317 0.2970 0.4120 0.5294 0.5568 
PA07M 0.1360 0.0764 0.1757 0.2717 
OP43 0.1409 0.3128 0.4047 0.4182 
AD544 0.1331 0.3963 0.4759 0.5132 
AD713 0.3271 0.6739 0.8221 0.7451 
MP3518 0.0689 0.1551 0.3673 0.5151 
TL074 0.2402 0.3267 0.3742 0.3250 
Analog-to-digital 
converter 
AD574 0.0178 0.0486 0.0633 0.0649 
AD674 0.1735 0.1503 0.2741 0.3345 
AD7885 0.0181 0.0229 0.0246 0.0209 
AD713 0.2265 0.3899 0.4286 0.3926 
E2PROM 28C010 0.0187 0.0465 0.1001 0.1179 
FPGA A1280 0.0023 0.0244 0.1341 0.1326 
Microcontroller 82C59 0.0638 0.0654 0.0985 0.1190 
Logic gate 
54AC02 0.0469 0.0494 0.0480 0.0724 





In this Chapter, radiation resistances of regular COTS components have been 
investigated. The results have shown that semiconductor-based electronic devices are 
more sensitive to ionizing radiation than that of other components. According to radiation 
damage threshold on electronic and radiation test data in literature, the total dose limit is 
defined as 20 K Rad (Si) in this work.  
On the other hand, the principle of component selection is also given in this Chapter, as 
well as the assessment method of radiation tolerance in the selecting of semiconductor 
devices. Based on radiation test data in literature, a number of selected candidate 
components and their radiation degradation factors are also presented.  Many radiation 
tests for simpler semiconductor devices have been performed in literature, such as BJT, 
operator amplifier, analog-to-digital converter, voltage reference, logic gate, etc. 
However, there have a limit number of test data for more complicate modern devices, 
such as microcontroller, microprocessor, wireless transceiver, etc. More investigations of 
radiation test for those modern devices need be investigated in the future.  
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Chapter 5  
5 Design Part II: Multi-Layer Radiation Shielding 
Protection 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, it is necessary and also important to find a way to reduce the 
cumulative total dose to be less than 20 K Rad (Si). Otherwise, COTS-based electronic 
systems cannot survive for a period of long time when the cumulative total dose is1 M 
Rad (Si). As studied in the literature, shielding protection is an effective solution to 
mitigate radiation damages, and to increase the reliability and the lifespan of electronic 
systems. It is therefore considered as a solution to reduce the total dose in this work. 
This Chapter starts with potential shielding materials to mitigate damages of total dose 
and related problem statement. Then, the design of a multi-layer shielding protection is 
presented in detail. A method to calculate the required shielding thickness according to 
the given radiation condition is also covered. Finally, a multi-layer radiation shielding 
protection is designed with several different solutions for the application of wireless 
monitoring in nuclear power plants. 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Background 
As previously mentioned in Section 4.1.2, the objective of a radiation shielding 
protection is to decrease the cumulative total dose to be less than 20 K Rad (Si) from the 
given cumulative dose (1 M Rad (Si)), so as to avoid common-mode damages for 
redundant systems. Therefore, the cumulative total dose measured after the shielding 
protection must be less than 20 K Rad (Si). Because the selected electronic devices in the 
design can work in when the cumulative total dose is from 0 K Rad (Si) to 20 K Rad (Si), 




Figure 5-1: Reduction of total radiation dose by shielding protection 
There are several factors that can influence the selection and the use of shielding 
materials, such as attenuation effectiveness, strength, resistance to damage, thermal 
properties, and cost, etc. The primary factors include: 
• Energy level of the radiation source; 
• Maximum allowable dose rate; 
• Geometrical relationships between the radiation source and the position of the 
device; 
• Distance from the source to the device; 





















20 K Rad (Si) 
Environmental radiation level 
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Table 5-1: Characteristics of particles and effective shielding layer 
Radiation particles Characterizes Comments 
Alpha and Beta 
Material density is the important 
parameter to block alpha and beta, 
and thickness is less of concern. 
A half-inch plastic can 
shield against alpha 
particles, but lead is 
ineffective to block alpha. 
Gamma and x-ray 
High-density materials are more 
effective to reduce intensity of 
radiation. 
Lead is particularly 
effective to block gamma 
and x-ray.  
Neutron 
Neutron shielding should be 
incorporated both high and low 
atomic number elements. 
Lead is ineffective to block 
neutron. 
 
A great variety of materials have been investigated for radiation shielding purpose to 
protect electronics in the literature, such as alloys, concrete, aluminum, copper, lead, and 
tungsten, iron, hydrogen, and boron, etc. (Gencel et al., 2011; Kharita et al., 2008; Korkut 
et al., 2010; Yilmaz et al., 2011, Akkurt et al., 2010; Damla et al., 2010; Kharita et al., 
2008; Kharita et al., 2011; Kurudirek et al., 2009, Abdao, 2002, Mangeret et al., 1996, 
Singh and Badiger, 2014, Okuno, 2005, Calzada et al., 2011, Kurudirek, 2014; Zeynali et 
al., 2012). Since the shielding characteristics of those materials are different. A parameter 
known as Half-value thickness (HVT) is used to express the thickness of the material at 
which the intensity of radiation is reduced by one half as compared to the entry surface 
(Yilmaz et al., 2011).  
5.1.2 Problem Statement 
For a complicated radiation environment (alpha particles, beta particles, gamma rays, x-
rays, and neutron particles) after a severe accident in a nuclear power plant, the objective 
of shielding protection cannot be achieved by using only one shielding material. Hence, a 
radiation shielding protection with different materials has to be used to protect common-
mode damages of COTS-based electronic components are used in the radiation-tolerant 
systems. On the other hand, for the portability of the wireless system, the size and weight 
of the shielding protection are also limited.  
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Key issues to deal with radiation shielding protection for COTS-based systems can be 
summarized as follows: 
(1) To design a shielding protection to reduce the intensity of Alpha, Beta, and 
Gamma radiation simultaneously; 
(2) To minimize common-mode damages in redundant systems; and 
(3) To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed multi-layer shielding protection 
under different radiation environments. 
5.2 The Design of Multi-Layer Radiation Protection 
In this work, the framework of shielding design is shown in Figure 5-2. Firstly, design 
specifications are obtained according to the considered radiation conditions and the 
design objectives of radiation-tolerance. Subsequently, the architecture of the multi-layer 
protection is presented. Then, the materials are selected based on the design objectives. 
The size and thickness are then calculated. Finally, simulations are carried out to validate 




Figure 5-2: Design framework for multi-layer radiation protection 
To enhance the radiation tolerance, the proposed architecture for electronic systems 
includes triple module redundant channels with spare units. The entire system is further 
protected by a multi-layer of radiation shielding as illustrated in Figure 5-3 to increase the 
radiation tolerance while avoiding the common-mode damage. The physical circuit board 
configuration is shown in Figure 5-3 (a). The three layers of shielding protection are 
illustrated in Figure 5-3 (a) (b) and (c), respectively. The first layer tightly encloses the 
circuit boards, while the second layer allows the circuit boards to be embedded in a lead-
block. Finally, third layers encapsulate the entire system. Different materials used in each 
layer are determined by the type and the radiation degradation factors of semiconductor 
















Figure 5-3: The layout of the multi-layer shielding protection. 
This radiation shielding has several unique advantages: 
• It is able to reduce the total dose to a tolerable level that the circuit components 
can safely operate under the given radiation condition; 
• It reduces the likelihood of common-mode damages because different shielding 
materials, shielding thickness, positioning angle, and placement locations are 
used. These approaches will have different effects on the radiation exposure to the 
electronic systems in six different irradiation directions (See installation of the 
circuit boards with different angles in Figure 5-3 (a)); 








(a) Electronic circuit boards 
(b) The first layer wrapping 
around the circuit board 
(c) The second layer embeds 
circuits into protection 
block 
(d) The third layer encapsulates 









• It is possible to custom design by selecting specific shielding materials for the 
first layer with consideration of the characteristics of the semiconductor materials 
in a specific channel.  
5.3 Calculation of Shielding Thickness in Multi-Layer 
Radiation Protection 
Considering gamma (γ) ray is more difficult to block than alpha (α) and beta (β) particles. 
As a worst case scenario, only gamma radiation is considered as the radiation source in 
the evaluation of the shielding protection. 
5.3.1 Attenuation of Gamma Radiation 
When a gamma ray passes through a material under conditions of a narrow geometry, as 
shown in Figure 5-4 (Gollnick, 2011), no photons are scattered. This is idealistic and 
without collimation or at a longer distance. Under this condition, a straight-line 
relationship between the logarithm of the intensity and the thickness of the shielding can 
be established as follows (Gollnick, 2011). 
.0
udeII −=           (5-1)  
 
Figure 5-4: An attenuation of gamma radiation under conditions of narrow 
geometry (Gollnick, 2011) 
The linear attenuation coefficient (u) is the probability per unit thickness that particles 
interact with the material. This value is dependent upon the atomic number Z of the 
material and its density (p). This relation can also be described through a linear 







( ) ( )./0
pdpueII −=      (5-2) 
However, under a broad geometry condition, as shown in Figure 5-5 (Gollnick, 2011), all 
scattered photons are assumed to reach the detector (or circuits in our case). This is also 
unrealistic. The first method under a narrow geometry condition underestimates the dose 
rate, while the second method under a broad geometry condition overestimates it 
(Gollnick, 2011). To obtain a dose rate closer to reality, the shielding thickness can be 
estimated by the use of a build-up factor (B), which is defined as the ratio of the intensity 
of the radiation at any point in a beam to the intensity of the primary radiation only at that 
point. It is a function of the total attenuation coefficient, the thickness of the shielding 
material, and the energy of the gamma radiation (Yilmaz et al., 2011; Suteau and Chiron, 
2005). Under this condition, only some of the scattered photons can reach the device, 
which is closer to a real situation, Eq. (5-2) can, therefore, be estimated by Eq. (5-3) 
(Gollnick, 2011). 
( ) ( ) ( )., /0
pdpuleIEudBI
−
=     (5-3) 
 
Figure 5-5: Gamma radiation attenuation under conditions of broad beam geometry 
(Gollnick, 2011) 
Build-up factors have been calculated for different levels of gamma energies and for 
various shielding materials, which can be found in (ANSI/ANS, 1991). 
5.3.2 Calculation of the Shielding Thickness 
As previously discussed, for a given radiation source, a given radiation dose rate, and a 
known shielding material, based on Eq. (5-1) to Eq. (5-3), the required shielding 














 =      (5-4) 
According to Eq. (5-4), various shielding materials can be selected and their performance 
compared, the designed shielding thickness can also be evaluated to achieve the design 
objective, of reducing the total dose to a level less than 20 K Rad (Si). 
5.4 Case Study: Design of Shielding Protection for 
Application to a Wireless Monitoring System in Nuclear 
Power Plants 
5.4.1 Development of Radiation Shielding Protection for the 
Proposed WPAMS 
As illustrated in Figure 5-3, with different shielding materials used in different layers, 
shielding thickness, radiation angle, and installation locations, all have different effects 
on the radiation exposure experienced by electronic devices in the six identified areas, as 
shown in Figure 5-3(a) (𝐴1 − 𝐴3, 𝑆1 − 𝑆3). Taking Co-60 as a gamma radiation source, 
and considering radiation rates in Fukushima accident, the objectives of the shielding 
protections can be summarized as follows: 
• Under the condition with dose rate 70 Sv/h, for a 24h period, the highest total 
dose in six areas should be less than 2.6 K Rad (Si). 
• Under the condition with dose rate 530 Sv/h, for a 24h period, the highest total 
dose in six areas should be less than 20 K Rad (Si); 
• Under the condition with dose rate 1350 Sv/h, for a 24h period, the highest total 
dose in six areas should be less than 50 K Rad (Si); 
• Under the condition with dose rate 2700 Sv/h, for a 24h period, the highest total 
dose in six areas should be less than 100 K Rad (Si); 
Theoretically, all materials can be used for radiation shielding if thick enough. The 
choice of the shielding material is dependent on many factors: desired attenuated 
radiation levels, effectiveness of heat dissipation, resistance to radiation damage, required 
thickness and weight, multiple use considerations, uniformity of shielding capability, 
permanence of shielding and availability (Yilmaz et al., 2011). According to the design 
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specifications and radiation given in Eq. (5-1) to Eq. (5-4), those designs for the proposed 
multi-layer radiation shieling have been investigated. The details are described in the next 
following Sections.  
Design #1 is to use copper, lead, and tungsten. Its detailed parameters can be determinate 
as follows theory calculation: 
• The material in the first shielding layer is tungsten, with the diameter being 4cm, 
and the thickness is chosen to be 1cm. 
• The material in the second shielding layer is lead, with the size being 24cm X 
24cm X 18cm, and the thickness is chosen to be 6cm; and  
• The material in the third shielding layer is copper, with the size being 26cm X 
26cm X 20cm, and the thickness is chosen to be 1cm; 
Design #2 is constructed with aluminum, iron, and lead. The detailed parameters can be 
determinate as follows theory calculation: 
• The material in the first shielding is lead, with the diameter being 4.2cm, and the 
thickness is chosen to be 1.2cm. 
• The material in the second shielding layer is Iron, with the size being 38.6cm X 
38.6cm X 18cm, and the thickness is chosen to be 13cm; and 
• The material in the third shielding layer is aluminum, with the size being 42.2cm 
X 42.2cm X 21.6cm, and the thickness is chosen to be 1.8cm; 
Design #3 is constructed with lead glass, lead, and tungsten. Its detailed parameters can 
be determinate as follows theory calculation: 
• The material in the first shielding layer is lead, with the size diameter being 4cm, 
and the thickness is chosen to be 1cm. 
• The material in the second shielding layer is iron, with the size being 24cm X 
24cm X 18cm, and the thickness is chosen to be 6cm; and 
• The material in the third shielding layer is aluminum, with the size being 25.4cm 
X 25.4cm X 19.4cm, and the thickness is chosen to be 0.7cm; 
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The parameters of these three designs are summarized in Table 4-4. Their performance 
evaluations are given in next Section. 




Layers Material Size Thickness 
Design #1 
First layer Tungsten 4 cm 1 cm 
Second layer Lead 24 cm X 24 cm X 18 cm 6 cm 
Third layer Copper 26 cm X 26 cm X 20 cm 1 cm 
Design #2 
First layer Lead 4.2 cm 1.2 cm 
Second layer Iron 38.6 cm X 38.6 cm X 18 cm 13 cm 
Third layer Aluminum 42.6 cm X 42.6 cm X 19.6 cm 1.8 cm 
Design #3 
First layer Tungsten 4 cm 1 cm 
Second layer Lead 24 cm X 24 cm X 18 cm 6 cm 
Third layer Lead glass 25.4 cm X 25.4 cm X 19.4cm 0.7 cm 
5.4.2 Performance Evaluation 
The shielding performance of the above three designs has been evaluated by a program 
RadPro Calculator (Rad Pro Calculator, 2018). RadPro Calculator provides an effective 
tool for calculating the radiation dose rate and layers of protections. This program has 
been widely used among radiation safety officers, health physics technicians (HP) and 
other professionals in radiation physics and radiological engineering. Many researches 
have also used RadPro Calculator for various academic and engineering applications 
(Brugger et al., 2014; Prelas et al., 2016). With regard to various dose rates, the 
performance evaluation is performed in RadPro Calculator. The results are summarized 
in Table 5-3. 
87 
 
Table 5-3: The performance evaluation for three shielding solutions (Sv/h) 
Design Solutions Initial dose rate Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3 
Design #1 
72  45 2 1.1 
530  345  14.5  8  
1350  900 38 21 
2700  1800 75 41.5 
Design #2 
72  55.5 1.8 1.1 
530  410 13 8 
1350  1040 33 20 
2700  2090 65 40 
Design #3 
72  46 2 1.1 
530  340 14.5 8 
1350  900 38 21 
2700  1800 75 41.5 
Considering the highest dose rate in the Fukushima accident, being 530 Sv/h, the dose 
rates within the shielded area are reduced to 8 Sv/h. Since the survival lifespan is 24 
hours, the total dose after three shielding layer are 194 Sv (19.4 K Rad(Si)). Therefore, 
all three designs satisfy the design specifications. On the other hand, the size of design #3 
is the smallest form factor and design #2 is the biggest. However, the cost of design #3 is 
the highest. Moreover, lead glass has the similar shielding characterize with lead. 
Therefore, design #2 is selected as the shielding protection configuration in this work. 
5.5 Conclusions 
In this Chapter, based on the characteristics of various shielding materials, a multi-layer 
shielding protection is proposed to reduce the total dose to a safe level for electronics. A 
method to calculate the required shielding thickness is also presented. Three solutions 
have been considered to achieve the design requirements in this work. Based on the 
results of simulation, all three can be reduce the total dose to be less than 20 K Rad (Si) 
from the given radiation condition (1 M Rad (Si)). Considering the size, the weight, the 
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cost, and the shielding performance, the design #2 (Copper + Lead + Tungsten) is the 
best one and it is therefore selected in this work. 
It is important to point out that this work just focuses on the performance analysis for 
blocking the total dose, for other types of radiations with various energy levels, more 
solutions are needed.   
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Chapter 6  
6 Design Part III: Radiation-Tolerant Architecture 
In Chapter 3, simulation studies of photocurrent responses have indicated that the 
photocurrents of the ideal p-n diode under different levels of ionizing radiations can be 
reduced dramatically if the bias voltage on the junction can be promptly reduced to zero. 
Hence, if the power on the junction can be removed quickly in an event of radiation 
exposure, a semiconductor device might not be damaged permanently by the accumulated 
photocurrent. This observation leads to the development of a new radiation-tolerant 
architecture and associated protection strategies.  
This Chapter starts with the potential solution techniques and related problem statement. 
Subsequently, some defense techniques are proposed for single event effects mitigation. 
Then, a radiation-tolerant architecture by using fault-tolerant techniques is developed to 
perform those functions and techniques. Based on this architecture, system-level design 
and analysis have been carried out. Detailed radiation protection techniques and diversity 
against the common-mode failure, online fault diagnosis scheme and prognostic 
algorithm to detect, identify, and prognosticate potential radiation-induced faults, have 
been presented. Finally, to validate the correctness of the architecture and the system 
logic, a number of injection experiments are performed in a developed hardware 
emulation bench. 
6.1 Introduction 
6.1.1 Potential Solution Techniques 
To mitigate damages caused by single event effects, some existing designs utilize three 
redundant duplicates for critical circuits and subsystems followed by a majority voter to 
select the most desirable output. Others rely on extra added circuits to detect faults. These 
techniques have been used in a range of situations, from low-level structures, to complex 
circuits, hardware modules, and even multi-core architecture (Gao et al., 2015; Fenton et 
al., 2001; Kim et al., 2010; Cuenca-Asensi et al., 2011; Sterpone et al., 2013; Voilante et 
al., 2011; Straka et al., 2013; Abate et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2011). A drawback of those 
90 
 
techniques is that additional measurement/test units and/or majority voters have to be 
employed to detect and diagnose faults caused by radiation. The fact of the matter is that 
these additional circuits themselves are also subject to the same radiation damage. 
Moreover, most of existing fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) methods for electronic 
systems mainly focus on common hardware or software faults in redundant systems, not 
on cross-board radiation damages. For example, a fault tolerant platform able to function 
in harsh space environments is developed in (Sterpone et al., 2013) for using in satellite 
payload processing. Its main weakness is that the inter-module communication and 
control buses are not independent of each other. The whole system will thus encounter 
failure when just one module has faults on the buses. In the architecture proposed in 
(Violante et al., 2011), the problem is the control logic unit which is also sensitive to 
radiation particles. 
It is important to point out that, unlike random hardware failures, radiation-induced 
damages can affect multiple redundant channels causing functional failure of the whole 
system. Special techniques have to be developed to deal with such unique situation 
regarding common-mode failures. 
6.1.2 Problem Statement 
As discussed in the previous Sections, to design and build a rad-hardened system using 
only COTS components, it is imperative to adopt radiation-tolerant architectures with 
independent and diversified redundancies, online fault-detection and prognostic scheme, 
equipped with proactive rapid power-off for recovery, as well as command-mode damage 
avoidance. Within this framework, the following specific goals are investigated: 
(1) To design completely independent redundant architecture without additional 
detection units and/or hardware voters. 
(2) To avoid common-mode damage in redundant channels. 
(3) To design the mechanisms of online fault detection, real time preventive remedial 
actions, and rapid power loss. 
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In order to address these issues, this work develops a radiation-tolerant architecture with 
a decision-making unit to achieve a high level of radiation tolerance and to prolong the 
lifespan of COTS-based systems in high level radiation environments. 
6.2 Techniques for Preventing Single Event Effects 
6.2.1 Redundancy 
One way to ensure continued operation of the system in the event of potential radiation 
damages, the proposed system makes use of redundancy to ensure that not all channels 
fail at the same time. It should have the capacity to detect and to prognosticate faults and 
errors in a timely manner, and then locate faults and errors in order to make a 
reconfiguration decision to deal with device power loss. Furthermore, in the proposed 
redundant architecture, each redundant channel has to be completely independent and 
there must have no additional measurement/test units or hardware majority voters. 
In general, a sender in a modern digital communication system includes several 
subsystems: input transducer, source encoder, channel encoder, modulator, and 
transmitter. In this work, a function of decision making is inserted to perform the self-
diagnostic function, which is integrated in existing hardware and therefore does not need 
any additional hardware. Each redundant channel can be divided into three layers: the 
input layer, the decision layer, and the output layer. The input layer’s job is to collect the 
information coming from input sensors, source encoders, and channel encoders. 
Subsequently, fault detection, fault diagnosis, prognostic assessment, and reconfiguration 
suggestions, are accomplished in the decision layer. The output layer then transmits 
and/or receives data with the outsider, which consists of a digital modulator and 
transceiver. All functions of the parameter measurement and the self-diagnostic are 
accomplished inside each redundant channel, which does not need additional 
measurement units to detect and diagnose faults. 
To achieve these requirements, the proposed redundant system totally has six channels to 
build an active triple modular redundant (TMR) system with their spares to replace the 
active one in case of fault or failure. For the sake of analysis, the following definitions are 
used to describe various channel states: 
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Definition 1: the system consists of three active channels and three respective spaces. 
  ( )1 2 3, , 1 3 .A A A A i=    
where 𝐴𝑖   represents the state of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ channel with 𝐴𝑖   = 1 and 0, respectively, 
corresponding to its powered (active) state and non-power state (inactive). 
  ( )1 2 3, , 1 3 .S S S S i=    
where 𝑆𝑖  represents the state of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ spare channel with 𝑆𝑖  = 1 and 0, respectively, 
corresponding to its powered (active) state and non-power state (inactive). 







where 𝐹𝐴𝑖 describes the state of  𝐴𝑖 channel. If 𝐴𝑖  is completely broken, then 𝐹𝐴𝑖= 1, 






where 𝐹𝑆𝑖 describes the state of  𝑆𝑖 channel. If 𝑆𝑖 is completely broken, then 𝐹𝑆𝑖= 1, 
otherwise 𝐹𝑆𝑖= 0. 
6.2.2 Hardware Switch 
With regard to the reconfigurator unit, its radiation resistance has to be higher than that of 
all redundant channels. Otherwise, it will be a major weakness of the whole system. In 
this work, two configurator are applied to control the power supply of each channel (the 
power reconfigurator), as well as the location of internal buses (the bus reconfigurator), 
which are determined by the reconfigure suggestions (𝑅𝑆𝑖  & 𝑅𝑀𝑖).  The power 
reconfigurator is to guarantee that the system only ever has three channels working 
simultaneously, which is critical for the whole system (see Figure 6-1 (a)).The bus 
reconfigurator, illustrated in Figure 6-1 (b), serves as the independent communication 
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mechanism. This way, the bus will not affect other channels when one channel fails. In 
addition, 𝑉𝑖𝑛_1 , 𝑉𝑖𝑛_2, 𝑉𝑖𝑛_3, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑖𝑛_𝑟 are the power inputs to the redundant channels and 
relays, and  𝑉𝐴𝑖 , 𝑉𝑆𝑖 are the power supplies for the redundant (TMR) core (𝐴𝑖) and spare 
units (𝑆𝑖), which are controlled by the reconfigure commands (𝑅𝑆𝑖  & 𝑅𝑀𝑖).  In addition, 
the system has independent and diversified buses: internal bus (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑠), to exchange 
information with other channels; and IO bus (𝐼𝑂𝑏𝑢𝑠), to accomplish the selection of 
primary channels. 
   
Figure 6-1: The schematic of reconfigurator (a) power reconfigurator (b) bus 
reconfigurator 
To ensure reliable operation, both Bus Reconfigurator and Power Reconfigurator units 
should have higher level of radiation resistance than the rest of electronic components in 
the system. For this reason, both units are designed using passive devices only, such as 
resistors (tolerant up to 104-1010 Gy), capacitors (tolerant up to 104-108 Gy), and non-
electronic relays (tolerant up to 105-107 Gy) (Houssay, 2000; Boutte, et al., 2013; 
Cochran, et al., 2008; Cochran, et al., 2006). The reconfigurator therefore can at least 































6.2.3 Diversity Techniques 
One of the weaknesses for redundant systems is their vulnerabilities with respect to 
common-mode failures. To ensure that the system is well protected, the following 
diversification strategies are chosen: 
1) Radiation protection 
Radiation shielding is an effective solution to mitigate the effects of radiation, and to 
increase the reliability and lifespan of the electronic system. The efficiency and 
functional quality of a particular electronic system are determined by: the type of 
radiation it is exposed to, the radiation resistance of its semiconductors, and the unique 
properties of the shielding materials (Shultis and Faw, 2005). Many different solutions for 
obtaining high levels of radiation resistance in radiation shielding have been applied for 
the package and/or chips (Abdao, 2002; Mangeret et al., 1996; Calzada et al., 2011). This 
work combines the proposed radiation-tolerant architecture with a structure of radiation 
protection (illustrated in Figure 4-5) whose design increases the radiation tolerance while 
avoiding common-mode damage. As illustrated in Figure 4-5, differences in shielding 
material, shielding thickness, radiation angle, and radiation locations, all have different 
effects on the radiation exposure experienced by electronic systems in the six identified 
areas (𝐴1 − 𝐴3, 𝑆1 − 𝑆3). The proposed architecture therefore offers the possibility of 
reducing instances of common-mode damage. On the other hand, another objective of 
this radiation protection is to ensure that the total radiation doses experienced by all six 
areas should be less than a pre-specified level. Parameters of radiation protection are also 
dependent on the given radiation condition. 
2) Enforcing differences 
Enforced differences are also considered for preventing common-mode failures in the 
proposed architecture. Approaches used can be described as follows: 
• Use diversified semiconductor technologies (E1): Considering the following facts: 
Bipolar devices can withstand a higher total dose; but they are particularly 
sensitive to lower dose rates. On the other hand, MOS devices are sensitive to 
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higher total doses and can also be robust to lower dose rates. Devices are chosen 
to complement these unique properties to cover perceivable conditions. 
• Rely on diversified, but functionally equivalent, components (E2): Among 
different channels, devices (mainly CPUs) rely on different technologies to 
implement identical functions. In this case, a microcontroller, FPGA, and/or a 
microprocessor are used, as they offer different tolerance to radiation. 
• Select the same component, but from different manufacturers (E3): Because 
different manufacturing processes, such as semiconductor materials, component 
size, etc., can realize the same functionalities for certain electronic components, 
but with different level of radiation tolerance, it is beneficial to select components 
of the same functionalities made by different manufacturers. 
• Use different tools for implementing different software and algorithms for the 
same functionalities (E4): Due to memory utilization and storage locations, a same 
software module developed using different programming languages and 
environment may have different responses to radiation effects. In this case, 
different programming environments have been used to develop modules for 
different channels. 
In summary, 𝐴𝑖  and 𝐴𝑗   (𝑖 = 1, 2, 3; 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3; 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) are built with diversified 
hardware, diversified software, as well as different shielding protection. However, 𝐴𝑖  and 
𝑆𝑖  (𝑖 = 1, 2, 3) are built with the same hardware, but different software logics to achieve 
the same functionalities. Different shielding protection is used in second layer also. Thus, 

























6.2.4 Fault Detection and Diagnosis 
Even though all possible measures have been taken at the system design and component 
selection processes, there is still no guarantee that the system will function trouble-free. 
To further improve the reliability of the system, real-time fault detection and diagnosis 
schemes are developed so that some remedial actions can be taken during the operation to 
restore system performance, for example by a rapid power reset.  
A hierarchical fault model, drawn according to electronic system abstraction levels, is 
illustrated in Figure 6-2. Radiation disturbances and/or other disturbances will directly 
affect the device level, after which the disturbances will be transmitted to the circuit and 
system level (subsystem). Faults at the device level (L1) correspond to sensors and 
semiconductor components; faults at the circuit level (L2) correspond to analog circuits, 
digital circuits, and mix circuits; and faults at the system level (L3) correspond to 
subsystems or functional modules. 
 
Figure 6-2: Hierarchical fault model for electronic systems 
As previously discussed, the system should have the capacity to detect and prognosticate 
faults and errors in a timely manner, and then locate faults and errors in order to make a 
reconfiguration decision to deal with device power loss. The objective of fault detection 
is to detect abnormal operating conditions of those levels under radioactive environments, 
and to estimate the nature and extent of the damages. Three definitions are given below to 
describe various states at device, circuit and subsystem levels: 
Definition 3 (Device): An electronic system consists of a number (𝑛𝑑) of components. 
  ( )1, , , 1 .di n dD d d d i n=    
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where 𝑑𝑖   represents the state of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ component with 𝑑𝑖  = 0 being operational and 1 
being fault states, respectively. 
Definition 4 (Circuit): An electronic system consists of a number (𝑛𝑐) of circuit modules. 
Each module consists of a number of components. 
  ( )1, , , 1 .cj n cC c c c j n=    
where 𝑐𝑗  represents the  𝑗𝑡ℎ circuit modules in the electronic system. Similar 
representations are used to represent the operational and fault modes as in Definition 5 in 
all subsequent definitions. 
Definition 5 (Subsystem): An electronic system can be decomposed into a number (𝑛𝑠) of 
subsystems. Each subsystem consists of several circuit modules. 
  ( ) .1,,1 skn nksssS s =   
where 𝑠𝑘  represents the 𝑘𝑡ℎ subsystem.  
Definition 6 (Functional State): For each circuit module and subsystem, two states can 
be defined: 
𝑋𝐶 , 𝑋𝑆 represent the state that temporary fault or recovered failure in the circuit blocks 
and subsystems, with 𝑥  = 0 for operational and 1 for temporary fault or recovered failure, 
respectively. 
𝑌𝐶 , 𝑌𝑆 represent the state that permanently fails in the circuit blocks and subsystems, with 
𝑦  = 0 for no failure and 1 for permanent failure, respectively. 
For each circuit module, the following conditions can be defined for the operational state: 




=   
If 𝑐𝑗 operates incorrectly, 𝑥𝑐𝑗= 1, otherwise 𝑥𝑐𝑗= 0. 
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=   
If 𝑐𝑗  is completely failed,  𝑦𝑐𝑗  = 1, otherwise 𝑦𝑐𝑗= 0. 
For each subsystem, the following state can be defined: 




=   
If 𝑠𝑘 operates incorrectly, 𝑥𝑠𝑘= 1, otherwise 𝑥𝑠𝑘= 0. 




=   
If 𝑠𝑘  is completely failed, 𝑦𝑠𝑘  = 1, otherwise 𝑦𝑠𝑘= 0. 
Based on the above definitions, a fault hypothesis for malfunctions of circuit blocks and 
subsystems can be formed in Eq. (6-1), where the goal is to integrate states of circuit 
blocks and subsystems. 
 .,YXH =       (6-1) 
where 𝑋 is the summary of 𝑋𝐶 and 𝑋𝑆, as well as 𝑌 is the summary of 𝑌𝐶 and 𝑌𝑆. 
A detection function reflects the credibility of 𝐻 as defined in Eq. (6-2). A smaller 𝐸(𝐻) 
suggests a higher credibility of 𝐻. If the detection function is equal or greater than unity, 
a reconfigure command should be issued. 











    (6-2) 
where 𝑤𝑥𝑐𝑗 , 𝑤𝑦𝑐𝑗,𝑤𝑥𝑠𝑘, and 𝑤𝑦𝑠𝑘are the weights of the discrepancy index. The range of 
the weights is from 0.1 to 1. If 𝑤1 ≫  𝑤2, its means that the discrepancy index 𝑤1 is 
much more important than 𝑤2. The values of these weights are determined according to 
the significance of circuit blocks and subsystems in electronic systems. 
99 
 
6.2.5 Prognostic for Lifespan of Components 
The objectives of prognosis protection are: (1) to predict the behavior of a circuit based 
on the present measurements, and hence to estimate whether a module or a subsystem can 
remain functional before complete failure occurs; and (2) to select the most appropriate 
channels for the radiation environment and corresponding characteristics of the 
diversified hardware. A hypothesis to predict malfunction of a device and a circuit block 
can be defined as follows: 
 ., cd ppP =        (6-3) 
where 𝑝𝑑 = {𝑝𝑑1, … , 𝑝𝑑𝑛𝑑
} represents the state of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ device with 𝑝𝑑𝑖   = 0 and 1, 
respectively, based on the prediction of its operational and fault states, and 𝑝𝑐 =
{𝑝𝑐1, … , 𝑝𝑐𝑛𝑐
} represents the prediction of incorrect circuit operation. If 𝑐𝑗 is predicted to 
operate incorrectly, then 𝑝𝑐𝑗= 1, otherwise 𝑝𝑐𝑗= 0. 
A prognostic function can be formed to reflect the prediction state of the credibility of 𝑃, 
which can be defined in Eq. (6-4). A smaller 𝐸𝑛(𝑃) suggests a higher credibility of 𝑃. 











     (6-4) 
where 𝑤𝑑𝑖 and 𝑤𝑐𝑗  are the weights of the discrepancy index of devices and circuit blocks. 
A function can also be used to reflect whether a particular semiconductor technology for 
a specific channel can work correctly in a given radiation environment. 
( ).3,2,1),( == ndsfRn      (6-5) 
where 𝑠 is the information about the radiation environment; 𝑑 is the information on the 
semiconductor technologies; and 𝑅𝑛 is the predicted channel selection. If channel n is 
estimated to have no capacity to operate in the given environment for a specific 
semiconductor technologies, 𝑅𝑛= 1, otherwise 𝑅𝑛= 0. 
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Using the fault prognostic function, if 𝐸𝑛(𝑃) is equal or greater than 1 or 𝑅𝑛 = 1, the 
reconfiguration command should be issued by the decision-making unit. 
6.3 Resulting System Architecture 
6.3.1 Redundant-Tolerant Architecture 
Based on previous studies on radiation damages to COTS components and potential 
prevention techniques, a radiation-tolerant architecture with independent redundancy, 
online fault-detection, real-time prognostic protection, rapid power off/ recovery, as well 
as command-mode damage avoidance, is proposed as shown in Figure 6-3. The 
architecture consists of an active triple modular redundancy (TMR) core (𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝐴3), 
with spare units (𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝑆3), and a bus, as well as a power reconfigurator. In an event that 
an active channel has malfunctioned, its corresponding spares will be reconfigured to 
replace the failed channel or channels automatically. This architecture can prolong the 
life for both devices and systems through independent built-in redundant channels, online 
fault detection, real-time prognostic protection, and rapid power off/on recovery, as well 
as reduction of modes for common-mode damages. 
 




























1) The mechanism of redundant system 
At any given time, there is only one channel from the input layer to the output layer 
needed for the system to function normally. This channel is known as the primary 
channel. The signal in this channel has to go through in the decision layer with voting 
functions. The other redundant channels are known as checkers. They can be selected by 
the selection mechanism through the IO bus. In fact, the states of the channels can change 
dynamically if a fault occurs in the primary channel. For internal information exchange 
among the primary channel and its checkers, the decision-making unit uses two types of 
buses: an internal bus for information exchange with other channels; and an IO bus for 
selection of the primary channel. All buses operate independently. A fault on one channel 
does not affect the operation of another channel. The flowchart of master selection 
mechanism is illustrated in Figure 6-4. 
 
Figure 6-4: The flowchart of master selection mechanism 
The composition of the decision-making unit is illustrated in Figure 6-5. The information 
is transmitted over its internal bus to fault detection, fault diagnosis, and fault prognostic 
schemes to generate suitable reconfiguration decisions.  The decision will include rapid 
power-off to the failed channels. If a channel and its spare have both failed, a failure 
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signal 𝑅𝑀𝑖 is registered. This channel will be permanently removed from the system. As 
mentioned early, diversity in components selection has been extensively used to avoid 
simultaneous failures of all three channels in this system. 
 
Figure 6-5: The block diagram of the decision making unit 
In particularly, 𝑅𝑀𝑖 are only provided by the primary channel under two cases: both a 
channel and its spare are in a state of failure; or neither are suitable to work at a given 
radiation level. In addition, it is assumed that cases of all three channels simultaneously 
encountering either faults or failure can be avoided by using a diversity of techniques. As 
such, this scenario is not considered in this work. 
The operating principle of the proposed system works as follows: when one channel fails 
to operate, which will be detected by the self-diagnosis and/or the function external-
diagnosis units, the decision-making units in another channel will generate some 
reconfiguration recommendations to cut off the power in a timely manner and its spare 
channel will be powered up to form a new TMR core.  
2) Functionalities and operation of the decision logic unit 
The objective of the decision logic unit is to integrate the functions of fault diagnosis and 
component life-span prognostics to generate potential reconfiguration signals ( 𝑅𝑆𝑖 
and 𝑅𝑀𝑖). A flowchart for this unit is illustrated in Figure 6-6. Specifically, all channels 
have the ability to detect, diagnose, and configure other channels in the TMR core until 
all channels have failed. 





























Figure 6-6: The flowchart of the decision making in TMRi 
If the semiconductor technology used in one channel (𝐴𝑖) has no capacity to operate 
correctly in the given radiation environment ( 𝑅𝑖 = 0), or a channel (𝐴𝑖) and its spare (𝑆𝑖) 
are both failed, this channel and its spare will be power-off. Otherwise, only one of them 
is power-on. The active state of all channels ( 𝐴𝑖 and 𝑆𝑖) can be described in Eq. (6-6). 
0 & 0, 1& 1, 1
.
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
=
      (6-6) 
The detailed logics of the reconfiguration commands are determined by the outputs of the 
fault diagnosis and prognosis schemes, which are illustrated in Eq. (6-7) and Eq. (6-8). 
The signal 𝑅𝑆 is used to switch the power supply between the active channel and its 
spare; and the signal 𝑅𝑀 is used to remove the power supply of one active channel and 
that of its spare.  If one of the detection function (𝐸𝑖(𝐻)), prognostic function (𝐸𝑖(𝑃)), 
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( )( ) 1 ( ) 1& 0 1 3 .Si Si i i iR R if E H or E P R i=   =      (6-7) 
( )
( )
0 1 1 1 , , 3,





R if R or R i j k i j k
R if F and F i j i j
R otherwise
= = =    

= = =   
 =
    (6-8) 
Signals for the reconfigurator suggestions are generated as a result of the decision-
making unit in other channels, as illustrated in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1: The provider of the signals for reconfigurator suggestions 
Reconfigurator signal A1 & S1 A2 & S2 A3 & S3 Primary 
RS1  ✓ ✓  
RS2 ✓  ✓  
RS3 ✓ ✓   
RM1&RM2&RM3    ✓ 
6.3.3 Analysis 
In general, it is difficult to online detect radiation response of each semiconductor device 
in an electronic system without additional measurement/testing units. In the developed 
redundant system, the detection focuses on the detection from circuit- and system-level. 
All circuit blocks and subsystems are monitored by external channel and/or itself to rapid 
remove its power when it encounters radiation damage.  Then, according to the output of 
circuit blocks and subsystems, the damage of component can be analyzed. In a typical 
digital communication system, a sender is usually conducted by variety semiconductor 
component, which is listed in Column 2 of Table 6-2. The detailed radiation response of 
each component in this work and related damage result on the subsystem is listed in 
Column 3, 4, and 5 of Table 6-2, and its detection method is illustrated in Column 6. 
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The degradation of Vz, within specification 
for high dose rate 
The output voltage 









The degradation is depending on both the 
manufacturer and the circuit configuration. 
OPs work nonfunctional. 
The output of the function 




SEL The degradation in current during irradiation. 
SET 
To be susceptible to SET, positive SETs are 
expected for positive supply voltage, both 
input and supply voltages affect amplitude 
and duration 
NPN BJT TID 
The primary ionizing response of BJTs is the 
degradation of the current gain β (𝐼𝑐/𝐼𝑏), 
particularly at the low dose-rates. 
The output of the function 







reference diode TID 
Increase of the reverse current and the 
changes of the forward voltage. 
The AD’s reference 






Electronic parameters are higher under high 
radiation dose, the part experiences functional 
failure at high irradiation levels. 
The output of the 
functions of source 




A number of least significant bits (LSBs) are 
masked out with the condition of positive 
analog input; the LET threshold for the 
negative input is significantly higher. 
SEL 
The LET threshold for SEL is higher, no SEL 
was observed in some radiation tests. 
SEFI 
To cause every conversion to be in error until 












Parameters exceed the maximum 
specification limit when the dose is more than 
10 K Rad (Si). 







A logic gate switch, voltage transients, 
alteration of stored information, and 
destructive effects. 








SETs are high current transients, possibly 
upset producing events; memory’s contents 
are altered during the transient events. 






The logical switch on GPIO ports. 
The output of GPIO port 





The degradation of electronical parameters 
during high irradiation level; the part is 
functional and stays within the specification 
limit. 




SEU,SEL A logic gate switch, destructive effects occur. 
Transceiver 
Voltage 
reference diode TID 
Increase of the reverse current and the 
changes of the forward voltage. 





Increase of the reverse current nut not of a 
serious degree, and the forward-voltage drop 
not essentially change. 





transmitter TDI The failure of functions. 




As illustrated in Table 6-2, when radiation effects on semiconductor components happen, 
the function of related circuit block and/or subsystem may not work or be nonfunctional. 
Then, through the external detection and/or the internal detection of the nonfunctional of 
106 
 
subsystems, semiconductor component can be online monitored. Subsequently, the 
decision-making unit generates reconfiguration suggestions to rapid remove the power of 
its channel and to power on its spares. The whole system will not work when all 
redundant channel are damaged. 
6.4 Performance Evaluation of the Developed System 
Architecture 
6.4.1 Emulation of Radiation Damages 
1) Radiation-induced damages considered in this work 
As previously discussed, the emulation of radiation-induced failure is also a critical 
element to evaluate the effectiveness and correctness of the design. This work combines 
with two emulation methods to mimic radiation responses of semiconductor component: 
circuit emulation, which is based on hardware-implemented fault injection, using external 
circuits to mimic circuit responses under radioactive conditions; and logic emulation, 
which is based on software-implemented fault injection, and uses injection commands to 
forcibly control and/or stop system functions. According to the analysis listed in Table 6-
2, the radiation failure modes concerned in this work are listed as follows. 
(1) Total dose effects on bipolar devices and circuits, such as diode, BJT, OP 
Amplifier; 
(2) Total dose effects on MOS devices and circuits, such as MOSFET, A/D 
converter, microcontroller, transceiver; 
(3) Single event effects on MOSFET devices, such as SEB, SEGR; 
(4) Single event effects on integrated circuits (ICs) (microcontroller, SRAM, Flash, 
wireless transceiver, etc.), such as SEU, SET, SEL, SEFI. 
2) Hardware emulation bench 
In the design phase of electronic systems for high level radiation environments, 
evaluating the system’s weaknesses and effectiveness is necessary but also difficult. 
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Generally, the evaluation can be accomplished by a physical radiation test, which uses 
external perturbation sources, such as natural and accelerated particle radiation, laser 
beams, pin forcing, etc.; such tests are very precise (Quinn et al., 2013). However, 
physical radiation tests are not always suitable in the design phase due to their excessive 
complexity and expense. Evaluation can also be accomplished by testing via a simulated 
environment, which usually uses logic resources of the circuit or system to access internal 
elements and insert the effect of a fault, according to the fault model (Quinn et al., 2013). 
In this work, a hardware emulation bench is developed to evaluate the correctness of the 
proposed architecture. The bench uses fault injection techniques to mimic radiation 
damages on semiconductor devices. It combines with two emulation methods: logic 
emulation (LE), which is based on software-implemented fault injection, and uses 
injection commands to forcibly control and/or stop system functions; and circuit 
emulation (CE), which is based on hardware-implemented fault injection, using external 
circuits to mimic circuit responses under radioactive conditions. The architecture of this 
emulation bench is illustrated in Figure 6-7. 
 
Figure 6-7: The architecture of the developed hardware emulation bench 
The developed hardware emulation bench includes four parts: a redundant wireless 
device, a wireless gateway, emulation circuits, and a control tool. The emulation bench is 
built with two communication buses: bus #1 (915MHz network) is used to 
transmit/receive the normal communication data; and bus #2 (RS485) is used to 
transmit/receive commands/reports for fault injection. This emulation bench is illustrated 






Fault injection unit 
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6.4.2 Actual Evaluation and Results 
Variables (𝑅𝑖, 𝐸𝑖(𝑃), 𝐸𝑖(𝐻)) under several different cases and related experimental 
results (𝐴𝑖, 𝑆𝑖) on the hardware emulation platform are listed in Table 6-3. Specifically, 
other cases are not listed in the table due to their similarity to the listed cases. The 
experimental results show that wireless channels can switch smoothly in several hundred 
milliseconds when single faults and multi-faults are inserted; reconfiguration suggestions 
are also correctly generated in the architecture’s decision-making unit. Therefore, the 
proposed architecture can clearly be shown to work smoothly and the logics of fault 
diagnosis, fault prognostic, and the logic of decision unit are correct and effective. 
Table 6-3: Summary of variables logic and experimental results in hardware 
emulation bench 
 
The experimental results have shown that wireless channels can switch smoothly in 
several hundred milliseconds (less than 500ms) when single- and multi-faults are 
inserted; reconfiguration suggestions are also correctly generated in the architecture’s 
decision-making unit. Therefore, the proposed architecture can clearly be shown to work 





In this Chapter, a radiation-tolerant architecture with a decision making unit is presented 
to allow COTS-based electronic systems for highly radioactive environments through 
independent redundancy, online fault detection, real-time preventive remedial actions, 
and rapid power loss/recovery. To evaluate the proposed architecture, a wireless 
communication system with redundant and diversified channels is implemented as a case 
study; and a simulated fault injection experiment has been performed on a hardware 
bench. The experimental results have shown, the developed radiation-tolerant 
architecture was verified to effectively work, and wireless channels were shown to switch 
smoothly in several hundred milliseconds (less than 500ms) when single- and multi-faults 
are inserted. The logics of fault diagnosis, fault prognostic, and decision unit work 
correctly. 
Therefore, the developed radiation-tolerant architecture can be used to design COTS-
based systems to achieve the independence, diversified, and redundancy without 
additional detection units and/or hardware voters. The function of fault detection and 
diagnosis, the algorithm of fault prognosis, the assessment method of radiation-tolerance, 




Chapter 7  
7 Design Part IV: Online Fault Detection Mechanism  
As previously discussed, methods of rapid power off are therefore highly effectively in 
protecting electronic systems under ionizing radiation, the key step is to timely detect the 
fault and the damage. Fault diagnosis techniques, such as case-based reasoning (CBR), 
rule-based reasoning (RBR), model-based approaches, machine learning (ML) 
approaches, artificial neural networks (ANN), etc., have been applied to isolate the nature 
and the location of the failures; and the correct diagnosis information is then used to 
reconfigure the unit to recover the functionality of the system (Fenton et al., 2001). In 
fact, an effective method of fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) plays an important role 
in some radiation-hardened electronic systems.  
This Chapter starts with the analysis of radiation damages in electronic systems. 
Subsequently, the online detection mechanism of radiation damages is illustrated, as well 
as the real-time diagnosis algorithm is discussed. Finally, some experimental tests are 
used to validate the effectiveness and correctness of the developed detection mechanism. 
As well as the detection coverage under the given radiation condition (20 K Rad (Si)) is 
given. 
7.1 Problem Statement 
Most existing fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) methods for electronic systems mainly 
focus on common hardware faults in redundant systems, not on cross-board radiation 
damages (Fenton et al., 2001; Gao et al., 2015). Some model-based FDD methods have 
been considered, but it is not a trivial task to develop accurate models to deal with 
potential failure modes caused by radiation (Fenton et al., 2001; Gao et al., 2015). 
Moreover, those methods usually detect and diagnose fault occurrences by using 
additional measurement/test units or majority voters, which are also affected and 
damaged by radiation. Therefore, it represents a major weakness in the whole system and 
as such should also be protected. 
111 
 
As previously discussed, the difficulty to diagnose radiation damages in electronic 
systems is the lack of the self-diagnosis architecture and the online diagnosis method of 
post-irradiation responses. Key issues to deal with the detection and diagnosis of 
radiation damages are listed as follows: 
(1) The analysis and identification of fault, error, and failure of devices and circuits 
under the given radiation condition. 
(2) An online logic to detect radiation damages and a real-time algorithm to diagnose 
and to locate radiation damages. 
(3) The validation of the developed detection method without physical radiation test 
in the design phase. 
To address these issues, in this Chapter, combining with the radiation-tolerant 
architecture developed in Chapter 6, an online detection and diagnostic approach is 
developed to timely identify/locate radiation damage in the system for prolonging its life, 
which are significant for the proposed radiation-tolerant architecture. 
7.2 The Framework of Detection Mechanism 
The functional organization and data flow of the fault detection and diagnosis unit can be 
illustrated in Figure 7-1. This unit consists of two parts: (a) database creation and (b) real-
time fault detection and prognosis for decision-making. In the first part, data 
specifications of the electronic components, boundaries of faults, errors, and failure are 
obtained to create an alarm database. Such information is used to create a fault detection 
hypothesis test framework. During online operation, measurements are then used to test 
the hypothesis, subsequently, to generate appropriate decisions in the decision-making 




Figure 7-1: The framework of the fault detection and diagnosis method 
7.3 Analysis of Radiation-Induced Damages 
7.3.1 Analysis Model  
According to abstraction levels of electronic systems, a hierarchical fault model is 
illustrated in Figure 7-2. Radiation disturbances and/or other disturbances will affect 
device level directly, and then the disturbance will be transmitted to circuit level and 
system level (subsystem). Faults at device level (L1) correspond to sensor and 
semiconductor components, faults at circuit level (L2) correspond to analog circuits and 
digital circuits, and faults at system level (L3) correspond subsystems or functional 
modules. 
 
Figure 7-2: Hierarchical fault model for electronic systems 
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The state of each level is defined as 𝑥𝑖 (i = 1, 2, 3). The model can be described as 
follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )



















  (7-1) 
where 
𝑥𝜑(𝑘) ∈ 𝑅
𝑛, 𝑢(𝑘) ∈ 𝑅𝑚, 𝑦(𝑘) ∈ 𝑅𝑝, 𝑛𝑟(𝑘) ∈ 𝑅
𝑙𝑟, 𝑛𝑜(𝑘) ∈ 𝑅
𝑙𝑜 is the state of the 
different levels, the input, radiation fault, and the component/parameter fault, 
respectively. 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷 are known parameter matrices; and ∆𝐴, ∆𝐵, ∆𝐶, ∆𝐷, ∆𝑥1, ∆𝑥2 are 
unknown fault and errors. 
As previously discussed, the system should detect and diagnose faults and 
errors (∆𝐴, ∆𝐵, ∆𝐶, ∆𝐷, ∆𝑥1, ∆𝑥2) in a timely manner. A number of assumptions for faults 
concern in this work are listed as follows: 
(1) Each component is either functioning, fault and failure; 
(2) Each circuit block is functional, operating incorrectly, and failure; 
(3) Each subsystem is functional, operating incorrectly, and failure; 
(4) All components are functional at initial moment. 
 
7.3.2 Definition and Properties 
Definition 1 (Device): An electronic system consists of a number (𝑛𝑑) of components. 
  ( )1, , , 1 .di n dD d d d i n=    
where 𝑑𝑖   represents the state of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ component with 𝑑𝑖  = 0 and 1, respectively, 
corresponding to its functional and fault state. 
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Definition 2 (Circuit): An electronic system consists of a number (𝑛𝑐) of circuit blocks. 
Each module consists of a number of components. 
  ( )1, , , , 1 .cj n cC c c c j n=    
where 𝑐𝑗  represents the  𝑗𝑡ℎ circuit of the electronic system.  
Similar representations are used to represent the operational and fault modes at 
Definition 2 in all subsequent definitions. 
Definition 2 (Subsystem): An electronic system can be decomposed into a number (𝑛𝑠) of 
subsystems. Each subsystem consists of several circuit modules. 
  ( )1, , , , 1 .sk n sS s s s k n=     
Definition 3 (Functional State): For each circuit module and subsystem, two states can 
be defined. 
𝑋𝐶 , 𝑋𝑆 represent the state that temporary fault or recovered failure in the circuit blocks 
and subsystems, with 𝑥  = 0 for operational and 1 for temporary fault or recovered failure, 
respectively. 
𝑌𝐶 , 𝑌𝑆 represent the state that permanently fails in the circuit blocks and subsystems, with 
𝑦  = 0 for no failure and 1 for permanent failure, respectively. 
For each circuit module, the following conditions can be defined for the operational state. 
  ( )
1
, , , , 1 .
j nc
c c c c cX x x x j n=    
If 𝑐𝑗 operates incorrectly, 𝑥𝑐𝑗= 1, otherwise 𝑥𝑐𝑗= 0. 
  ( )
1
, , , 1 .
j nc
c c c c cY y y y j n=    
If 𝑐𝑗  is completely failed,  𝑦𝑐𝑗  = 1, otherwise 𝑦𝑐𝑗= 0. 
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For each subsystem, the following state can be defined: 
  ( )
1
, , , , 1 .
k ns
s s s s sX x x x k n=    
If 𝑠𝑘 operates incorrectly, 𝑥𝑠𝑘= 1, otherwise 𝑥𝑠𝑘= 0. 
  ( )
1
, , , , 1 .
k ns
s s s s sY y y y k n=    
If 𝑠𝑘  is completely failed, 𝑦𝑠𝑘  = 1, otherwise 𝑦𝑠𝑘= 0. 
Definition 4 (Logic Action): 𝑅𝑑𝑐 is the relation from set 𝐷 to set 𝐶, and 𝑅𝑐𝑠 is the relation 




































Thus, the relation from set 𝐷 to set 𝑆 can be expressed by: 
.
,,, kjjiki csdcds
MMM =  
Definition 5 (Fault Set): for the circuit block 𝑐𝑗, the fault set is 
 .,,
1 dn
jjj FcFcFc =  
𝐹𝑐𝑗𝑖 describes that ionizing radiation effects of  𝑖𝑡ℎ component 𝑑𝑖 to the circuit block 𝑐𝑗. 
𝐹𝑐𝑗0 denotes the functional state of the circuit block 𝑐𝑗, which considers components 
tolerance effect. 




For the subsystem 𝑠𝑘, the fault set is 
 .,,
1 cn
kkk FsFsFs =  
𝐹𝑠𝑘𝑗 describes that ionizing radiation effects of  𝑗𝑡ℎ circuit block 𝑐𝑗 to the sub-system 𝑠𝑘. 
𝐹𝑠𝑘0 denotes the functional state of the subsystem 𝑠𝑘. 
.00 , == kjk MifFs j
 
7.3.3 Identification of Fault, Error, and Failure 
The identification focuses on analog and mixed circuit blocks with certain input. Suppose 
that 𝑢 is the measured voltage of the output of one circuit block (𝑐𝑗). An ambiguity region 
of the output of the circuit block (𝑐𝑗) for all components 𝑑𝑖  can be created in time domain. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .,,, 21 tutututu dni dddd =  
with 
( ) ( ).1,100 , cdji
d
njniMiftu i ==  
In general the element value with component tolerance is changed from 𝑌 to 𝑌 + ∆𝑌. The 
upper and lower envelopes of the output of the circuit block (𝑐𝑗) for all components 
responses are: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) .max,,max,max 21 tutututu dnddddupper =  
and 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) .min,,min,min 21 tutututu dnddddlower =  
Thus, the response for the functional state of the circuit block (𝑐𝑗) is: 
( ) ( ) ( ).tututu dupper
d
lower   
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On the other hand, for the output of the circuit block (𝑐𝑗) of each component 𝑑𝑖 under the 
condition of the fault, error, and failure (𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡
𝑑𝑖  , 𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟,
𝑑𝑖  and 𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙
𝑑𝑖  ), the upper and lower 
envelopes of the circuit 𝑐𝑗 output for sensitive component 𝑑𝑖 under the fault state are: 
( ) ( ) ( ).tututu ii derr
d
fault      (7-2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) .tututu jj dfail
d
err      (7-3) 
The fault, error, and failure of the circuit block (𝑐𝑗) response 𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡






also be obtained. The upper and lower envelopes of the fault state of the 
circuit 𝑐𝑗   response are: 
( ) ( ) ( ) .tututu jj cerr
c
fault      (7-4) 
The upper and lower envelopes of the broken state of the circuit block (𝑐𝑗)  response are: 
( ) ( ) ( ) .tututu jj cfail
c
err      (7-5) 
According to Eq. (7-2) to Eq. (7-5), malfunction of components and circuit blocks in 
analog and mixed circuits can be classified into several types: 
(1) Component operates incorrectly, the output of related circuit block should be 
range from 𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡
𝑑𝑖  to 𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟,
𝑑𝑖 ; 
(2) Component fails, the output of related circuit block should be range from 𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟
𝑑𝑖  to 
𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙,
𝑑𝑖 ; 




 to 𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟 
𝑐𝑗
; 









Fault diagnosis of analog and mixed circuits is to identify the current state of the circuit 
block according to the measured value 𝑢. If 𝑢 is within the neighborhood of the nominal 
value under fault 𝐹𝑖, the similarity between the current state and fault 𝐹𝑖 is high. On the 
other hand, if 𝑢 is out of the neighborhood, the similarity will be low. 𝑈𝐹𝑖(𝑢) is used to 
express the similarity between the current state and fault 𝐹𝑖 state. According to the 
maximum degree of criterion, if fault 𝐹𝑖 satisfies 




FFFFF =    (7-6) 
Then we can deem that 𝑢 is subordinate to 𝐹𝑖, and the current state is more similar with 
fault 𝐹𝑖 state. 
7.4 Detection of Radiation Damages 
7.4.1 Determination of  𝑈𝐹𝑖(𝑢) 
According to the characteristics of different circuit blocks and/or subsystems, the method 
of the determination of  𝑈𝐹𝑖(𝑢) can be separated into internal detection and external 
detection. Even though Figure 7-1illustrates a general framework for fault detection and 
diagnosis schemes, the current design includes three distinctive levels: devices, circuits, 
and subsystems. Damage to the device propagates to circuit and subsystem. According to 
the characteristics of circuit modules and subsystems, detection of fault state can be 
carried out within its own channel or by using the data from other channels. For circuit 
modules, such as power related circuits, self-test circuits, faults can be detected within the 
channel. However, other circuit modules, particularly with uncertain inputs, such as 
sensor inputs, sub-functional blocks, it would be difficult to validate their functionalities 
within the channel. The fault detection is often accomplished by comparing with the 




Figure 7-3: The block diagram of detection logical allocation 
7.4.2 Internal Detection 
For analog and mixed circuits with certain input, the determinate 𝑈𝐹𝑖(𝑢) is accomplished 
by the comparison of the measured voltage with the voltage distribution under the fault 
state. The voltage distribution under the fault state can be obtained from the calculation 
result of the identification of fault, error, and failure. For example, suppose the voltage 
distribution of a circuit block (𝑐𝑗) under the fault state is presented as Figure 7-4. 
 
Figure 7-4: Voltage levels of a circuit block under the fault state 
When there has free space between 𝑢𝐹0(𝑡) and 𝑢𝐹𝑖(𝑡), if the measured voltage 𝑢 is 
located at the region of 𝑢𝐹0(𝑡) or 𝑢𝐹𝑖(𝑡), then 
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When there has no free space between 𝑢𝐹1(𝑡) and 𝑢𝐹2(𝑡). If 𝑢 is located at the overlap 
region of 𝑢𝐹1(𝑡) and 𝑢𝐹2(𝑡), the similarity between the current state and fault 𝐹1 , 𝐹2state 
can be determined by sensitivity analysis for 𝑑1 and 𝑑2. 
7.4.3 External Detection 
For those circuit blocks with uncertain input, the determinate 𝑈𝐹𝑖(𝑢) is accomplished by 
combining with the error detection code and the voter mechanism. The information of 
circuit blocks and subsystems can be encoded and transmitted to the primary channel 
through the internal bus. Then, the primary channel accomplishes the function of 
detection damages among all three channels. As previously mentioned, due to the inputs 
of those circuits are unknown, moreover, in high level radiation fields, radiation damages 
may occur in one or two even three of the triplication simultaneously. The detection of 
radiation damages in those circuits is difficult by only using majority voters and/or 
additional test/detection units. A filter function is therefore used to detect radiation 
damages in three channels according to past and present measurements, which is 
expressed in Eq. (7-7). The detection function will output the states of those circuit 
blocks. 
( ).,,,,,],,,,,[ 321321321321 jjjjjjjjjjjj pppmmmfYYYXXX =   (7-7) 
where 
𝑚𝑙𝑗 is the present measurement of the circuit block 𝑗 in the channel 𝑙; 
𝑝𝑙𝑗 is the past measurement of the circuit block 𝑗 in the channel 𝑙; 
𝑋𝑙𝑗 , 𝑌𝑙𝑗 is the state of the circuit block 𝑗 in the channel 𝑙. 
121 
 
7.5 Diagnosis of Radiation Damages 
7.5.1 Fault Hypothesis 
Based on the above definitions, a fault hypothesis for malfunctions of circuit blocks and 
subsystems can be formed in Eq. (7-8), where the goal is to integrate states of circuit 
blocks and subsystems. 
 .,YXH =       (7-8) 
where 𝑋 is the summary of 𝑋𝐶 and 𝑋𝑆, as well as 𝑌 is the summary of 𝑌𝐶 and 𝑌𝑆. 
7.5.2 Detection Function 
A detection function reflects the credibility of 𝐻 as defined in Eq. (7-8). A smaller 𝐸(𝐻) 
suggests a higher credibility of 𝐻. If the detection function is equal or greater than unity, 
a reconfigure command should be issued. 











    (7-9) 
where 𝑤𝑥𝑐𝑗 , 𝑤𝑦𝑐𝑗,𝑤𝑥𝑠𝑘, and 𝑤𝑦𝑠𝑘are the weights of the discrepancy index. The range of 
the weights is from 0.1 to 1. If 𝑤1 ≫  𝑤2, its means that the discrepancy index 𝑤1 is 
much more important than 𝑤2. The values of these weights are determined according to 
the significance of circuit blocks and subsystems in electronic systems. 
7.5.3 Diagnosis Mechanism 
The flowchart of fault detection loop in each channel is illustrated in Figure 7-5. The 
states of fault hypothesis (𝐻1, 𝐻2, 𝐻3)  will be timely updated for the calculation of 
detection functions (𝐸(𝐻1), 𝐸(𝐻2), 𝐸(𝐻3)) in each channel for all three channels. The 
results of fault detection are transmitted to the diagnosis loop for the calculation of 





Figure 7-5: The flowchart of fault detection loop 
The flowchart of fault diagnosis is illustrated in Figure 7-6. Firstly, new fault hypothesis 
is generated according to the system architecture. Subsequently, objective function is 
updated based on the results of fault detection. If the objective function 𝐸(𝐻) is equal or 
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Figure 7-6: The flowchart of fault diagnosis function 
7.6 Experimental Validation 
7.6.1 Experimental Results 
The proposed method of fault detection and diagnosis are validated in the developed 
hardware emulation bench which is described in Appendices A. Detailed information are 
listed in Table 7-1. Radiation effects and their responses of selected semiconductor 
devices are described in Column (5) and Column (6) of Table 7-1. The radiation damages 
concerned in this work are listed as follows: 
(1) Total dose effects on bipolar devices and circuits, such as diode, BJT, OP Ampler; 
(2) Total dose effects on MOS devices and circuits, such as MOSFET, A/D 
converter, transceiver; 
(3) Single event effects on MOSFET devices, such as SEB, SEGR; 
(4) Single event effects on ICs (microcontroller, SRAM, Flash, etc.), such as SEU, 
SET, SEL, SEFI. 
Above radiation-induced failure, several simple failures can be emulated through external 
circuits. However, most failures are very sophisticated due to the significant architecture 
N 
Ei(H) ≥ 1? 
Calculate the objective 
function  










and fabrication technology of complicated circuits. They are therefore only performed 
through the method of software-implemented fault injection. All emulation approaches 
and related radiation-induced damages are summarized in Table 7-1. 
Table 7-1: The summary of radiation-induced damages and emulation methods 




Radiation-induced damage Emulation method 
Diode 
F1 Gain degradation 
(HW) Adding a current source to mimic 
gain degradation 
F2 Loss of the function (HW) Removing the component 
BJT 
F3 
The gain degradation at collector-
emitter voltage 
(HW) Adding a current source to mimic 
gain degradation 
F4 
The gain degradation at base-
emitter voltage 
(HW) Adding a current source to mimic 
gain degradation 
F5 Loss of the function (HW) Removing the component 
OPs 
F6 
The change of circuit parameters/ 
gain degradation 
(HW) Adjusting  resistor values to change 
amplify gain 
F7 Loss of the function (HW) Removing the component 
MOSFET 
F8 
Large threshold voltage shift, loss 
of on/off control 
(HW) Injecting a voltage to change the 
ON/OFF state 
F9 Destructive effects 
(HW) A short circuit between the drain and 
the gate 




F11 Loss of drive capability (HW) Disconnect the output control signal 
F12 
Propagation delay and/or the 
change of circuit timing 
(HW) Disconnect control/data signals 
F13 Inaccurate conversion 
(HW) Adjusting the input of the 
measurement signal 
F14 Temporarily lose the functionality 
(SW) Temporarily disable the function of 
transceiver 
F15 
Loss of the function / out of the 
control 
(HW) Removing the component 
Logic gate 
F16 The change of the voltage level (HW) Inverting the voltage level 
F17 Loss of drive capability (HW) Disconnect the output signal 
F18 Loss of the function (HW) Removing the component 
Voltage 
reference 
F19 Loss of drive capability (HW) Adjusting the configure circuit 
F20 Loss of the function (HW) Removing the component 
MCU 
F21 Loss of drive capability on GPIO (HW) Disconnect the GPIO signal 
F22 The invert of the voltage level 
(HW) Inverting the voltage level of GPIO 
output 
F23 
The change of circuit timing 
parameter (inaccurate frequency) 






Radiation-induced damage Emulation method 
F24 
The change of circuit parameter 
(data / address bus) 
(SW) Injecting a wrong value on 
data/address bus 
F25 
Temporarily lose the functionality 
(SEFI) 
(HW) Hardware restart 
F26 
Loss of the function  / out of the 
control 
(HW) Removing the component/module 
SRAM 
F27 Loss of drive capability on bus 
(SW) Injection a wrong value on a  unit of 
SRAM 
F28 
The invert of the voltage level of 
memory unit (SEU) 
(SW) Injection a wrong value on a unit of 
SRAM 
F29 
Temporarily lose the functionality 
(SEFI) 
(SW) Temporarily disable the function of 
SRAM 
F30 
Loss of the function  / out of the 
control 
(SW) Disable the function of SRAM 
FLASH 
F31 Loss of drive capability on bus 
(SW) Injection a wrong value on a  unit of 
flash 
F32 
The change of the voltage level of 
memory unit 
(SW) Injection a wrong value on a  unit of 
flash 
F33 Temporarily lose the functionality 
(SW) Temporarily disable the function of 
flash 
F34 
Loss of the function  / out of the 
control 
(SW) Disable the function of flash 
Transceiver 
F35 
A loss of drive capability on 
control signal 
(HW) Disconnect the control signal 
F36 Non-function of receiving data (HW) Disconnect the receiving circuit 
F37 Receiving incorrect data 
(SW) Injection a wrong data in receiving 
buffer 
F38 Non-function of sending data (HW) Disconnect the sending circuit 
F39 Sending incorrect data 
(SW) Injection a wrong data in sending 
buffer 
F40 Incorrect frequency 
(SW) Modifying the configuration of 
frequency 
F41 Temporarily lose the functionality 
(SW) Temporarily disable the function of 
transceiver 
F42 Loss of the function (SW) Disable the function of transceiver 
HW: hardware-based emulation; SW: software-based emulation 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, a hardware emulation bench, illustrated in Appendices A, is 
developed to evaluate the correctness of the proposed detection method. The bench uses a 
combination of fault injection techniques, which combined with two emulation methods, 
mimic radiation effects on semiconductor devices; logic emulation (LE), which is based 
on software-implemented fault injection, and uses injection commands to forcibly control 
and/or stop system functions; and circuit emulation (CE), which is based on hardware-
(Continued Table 7-1) 
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implemented fault injection, using external circuits to mimic circuit responses under 
radioactive conditions. With respect to each fault, related emulation method is listed in 
Column (4) of Table 7-1. 
The hardware emulation platform includes an implementation of a wireless monitoring 
system as a case study of the proposed radiation-tolerant architecture. In this work, for 
simplicity, all channels are considered with the same hardware to validate the developed 
architecture and fault detection mechanism; and the system considers two uncertain input 
signals: 4~20mA and 0~100 Ω. The detailed information of the implementation of the 
wireless channel is given in Table 7-2.  Specifically, those components with the high 
radiation resistances, such as resistance, capacitance, etc., are not listed in the table due to 
they have the capacity to survive in the given radiation condition. Each wireless channel 
consists of 13 semiconductor components (component-level), which are listed in the 
Column (2) of Table 7-2; 9 circuit blocks (circuit-level): 2 voltage reference circuit, 2 
analog signal processing circuits, A/D convert circuit, memory circuit, controller circuit, 
wireless sending circuit, wireless receiving circuit; also includes 6 modules (system-




Table 7-2: The information of the developed radiation-tolerant wireless device 
Comp. Q. FIT 
Fault 
cases 












The output voltage decreases, 
OPs work nonfunctional 
External 200 ms 1/2 
OPs 4 1.85 
F6, 
F7 
OPs work nonfunctional. The 
output of the function of input 
source will be incorrect. 
External 200 ms 2/2 
NPN BJT 1 2.45 
F3-
F5 
The output of the function of 
input source will be incorrect. 






The AD’s reference voltage will 
be incorrect. 






Out of control 
External 200 ms 
2/2 
F13 
The output (10bits) of the 











Microcontroller will be 
nonfunctional. 
External 300 ms 1/1 
F23 Timer period is incorrect. Internal  100 ms 1/1 
F27-
F30 
SRAM (256 bytes) will be 
nonfunctional 
Internal 500 ms 16/256 
F31-
F34 
Flash (4K bytes) will be 
nonfunctional 





The output of GPIO (32 bits) will 
be nonfunctional. 
External 500 ms 24/32 
F25, 
F26 
Microcontroller will not work. External 300 ms 2/2 
Logic gate 1 0.50 
F16-
F18 
Microcontroller will be 
nonfunctional. 
External 300 ms 3/3 
Diode 1 3.30 
F1-
F2 
Wireless transmitter may be 
nonfunctional 
Internal  500 ms 1/2 
Varactor 1 3.30 
F1-
F2 
Wireless transmitter may be 
nonfunctional 




F35 Out of control Internal 500 ms 1/1 
F36-
F40 
Communication will be 
nonfunctional 
External 500 ms 5/5 
F41-
F42 




7.6.2 Detection Coverage 
One way to quantify the effectiveness of the fault tolerance capability is by fault coverage 
measure 𝐶. This figure of merit is defined as the number of faults dealt with successfully 
over the total number of faults considered (Kim et al., 2006). 
( )./ existencefaultcorrectlyprocessedfaultPC =     (7-13) 
Considering a system in a radiation environment, for a given time ∆𝑡, the fault detection 




















     (7-14) 
where 
𝐶𝑖,𝑑 is the detected faults in component 𝑖; and 𝜆𝑖 is the failure rate of component  𝑖 (𝑖 =
1, 2, ⋯ 𝑛𝑑). 
In the current validation process, for the chosen fault rates in Column 4 in Table 7-2 and 
experimental results, the detection coverage is calculated to be 62.11%. This means that 
62.11% of perceivable radiation induced fault scenarios can be successfully dealt with. 
7.7 Conclusions 
In this Chapter, a method of fault detection and diagnosis within a radiation-tolerant 
architecture is developed to enhance the radiation tolerance and to prolong the life of 
electronic systems. To evaluate the proposed method, a number of simulated experiments 
through fault injection are performed on a developed hardware emulation bench. The 
experimental results have shown that the radiation-tolerant wireless device was verified 
to effectively work and the developed detection and diagnosis logic was also verified to 
timely detect the abnormal condition. The detection coverages of the developed method 
for the redundant wireless device is 62.11%. Moreover, the detection coverages can be 




Based on the experiment results in this work, the developed detection and diagnosis 
method can timely detect and diagnose most of radiation damages in the radiation-
tolerant architecture. It can therefore be applied to design redundant systems without rad-
hardened devices for high level radiation fields. System validation through the physical 
radiation test will be presented in the following Chapters. 
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Chapter 8  
8 Implementation: an Application of Wireless Monitoring 
System for Radiation Environments in NPPs  
Considering various potential scenarios, e.g., the high level of radiation, the lack of 
power, and the damaged communication infrastructure, during a severe accident in 
nuclear power plants, a self-powered wireless monitoring system (WPAMS) is extremely 
useful in surveying the plant even when there is no functioning communication 
infrastructure during a severe post-accident situation, as well as those high level radiation 
fields in nuclear power plants. Key issue is to protect wireless devices for surviving in 
high level radiation environments. As previously mentioned, a number of radiation-
hardened design techniques and methods are investigated in this research, which can be 
applied to implement the proposed wireless monitoring system. On the other side, this 
wireless monitoring system can be also used to validate the correctness and effectiveness 
of the investigated techniques and methods. 
This Chapter starts with design considerations of the proposed wireless monitoring 
system for high level radiation environments in nuclear power plants. Subsequently, the 
developments of all devices in the system are described in detail, which include radiation-
tolerant wireless device, gateway device, portable monitoring device, and remote 
monitoring station. Then, the developed system is tested in the normal condition, as well 
as related test results are presented. 
8.1 Design Considerations 
1) Design Requirements 
The mission of a wireless monitoring system is to obtain essential information about the 
status of the plant even when there is no communication infrastructure, which is crucial 
to plant operators and emergency response teams to effectively manage and to mitigate 
the effects of the accident. In this mission, the issues listed in Chapter 2.1.2 may need to 
be considered and investigated. 
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As explained in Chapter 1.2, the highest radiation level considered in this research is 1 M 
Rad (Si). Those cases whose total radiation doses are more than 1 M Rad (Si) are not 
considered in this research. 
2) Criteria Variables 
The monitoring variables should refer the selection criteria of IEEE Std.-2016. The 
variable types include type A, B, C, D, and E. 
• Type A: planned manually controlled actions for accomplishment of safety 
functions for which there is no automatic control. 
• Type B: assess the process of accomplishing or maintaining plant safety functions 
• Type C: indicate an actual breach of fission product barriers. 
• Type D: indicate performance of safety systems, indicate the performance of 
required auxiliary support features, indicate the performance of other systems 
necessary to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition, verify safety system 
status. 
• Type E: monitor the magnitude of releases of radioactive materials through 
identified pathways, monitor the environmental conditions used to determine the 
impact of release of radioactive materials through identified pathways, monitor 
radiation levels and radioactivity in the plant environs, monitor radiation and 
radioactivity levels in the control room and selected plant areas where access may 
be required for plant recovery. 
Also Regulatory Guide 1.97 (rev 3) provides a graded method to requirements according 
to the importance of variables. Three separate categories are listed as follows. 
• Category 1: provides the most stringent requirements and is intended for key 
variables. 
• Category 2: provides less stringent requirements and generally applies to 
instrumentation designated for indicating system operating status. 
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• Category 3: is intended to provide requirements that will ensure that high-quality 
off-the-shelf instrumentation is obtained and applies to backup and diagnostic 
instrumentation. 
One of the lessons we learned from the Fukushima accident is that the equipment should 
be for multi-purpose use under post-accident circumstances, such as radiation detecting, 
hydrogen monitoring, thermal imaging, pressure, temperature, gas, and humidity sensing. 
Considering those factors, the criteria variables and specifications for WPAMS are shown 
in Table 8-1. Furthermore, conditions of protection systems, such as water level in a spent 
fuel pool, coolant inventory, containment pressure, etc., also need to be monitored. The 
system should reserve some channels which used for monitoring those condition 
parameters. Moreover, those channels have flexible voltage range and can be 
reconfiguration according to sensors signals, e.g., 0.5v to 5v voltage signal, 4~20 mA 
current signal, etc. 
Table 8-1: Criteria variables and specifications considered in the design of wireless 





Neutron flux Type B 1 10-6 % to 100 % 
Containment Hydrogen concentration Type C 1 0 to 30 vol-% 
Containment area radiation Type C 1 1 to 107 R/hr 
Containment atmosphere humidity Type D  0% to 100% 
Containment atmosphere temperature Type D 2 40 oF to 400 oF 
 
3) Potential Solution 
Considering potential scenarios and issues during a severe accident, a wireless 
monitoring system, illustrated in Figure 8-1, is proposed in this work to obtain up-to-date 
information of the plant after a severe accident. The proposed monitoring system includes 
four types of devices: radiation-tolerant wireless devices (strong radiation field), gateway 
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device (low radiation field), portable monitoring device, and remote monitoring station. 
The detailed implementations of those devices are described in the follow. 
 
Figure 8-1: A potential wireless monitoring system for high level radiation 
environments in a nuclear power plant 
8.2 Development of Wireless Monitoring System 
8.2.1 Measurement and Transmission Unit 
In the proposed monitoring system, wireless devices will be installed in high level 
radiation environments and are used to collect up-to-date environment parameters, such 
as temperature, humidity, gamma dose, neutron level, hydrogen level, water level, etc., 
and to transmit that information to the gateway which is installed out of the containment. 
Therefore they have to have high radiation resistance to survive in those environments. 
The previously investigated techniques will be used in the implementation of those 
wireless devices. The framework of the developed radiation-tolerant wireless device is 
illustrated in Figure 8-2. 


























Figure 8-2: The framework of the developed radiation-tolerant wireless device 
As illustrated in Figure 8-3, the tolerant management of the developed radiation-tolerant 
wireless device includes an active triple modular redundant core. Each modular consists 
of an input layer, a decision layer, and a output layer. Specially, the input layer consists 
of input sources, a source encoder, and a channel encoder; the decision layer consists of 
the decision-making unit; and the output layer consists of a digital modulator and 
transceiver. For simplity’s sake, only temperature sensor and water level sensor are taken 
as the input signal in this Chapter. In addition, all channels are constructed with 








Sensors (temperature, level, pressure, relative humidity, radiation, 
hydrogen gas, etc.) 























Figure 8-3: The TMR core of the proposed wireless communication system (Proakis 
and Salehi, 2008) 
On the other hand, component selection is a significant step to implement radiation-
tolerant system. Radiation hardness of different semiconductor technologies and COTS 
components are different. In this work, referring to radiation test data from the NASA 
Goddard Space Flight Center, all wireless channels and their spares are implemented with 
diversified devices. Picture of the developed wireless device is shown in Figure 8-4, as 
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Figure 8-4: Picture of radiation-tolerant wireless device developed in this work 
 
Figure 8-5: Picture of radiation shielding protection developed in this work 
The detailed implementation of wireless monitoring device and related information are 
listed in Table 8-2. Specifically, those components, such as resistance, capacitor, relay, 
etc., are not listed in the table due to their robustness to radiation. 
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Table 8-2: The implementation of radiation-tolerant wireless devices in this research 




NPN BJT 1 Bipolar Semicoa 
Voltage reference 1 Bipolar Ti 
OP amp 3 Bipolar National Semi. 
Channel 
encoder 
Voltage reference 1 Bipolar Ti 
AD 1 Bipolar Analog Devices 
Decision & 
Digital  
E2PROM 1 CMOS Atmel 
Microcontroller 1 CMOS Microchip 
Transceiver 
Voltage reference 1 Bipolar Linear 
Diode 1 Bipolar Toshiba 




Voltage reference 1 BiCMOS Ti 
OP amp 3 CMOS Analog Devices 
Channel 
encoder 
OP amp 1 CMOS Analog Devices 
Voltage reference 1 CMOS Ti 




Microcontroller 1 CMOS Atmel 
Logic gate 1 CMOS Ti 




Voltage reference 1 HSCMOS Allegro 
OP amp 3 BiFET Ti 
Channel 
encoder 
Voltage reference 1 CMOS Analog Devices 
AD 1 LC2MOS Analog Devices 




Microcontroller 1 TTL Logic Silicon 
Logic gate 1 TTL Logic Ti 
Transceiver 
433 MHz RF 1 TTL Logic Silicon 




Specially, as previously mentioned, the important variables of interests are temperature, 
humidity, hydrogen concentration, and radiation levels of the environment. It is also 
important to gather information about the conditions of protection systems, such as water 
level in a spent fuel pool, and coolant inventory etc. However, to be simple, only two 
different sensor signals are involved in this work, they are: 
• 4~20 mA current source (water level sensor); 
• 0~100 Ω resistance (temperature sensor). 
More work about sensors, such as gamma detector, neutron detector, etc., will be 
investigated in other works. 
8.2.2 Gateway  
The objective of a gateway device is to collect the up-to-date information from wireless 
devices, to transmit that information to remote emergency monitoring station and/or the 
portable monitoring device, and also to integrate and to preserve that information. The 
device works in the low level radiation fields and consists of diversified communication 
interfaces, such as diversified wireless networks, Ethernet network, satellite 
communication interface, cellular network, etc. It therefore needs a powerful processor to 
hand all communication threads and data processing tasks.  
In this work, the gateway device is constructed by Freescale i.mx6 microprocessor, which 
is a feature- and performance-scalable multicore platform based on the ARM Cortex 
architecture and run up to 1.2 GHz with various communication interfaces. The gateway 
device includes several local hardware interfaces, such as USB, SD card, HDMI, LCD, 
etc. They are used to debug, to setup working parameters, and to save the history data. 




Figure 8-6: The block diagram of the gateway device developed in this research 
In addition, the gateway device uses a Linux operating system to manage its resources, 
which include several threads to accomplish all functions, such as WSN communication 
thread.   On the other hand, due to the gateway device is installed in the low level of 
radiation fields, a copper shielding (1cm thickness) is used to mitigate radiation effects on 
the electronics. The picture of the developed gateway device is shown in Figure 8-7, as 































































Figure 8-7: Picture of gateway device developed in this research 
 
Figure 8-8: Picture of the shielding for gateway device developed in this research 
8.2.3 Remote Monitoring Station 
1) Remote monitoring station 
The objective of remote monitoring station is to collect the up-to-date information from 
the gateway devices, to manage and to analyze environment parameters of high radiation 
fields, as well as to display those parameters. A software tool is therefore developed to 
control, to collect, and to display the information of environment parameters, as well as 
to analyze the node performance of wireless network.  
In this work, a rugged laptop is used as the remote monitoring station to accomplish all 
functions, such as message transceive function, data collecting management, data 
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processing, database management, and GUI function. The overview of this software tool 
is illustrated in Figure 8-9. 
 
Figure 8-9: The overview of remote monitoring station developed in this research 
Picture of the remote monitoring station used in this research is shown in Figure 8-10. 
 
Figure 8-10: Picture of the remote monitoring station used in this research 
2) Portable monitoring device 
In addition, a portable monitoring device is also implemented in this work by using the 
DLI8800 rugged tablet, which also includes several hardware interfaces, such as USB 
ports, user-programmable key, and multiple radio communication interfaces. Operating 

















Figure 8-11: Picture of portable monitoring device used in this research 
3) Monitoring Tool 
A software tool has been developed to collect, to display, and to handle the data in the 
remote monitoring device and portable monitoring device. It is developed by using C++ 
in Microsoft Visual Studio. Picture of the software tool is shown in Figure 8-12. 
 
Figure 8-12: Picture of a monitoring software tool developed in this research 
143 
 
8.3 Testing in a Normal Environment 
8.3.1 Accuracy of Parameters Measurement 
Taking water level as an example, the measurement results during 24 hours, listed in 
Table 8-3, demostrate the reliable and accurate monitoring performance of the developed 
system under a normal condition. 



















2 inch 1 2 0% 2 0% 
10 inch 1 10.2 2% 9.8 2% 
20 inch 1 20.3 1.5% 19.8 1% 
40 inch 1 40.4 1% 39.6 1% 
 
8.3.2 Wireless Communication Performance 
In the test, wireless device sends one message packet to the gateway at a period of two 
seconds. Packet loss rate can be calculated by: 
.PacketLossPacketLossRate
PacketSent
=       (8-1) 





=      (8-2) 
The test results of communication performance under a normal condition are given in 
Table 8-4. The test results have shown that the real-time transmission from wireless 
detectors to the remote monitoring station is stable and reliable. The remote station 
receives the data and adequately displays the up-to-date information. 
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24 43153 47 0.054% 55 0.127% 
 
8.4 Summary 
In this Chapter, based on design considerations, the implementation of the proposed 
wireless monitoring application for radiation environment in a nuclear power plant is 
presented in detail. The system includes four type devices:  radiation-tolerant wireless 
device, gateway device, portable monitoring device, and remote monitoring device. In a 
normal environment, the developed system can work smoothly. Experimental results 
have shown that environment parameters can be correctly measured and its deviation is 
less than 2%. In addition, the performance of wireless communication satisfies the design 
requirement; its packet loss rate and packet error rate are 0.054% and 0.127%, 
respectively.  
Experiment results have shown that the proposed redundant architecture is correct and the 
developed wireless monitoring system can be used to effectively obtain up-to-date 
information from a specified environment. The radiation-tolerance assessment for the 
developed redundant wireless device will be explained in Chapter 9. As well as the 
experimental validation in a real radiation environment will be presented in Chapter 10. 
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Chapter 9  
9 Evaluation: Radiation-Tolerance Assessment  
In the design of a radiation-tolerant system, the assessment of its radiation-tolerance is a 
critical step. The physical test is very precise but could be excessively complicated and 
expensive. As well as simulation method is difficult to assess the radiation-tolerance of 
the whole system. A method is developed in this Chapter to assess the radiation-tolerance 
in the design phase without repeated physical test. 
This Chapter starts with the problem about radiation-tolerance assessment in the design 
of electronic systems for high radiation level fields. Subsequently, reliability assessment 
models are established for before- and post-irradiation. Then, radiation degradation factor 
are used to describe the radiation response of the component, the subsystem, and the 
system under a total radiation dose. Finally, the reliability assessment for the developed 
wireless device is given in detail. 
9.1 Problem Statement 
In general, the performance of rad-hardened systems can be evaluated in two ways: (1) 
physical tests: which use external perturbation sources (natural and accelerated particle 
radiation, laser beam, pin forcing, etc.) to create a similar radiation environment to 
evaluate the performance of the design. This approach is very precise but could be 
excessively complicated and expensive; and (2) simulation with analysis: which uses 
logic relationships of the circuits and systems to access internal elements and insert the 
effect of a radiation induced fault according to the fault model. However, a limitation of 
this approach is that it is difficult to assess the radiation-tolerance of the whole system. 
To address these issues, an approach by combining with reliability analysis and radiation 
degradation factor is developed. Key issues to deal with the assessment of radiation-
tolerance without physical tests are listed as follows: 
(1) To establish reliability assessment model for post-irradiation. 
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(2) To obtain radiation degradation factors for semiconductor components. 
9.2 Evaluation of Radiation Shielding Protection 
Taking radiation levels (7.3 K Rad/h and 53 K Rad/h) in Fukushima nuclear accident, as 
illustrated in Chapter 5, using Co-60 as a radiation source for gamma radiation, the ability 
of the developed protections can be evaluated with the aid of RadPro Calculator (Rad Pro 
Calculator, 2018). 
• Under the condition with dose rate 70 Sv/h (7 K Rad/h), for a 24h period, the 
highest total dose in six areas should be less than 2.6 K Rad (Si). 
• Under the condition with dose rate 530 Sv/h (53 K Rad/h), for a 24h period, the 
highest total dose in six areas should be less than 20 K Rad (Si); 
• Under the condition with dose rate 1350 Sv/h (130 K Rad/h), for a 24h period, the 
highest total dose in six areas should be less than 50 K Rad (Si); 
• Under the condition with dose rate 2700 Sv/h (270 K Rad/h), for a 24h period, the 
highest total dose in six areas should be less than 100 K Rad (Si); 
9.3 Assessment of System Reliability 
9.3.1 Reliability Assessment Model 
The reliability function 𝑅(𝑡) represents the probability that an item (component, 
subsystem, or system) will perform the designed functions over a given time interval 
[0, 𝑡] under specific operating environment and conditions (Song and Wang, 2013). 
Conventional analysis methods for system reliability are dependent on probabilistic 
approaches, which incorporate all failure events as random events. These methods are 
based on two fundamental assumptions: (1) binary state assumptions, where the system 
can only be in either of the two states (fully functioning or completely failed); and (2) 
probability assumptions, where the system failure behavior is fully characterized by the 
probability measures (Ravi et al., 2000). However, there are many uncertainties when a 
device or a system is operating in a harsh environment, which may include strong level of 
radiation, extremely high temperature, and high humidity, etc.; those uncertainties 
challenge the assumptions made in the “conventional” reliability analysis of the 
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components, and lead to an increase in the probability of failure for the item (component, 
subsystem, and/or system) (Lauridsen et al., 1996). Therefore, the analysis employed by 
the conventional methods may not represent a realistic situation in a harsh environment.  
Radiation effects should be considered in the reliability analysis. 
The current work establishes the assessment model for non-radiation conditions first 
through failure rates to obtain the reliability of the proposed architecture under radiation 
conditions. The failure rate 𝜆(𝑡) of an item expresses the “possibility to failure” of the 
item after time 𝑡 has passed (Song and Wang, 2013). It is estimated from the mean 
number of failures per unit time, which can be expressed by failure in time (FIT) as 
follows: 
./101 9 hourfailureFIT −=  
The reliability 𝑅(𝑡) of the item can then be determined from the failure rate 𝜆(𝑡) with the 










       (9-1) 
Assuming that the failure rate is independent of time (𝑡), then 𝜆(𝑡) = 𝜆, Eq. (9-1) can be 
simplified to (Song and Wang, 2013) 
( ) .tetR −=      (9-2) 
Considering that the proposed architecture consists of an input layer, a decision layer, and 
an output layer; and the reliability of diversified channels are all different, the reliability 
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According to Eq. (9-3), 𝑅𝑖1(𝑡), 𝑅𝑖2(𝑡), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑖3(𝑡) can be obtained. Subsequently, the 
reliability model of the proposed architecture under non-radiation conditions can be 
derived as follows: 
























  (9-5) 
Specifically, as previously discussed, cases of all three channels encountering failures 
simultaneously are not considered in this work, common-mode failure is therefore not 
considered. 
9.3.2 Radiation Degradation Factor 
To take radiation effects in consideration in the system reliability analysis, a new analysis 
method for electronic systems has been developed in (Lauridsen et al., 1996a; Lauridsen 
et al., 1996b). This method uses radiation degradation factors(∆), instead of the usual 
failure rate data, of an item in the reliability model, to describe the radiation response of 
this item under a total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡, which will lie in the interval [0, 1] and can be 
defined as follows: 
( ) ( ) .1,/min 00 ft PPPP −−=      (9-6) 
A detailed description of the radiation degradation factor can be found in (Lauridsen et 
al., 1996b). 























  (9-7) 
Some previous studies (Lauridsen, et al., 1996a; Lauridsen, et al., 1996b) have derived 
the parameter values of radiation degradation based on actual radiation test data; with 
radiation degradation function which are used to describe how the properties of the 
materials and/or components change under various radiation conditions.  
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Since semiconductor components may have a number (𝑛𝑝) of critical parameters, in this 
study, the radiation degradation factor is chosen as the mean value of the degradation 
factors across all critical parameters as follows: 















=      (9-8) 
The reliability (𝑅′(𝑡)) of an item under the total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 can then be expressed 
in Eq. (9-9). 
( ) .)1()1()(' tetRtR −−=−=    (9-9) 
The reliability of the 𝑗th layer in the channel 𝑖 under the total radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 can be 













   (9-10) 
Assuming that the channel 𝑖 consists of  𝑛𝑐 components, the reliability of the channel 𝑖 
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𝑖3(𝑡) can be evaluated. The 
reliability model of the redundant architecture mentioned in Figure 6-3 under the total 
radiation dose 𝐷𝑡 can be derived as Eq. (9-12). 




























iS tRtRtRtR    (9-12) 
9.4 Radiation-Tolerance of the Developed Wireless Device 
In the assessment of system reliability using Eq. (9-12), only the total radiation dose has 
been considered. One difficulty in the assessment is proper determination of the 
degradation factors for semiconductor devices used. Most of radiation degradation factors 
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under different radiation doses in this study come from NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center radiation test database, which are publicly available on-line; others are derived 
from the existing literature (Messenger and Ash, 1991; Houssay, 2000; Kulkami and 
Agarwal, 2003). 
In this work, the failure rates of semiconductor components listed in Column (5) of Table 
9-1 come from the online resources of their manufacturers, while those radiation 
degradation factors listed in Column (7) to (10) of Table 9-1. For some components, their 
𝑃𝑓 are not available in NASA database and literature. Under these circumstances, they are 
derived from the limits of respective parameters in the specifications. According to the 
sources used, they can be categorized into three types: 
• Most radiation degradation factors (83.34%) for different radiation doses are 
derived from the test data; 
• Several radiation degradation factors (8.33%) are derived from the test data of 
similar components of same function and same semiconductor technologies; 
• Other radiation degradation factors (8.33%) are derived from the mean value of 
the test data of different components with the same semiconductor technologies. 
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Table 9-1: Radiation degradation factors of the developed wireless device 
Channel Function Type Q. FIT 
R.
D.F 
Δ Δ Δ Δ 




NPN BJT 1 2.45 A 0.194 0.3201 0.4267 0.4591 
Voltage ref. 1 3.30 A 0.0774 0.1010 0.2104 0.3432 
OP Amp 3 1.85 A 0.0208 0.0365 0.0383 0.0365 
Channel 
encoder 
Voltage ref. 1 3.30 A 0.0642 0.1099 0.5158 0.5786 




E2PROM 1 2.20 A 0.0023 0.0244 0.1341 0.1326 
FPGA 1 3.30 A 0.0187 0.0465 0.1001 0.1179 
Transceiver 
Voltage ref. 1 3.30 C 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Varactor 1 3.30 A 0.0000 0.0577 0.0145 0.0769 




Voltage ref. 1 3.30 A 0.1510 0.0181 0.0087 0.0094 
OP amp 3 0.28 A 0.0409 0.0770 0.2989 0.2168 
Channel 
encoder 
OP amp 1 0.28 A 0.2377 0.3964 0.6620 0.6537 
Voltage ref. 1 3.30 A 0.1408 0.3371 0.3204 0.3846 




Controller 1 5.60 A 0.0638 0.0654 0.0985 0.1190 
Logic gate 1 0.50 A 0.1330 0.0244 0.1850 0.2432 




Voltage ref. 1 3.30 A 0.1408 0.3371 0.3204 0.3846 
OP amp 3 0.20 A 0.0689 0.1551 0.3673 0.5151 
Channel 
encoder 
Voltage ref. 1 3.30 A 0.0039 0.0216 0.0223 0.0644 
AD 1 1.60 A 0.0181 0.0229 0.0246 0.0209 




Controller 1 2.26 A 0.0109 0.0134 0.0149 0.0168 
Logic gate 1 3.30 A 0.0469 0.0494 0.0480 0.0724 
Transceiver 
915 MHz RF 1 1.90 A 0.0479 0.0781 0.1108 0.1567 
Voltage ref. 1 3.30 A 0.0055 0.0269 0.0238 0.0646 
 
According to Eq. (9-12), under four total radiation dose levels (10 K Rad (Si), 20 K Rad 
(Si), 50 K Rad (Si), 100 K Rad (Si)), the reliabilities of the developed wireless devices 
are shown in Figure 9-1. It can be seen that the reliability decreases significantly as the 
total radiation dose increases. Moreover, through the comparison, the reliabilities in 
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single channel (A1/S1, A2/S2, A3/S3), the system with triple channels (FT (m=3)), and the 
system with six redundant channels (FT (m = 6)), also shown in Figure 9-1. It is evident 
that the reliabilities (98.4%, 94.9%, 61.5%, 44.2%) of the system with redundant 
architectures are much higher than those (60.3%, 37.5%, 11.9%, 7.2%; 33.6%, 20.7%, 
3.2%, 3.4%; and 35.2%, 36.8%, 16.0%, 6.2%) of non-redundant channels under the same 
radiation conditions. 
 
Figure 9-1: The compassion of the reliability of the developed redundant system and 
no-redundant channels under the given total doses (0, 10 K Rad (Si), 20 K Rad (Si), 
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Figure 9-2: Radiation assessment of the developed wireless device under various 
dose rates 
In a summary, combing with the developed radiation protection in Chapter 5, the 
radiation assessment of the developed system under various dose rates for (24h) duration 
is illustrated in Figure 9-2. It can be seen that the reliability of the developed device 
under a dose rate of 530Sv/h for 24 h is about 89.6%. This means that the device can 
therefore work reliably in those high level radiation environments. Cumulative dose can 
be calculated by: 
.Dose Dose Rate Irradiated Time=         (9-12) 
According to Eq. (9-12), using the levels of Fukushima disaster as a guideline, before 
March 2012, the highest dose rate recorded is about 73 Sv/h, that means the developed 
system can survive for at least 7 days. In Feb. 2017, the highest recorded dose rate is 530 
Sv/h, the system can survive for at least 24 hours. 
On the other hand, based on the calculation, as the radiation level increases, the radiation 
degradation factors of the semiconductor components increase significantly as well, 
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different levels of the total doses, the reliability (60.3%, 37.5%, 11.9%, 7.2%) of A1/S1 
channel (bipolar semiconductor technologies) is higher than that (35.2%, 36.8%, 16.0%, 
6.2%) of A3/S3 channel (Hybrid semiconductor technologies) and much higher than that 
(33.6%, 20.7%, 3.2%, 3.4%) of A2/S2 channel (CMOS semiconductor technologies). 
These results agree with the known knowledge in the domain of radiation assurance. 
Hence, this assessment technique can be used to select components and to evaluate the 
radiation-tolerance of the entire whole system in the design phase. It is also an effective 
tool to aid in design of tests in a physical radiation environment. 
9.5 Conclusions 
In this Chapter, an assessment method of the radiation-tolerance of a wireless monitoring 
device is presented for radiaiton conditions, which is developed by using radiation 
protection and radiation-tolerant techniques. The study results show that total dose can be 
effectively decreased by radiation protections. The analytical results conclude that, under 
given radiation conditions (10 K Rad (Si), 20 K Rad (Si), 50 K Rad (Si), 100 K Rad (Si)), 
the reliability of the developed architecture (98.4%, 94.9%, 61.5%, 44.2%) is much 
higher than those of non-redundant channels (60.3%, 37.5%, 11.9%, 7.2%; 33.6%, 
20.7%, 3.2%, 3.4%; and 35.2%, 36.8%, 16.0%, 6.2%). The system reliability can further 
be improved by selecting components with higher radiation resistance and/or by 
increasing the protection capability of radiation shielding. 
According to assessment studies, the developed system can work in high level radiation 
fields with a total dose up to 1 M Rad (Si). It provides an economical and effective 
solution to obtain up-to-date information in the event of a severe accident in a nuclear 
power plant without resorting to use of expensive rad-hardened electronics components. 
However, it is important to mention that the proposed radiation-tolerance assessment 
method should not replace physical tests. It can be used to design physical tests and be 
treated as complementary tool.  Their value cannot be underestimated at the design phase 





Chapter 10  
10  Experimental Validation 
In the design of a radiation-hardened electronic system, the investigation of the 
correctness and effectiveness of the proposed radiation-hardened design techniques and 
the evaluation of the radiation hardness of the developed electronic devices are the 
critical parts. They are usually performed by exposing the device and/or system to a 
radiation environment and measuring the performance parameters. Over the years, a lot 
of research works has been done to obtain radiation data. In general, a radiation test has 
three distinct objectives: (1) to investigate the mechanisms of the interaction of radiation 
particles with semiconductor materials and to understand how a device fails caused by 
these effects; (2) to investigate radiation responses of specific devices and technologies 
for the component selection in the system design; and (3) to investigate the radiation 
hardness of the product to determine its acceptability (Ronald et al., 1988). The first type 
of tests is fundamental for the understanding of radiation effects and damages on 
electronics. The second focuses on radiation responses of devices and technologies. The 
third focuses on the system-level to investigate the radiation hardness of the product. 
However, investigation of radiation responses of modern wireless communication devices 
is limited in the literature. Such information is not only significant but also necessary for 
design of systems operating in high level radiation environment. 
In this Chapter, to investigate the radiation hardness of the developed wireless systems, 
as well as to validate the investigated methods, four different experiments with several 
distinct wireless devices built with diversified commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
components have been performed under radiation conditions with both high dose rate (20 
K Rad (Si)/h) condition and low dose rate (200 Rad (Si)/h) condition by using 60Co 
gamma irradiator in Nuclear Reactor Laboratory of the Ohio State University (OSU-
NRL). The goals are: (1) the investigation of radiation vulnerabilities of the wireless 
monitoring system with diversified commercial off-the-shelf components under a high 
dose rate condition; (2) performance evaluation of popular wireless transceivers and 
networks under a radiation environment; (3) evaluation of diversified non-redundant 
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wireless monitoring devices under radiation conditions with high and low dose rate; (4) 
evaluation of the radiation hardness of the developed radiation-tolerant wireless devices 
under a high dose rate condition. 
This Chapter starts with the objectives of the total dose test. Test facility is then described 
and experimental approaches are also explained. Subsequently, experimental schemes, 
experimental results, and related technical discussions for four tests are presented in 
detail. Finally, based on experiment results, conclusions are given. 
10.1 Overview 
10.1.1 Objectives of Experiments 
To obtain up-to-date information, modern digital communication technologies are offen 
applied to specifically deal with digital data and digitally pre-processed signals and also 
to transmit that information. The composition of a digital communication system is 
illustrated in Figure 10-1. The basic elements of a transmitter in a digital communication 
system include: (1) input transducer, which converts the output of a practical sensor into 
an electrical signal; (2) source encoder, which converts the output of either an analog or a 
digital source into a sequence of binary digits; (3) channel encoder, which introduces, in a 
controlled manner, some redundancy in the binary information sequence used at the 
receiver to overcome the effects of noise and interference encountered in the transmission 
of the signal through the channel; (4) digital modulator, which serves as the interface to 
map the binary information sequence into the signal waveforms (Proakis and Salehi, 
2008). At a receiver end, the basic elements are: (1) digital demodulator, which processes 
channel-corrupted transmitted waveforms and reduces each of them to a single number 
that represents an estimate the transmitted data symbol; (2) channel decoder, which 
reconstructs the original information sequence from the knowledge of the code used in 
the channel encoder; (3) source decoder, which reconstructs the original signal from the 
source; and (4) output transducer, which converts the electrical signals into a form that is 




Figure 10-1: Composition of a digital communication system (Proakis and Salehi, 
2008) 
As illustrated in Figure 10-1, various modern semiconductor components and circuits 
have to be used for implementing the functions in wireless senders, such as signal 
processing circuit, analog-to-digit converter, microcontroller/microprocessor, and 
transceiver, etc. The block diagram of a typical transmission system is illustrated in 
Figure 10-2.  
 
Figure 10-2: A block diagram of the implementation of a typical wireless 
transmission system 
When a transmission system works in a strong radiation environment, semiconductor-
based electronic components and circuits could be damaged due to radiation particles 
through either non-ionization processes (displacement damage) and/or ionization 








































Gregory and Gwyn, 1974). In order to ensure that a device can complete its mission in a 
radiation environment, investigation of radiation responses at component-level, circuit-
level, and system-level becomes significant and necessary. As explained in Chapter 2, 
many research works have been carried out to investigate radiation effects on 
components. However, for a digital communication system, investigation of radiation 
effects on circuit-level and system-level is still limited. There have a number of questions 
need to be investigated, such as: 
(a) Which module is most sensitive to high level radiation? 
(b) Which wireless transceivers and networks are suitable to be used in a high level 
radiation environment?  
(c) How different wireless measurement and communication devices can be built 
with diversified hardware to survive under different radiation environments? and 
(d) What is the radiation hardness of the developed redundant wireless device in a 
high level radiation environment? 
Hence, the experiments in this research focus on circuit- and system-level rather than 
component-level to determine answers to the above questions through measuring 
radiation responses of the developed wireless devices, as well as to validate the 
developed radiation-hardened methods. The overview of the experimental validations is 




Figure 10-3: An overview of the experimental validation in this research 
The objectives of the irradiation test are as follows: 
(1) Experiment Part I: to investigate radiation vulnerability in wireless measurement 
and transmission devices with diversified COTS components in a radiation 
environment with a high dose rate; 
(2) Experiment Part II: to evaluate the performance of popular wireless transceivers 
and networks, such as ZigBee, Wireless-Hart, ISA100.11a, LoRa, 433MHz 
network, and 915MHz network, in a radiation environment with a high dose rate; 
(3) Experiment Part III: to evaluate the performance of non-redundant wireless 
devices implemented with different semiconductor technologies, e.g., CMOS, 
Bipolar, and Hybrid, etc., under radiation conditions with both low and high dose 
rate conditions. 
(4) Experiment Part IV: to evaluate the performance of the developed redundant 
wireless devices under a radiation condition with a high dose rate, such as lifespan, 
and the performance of wireless communication, etc. 
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10.1.2 Experimental Approaches 
One typical approach of a system and part level hardness assurance is to irradiate the 
system and/or the part by a selected radiation source (such as γ source) for fixed period of 
time and then test hardware for potential errors and/or degradations (Ronald et al., 1988). 
According to characterizations of the radiation source, it can be also separated into three 
types: (1) displacement damage test, which is performed by exposing a device to a fixed 
particle fluence (electron, proton, or neutron) and characterizing its parameter 
degradation; (2) total dose test, which is performed by exposing a device to an ionizing 
radiation environment and measuring the electrical performance under various operating 
conditions; and (3) single particle effects test, which is performed by continually 
measuring the device responses under a high-energy particle accelerator while the device 
is operating (Ronald et al., 1988).  
Furthermore, there are two other tests to characterize the responses: (1) step-stress test, 
which is performed by first measuring the electrical performance of the device, 
subsequently, exposing it to a fixed dose of ionizing radiation for a certain duration of 
time, then re-measuring those parameters to obtain their responses; and (2) in-flux test, 
which the device response is continually measured while it is being irradiated (Ronald et 
al., 1988). 
According to the previously mentioned objectives, the current work focuses on total dose 
test at the circuit-level and the system-level. All test samples will be exposed to an 
ionizing radiation environment first. Afterwards the electrical performance and wireless 
communication performance are measured. In Experimental Part I, using the method of 
step-stress test, irradiated samples are exposed to radiation for a fixed period of time, and 
then their electrical parameters are re-measured until most modules fail. Other 
experiments are performed using online method to continually measure the device 
response until it fails.  
Three type parameters are monitored to reflect behaviors of tested samples under 
radiation environments: (1) the lifespan defined that the unit has a functional failure 
under the condition of dose rate; (2) the accuracy of parameter measurement, e.g., 4~20 
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mA current signal; and (3) the performance of wireless communication, e.g., packet error 
rate, packet loss rate, frequency, and received signal strength indicator (RSSI). The 
amount of radiation dose can be calculated how much radiation the device has 
accumulated over time, which is illustrated in the following equation. 
.Dose Dose Rate Irradiated Time=   
Hence, radiation resistance of the irradiated sample can be calculated by: 
Re tan .Radiation sis ce Dose Rate Survival Time=        (10-1) 
Experimental objectives and approaches of each test are summarized in Table 10-1. 
Table 10-1: Summary of experimental objectives and approaches in this total dose 
test 
Experiments Objectives Dose rates Approaches 
Part I 
To investigate radiation vulnerability in a 
wireless measurement and transmission 
device 
20 K Rad/h Off -line 
Part II 
To evaluate the performance of six 
industrial wireless transceivers and 
networks under a radiation environment 
20 K Rad/h Online 
Part III 
To evaluate the performances of non-
redundant wireless devices implemented 
with varies semiconductor technologies 
under radiation conditions with both low 
and high dose rate 




To investigate radiation hardness of the 
developed redundant wireless device with a 
shielding protection 
20 K Rad/h Online 
 
10.1.3 Radiation Level Considered in Experimental Validation 
As mentioned in Chapter 2.1.3, in March 2012, the level of radiation particles was 
estimated to be up to 73 Sv/h (7.3 K Rad/h) inside the containment of No.2 reactor in 
Fukushima plant (Eisler, 2012), and in Feb. 2017, it was up even further to 530 Sv/h (53 
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K Rad/h) (The Guardian, 2017). Therefore, taking that information as a reference, 
radiation level in this experimental validation is therefore considered in the range of 10 K 
Rad/h ~ 100 K Rad/h. The selected highest dose rate in this test is 20 K Rad/h, which is 
within ballpark of 530 Sv/h. 
10.1.4 Experimental Facility 
In this work, all tested devices are irradiated in a 6"-diameter dry tube in the Cobalt-60 
underwater irradiator in Nuclear Reactor Laboratory of the Ohio State University. The 
irradiation chamber is a dry, air-filled, 6 inches tube that is open to atmosphere (OSU-
NRL, 2018). For samples, a shielded elevator is used to move them into the irradiation 
position. The approximate dose rate at the peak location is 20 K Rad (Si)/h and the lowest 
dose rate is 200 Rad (Si)/h (2018-10-08) (OSU-NRL, 2018). The Cobalt-60 gamma 
irradiator dose-rate curve in 6" tube is shown in Figure 10-4. 
 
Figure 10-4: The Co-60 gamma irradiator dose-rate curve (OSU-NRL, 2018) 
The distance above the bottom of the highest dose rate (20 K Rad/h) is 8 inch and that of 
the lowest dose rate (200 Rad/h) is 20 inch. The sample plate and the shielding of the Co-




Figure 10-5: Sample plate and shielding of 60Co gamma irradiator (OSU-NRL, 
2018) 
10.1.5 Experimental Schemes 
Due to the highest dose rate in 60Co gamma irradiator is located at the bottom and the 
length of dry tube is about 45 inch, it is therefore difficult to use the online method for 
directly measuring signals from the devices under test. Moreover, the measurement 
equipment cannot be directly exposed to the radiation source. There are several issues 
need to be resolved if the tests are performed through continually measuring the device 
responses while it is being irradiated. These issues are: (1) signal issues, where the signal 
will be attenuated if transmitted by using long cables; (2) power supply issue, where the 
power will be reduced if passing through a long cable, and (3) the location of the 
measurement equipment, which cannot be working in strong radiation environments. 
An experimental setup is developed to obtain responses of irradiated devices under a high 
dose rate (20 K Rad/h) condition. An illustration diagram for a high dose rate condition is 




Figure 10-6: Schematic of the experimental setup inside 60Co irradiator 
Some equipment and devices are used to measure electrical parameters and obtain 
behaviors of the device while the samples are irradiated. A list is provided in Table 10-2. 
Table 10-2: Testing equipment using in the experiment 
Equipment Type Manufacture Function 
34410 A Digital multi-meter AGiLENT 
To measure 4~20 mA signal as a 
reference 
1672 D 
Precision DC power 
supply 
BK 
DC power supply for irradiated 
samples 
TDS2024B Oscilloscope TEKTRONIX 
To measure electrical parameters 





To measure frequency and RSSI 
of wireless transceivers 
T430 Laptop Lenovo 
To receive, record, and analyze 










RS232 Connection Antenna 
High dose rate 
(20 K Rad/h) 







10.2 Part I: Investigation of Radiation Vulnerability with 
Diversified COTS Components 
In this Section, a total dose test for various modules in a typical wireless measurement 
and transmission unit is performed under a high dose rate (20 K Rad/h) condition by 
using 60Co gamma irradiator. The irradiated modules are implemented with selected 
diversified commercial off-the-shelf components as indicated in Chapter 4, which include 
the module of analog signal processing, the module of analog-to-digital converter, the 
module of microcontroller, and the module of wireless transceiver. The results of this test 
will provide a guideline at the design phase for wireless monitoring systems to be used in 
high level radiation environments. 
This Section starts with the experimental background, which includes test circuits and 
related experimental approaches. Subsequently, experimental setup is described in detail. 
Then, experimental results for each module are presented, which include the output of the 
analog signal processing circuits, the response of the analog-to-digital converters, the 
performance of microcontroller units, and the performance of wireless transceivers. 
Finally, several technical discussions and limitation of this test are presented.  
10.2.1 Introduction of Irradiated Circuits 
(1) Analog Signal Processing Circuits 
When ionizing radiation passes through a bipolar device, due to an increase in the density 
of interface traps at the surface of the extrinsic base region and positive charge buildup, 
the degradation of a bipolar transistor can include two aspects: the increase of 
recombination current, and the reduction in the common-emitter current gain (Johnston et 
al., 1994). For many linear bipolar technologies, the degradation at a given total dose 
depends on the dose rate and it is more prominent at the low dose rate, which is called 
Enhanced Low Dose Rate Sensitivity (ELDRS) (Boch et al., 2004). Several critical 
parameters of operational amplifiers under different dose rates have been investigated in 
(Boch et al., 2004; Pease et al., 1997; Pease et al., 1998), such as the input bias current, 
supply current, input offset voltage, and output voltage, etc. As previously mentioned, 
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this test focuses on circuit responses, instead of component responses. Therefore, the 
output voltage of the entire circuit is the only parameter considered in this test. 
Many variables in a nuclear power plant are measured by sensors whose output is a 
current source (4~20 mA). The processing circuit for 4~20 mA signal is illustrated in 
Figure 10-7. Experiment Part I is performed under the condition of high dose rate for 
three different operational amplifiers: CLC502, LM108, and UA741, which are 
manufactured by National Semiconductor, Texas Instruments, and STMicroelectronics, 
respectively. The main purpose is to evaluate radiation-induced damage in different 
operational amplifiers, as well as to determine the radiation hardness of different 
amplifier circuits. Due to the selected operational amplifiers need a -5V signal as the 
power source and the input of the power supply  is +5 V, several voltage regulators are 
used to generate -5 V signal: LT1611, MAX660, and LM2662, which are manufactured 
by Linear Technology, and Texas Instruments, respectively.  
 
Figure 10-7: Irradiated circuits of analog signal processing in Experiment Part I 
Pictures of electronic circuits for analog signal processing used in Experiment Part I are 

















Figure 10-8: Pictures of electronic circuit boards for analog signal processing used 
in Experiment Part I 
(2) Analog-to-Digital Converter 
Analog-to-digital converter (ADC) is analog- and mix-signal circuit in a digital 
communication system, which can become non-functional due to performance 
degradation, loss of calibration, transient output errors, and latchup caused when it works 
in strong ionizing radiation environments (Sternberg et al., 2006). Several critical 
parameters of various ADCs amplifiers under different dose rates have been investigated 
in (Sternberg et al., 2006; Kalshnikov et al., 1998; Lee and Johnston, 1998; Lee et al., 
1994), which include conversion time, degraded conversion function, power supply 
current, output voltage degradation, reference voltage degradation, and current noise, etc. 
In this work, the test is performed under the radiation condition with high dose rate for 
three circuits with different ADCs: AD571, AD674, and AD1671, which are all 
manufactured by Analog Devices. Several parameters are involved to reflect radiation 
responses of those circuits: the output voltage of ADC’ IO port and the output of analog-
to-digital conversion. The analog-to-digital circuits and analog signal circuits are 
integrated in a same circuit board, which is shown in Figure 10-8.  
(3) Microcontroller Module 
For the measurement and transmission unit, many functions of calculation and control are 
carried out inside the microcontroller module, which is the most important part in a 
Sample-1 Sample-2 Sample-3 
168 
 
digital communication system. Ionizing radiation may affect many aspects of the 
microcontroller, such as degradation of general-purpose input/output (GPIO)’s drive 
capability, non-function of memory units, inaccuracy of clock frequency, etc. In this 
work, tests for three type microcontrollers are performed under the radiation condition 
with a high dose rate: P89V51RC2, PIC16F77, and C8051F581, which are manufactured 
by NXP, Microchip, and Silicon Labs, respectively. Several test parameters are involved 
in this part: output voltage of GPIO, performance of memory unit (SRAM and 
EEPROM/FLASH), accuracy of clock frequency (PWM). Pictures of irradiated circuit 
boards of microcontroller modules are shown Figure 10-9. 
 
Figure 10-9: Pictures of electronic circuits for microcontroller modules used in 
Experiment PART I  
(4) Wireless Transceiver Module 
Irradiation may affect many aspects of wireless transceiver from system-level, such as 
degradation of IO’s drive capability, inaccuracy of frequency, degradation of 
communication performance, received signal strength indicator (RSSI), etc. In this work, 
tests for three type wireless transceivers (433 MHz & 915 MHz) have been performed 
under the radiation condition with a high dose rate: RF2905, SI4463, and SX1278, which 
are manufactured by RF Micro Devices, Silicon Labs, and Semtech, respectively. Several 
test parameters are involved to obtain the degradation of wireless transceivers: output 
voltage of IO port, packet loss rate, packet error rate, frequency, and RSSI.  
Pictures of irradiated circuit boards of wireless transceiver modules in Experiment Part I 
are shown in Figure 10-10. 




Figure 10-10: Picture of electronic circuits for wireless transceiver modules using in 
Experiment Part I  
10.2.2 Experimental Setup 
In this test, samples are placed in the 6-inch diameter Co-60 irradiator tube.  The gamma 
irradiator generates the dose rate of 20 K Rad/h on the samples. A voltage source located 
outside the irradiator is connected to wireless measurement and transmission units as 
power supply with 30 ft wires. A DC-DC converter is installed at the top of the elevator 
as power supplies for all irradiated samples. A lead shielding is used to mitigate radiation 
damages on the DC-DC converter. Picture of this experimental setup is shown in Figure 
10-11. 
 
Figure 10-11: Picture of experimental setup in Experiment Part I 






Several radiation levels are considered in this part of tests: 0 Rad, 10 K Rad, 30 K Rad, 
50 K Rad, 100 K Rad, and 130 K Rad. The test is performed by first measuring electrical 
parameters of the device, then according to the selected radiation level, exposing it to 
ionizing radiation, after a fixed period of time (30 mins, 90 mins, 150 mins, 300 mins, 
and 390mins), re-measuring those parameters to obtain their responses. If a device 
permanently loses its function, it will not further be irradiated. According to measured 
parameters, radiation-tolerances of each module can be obtained and the radiation 
vulnerability in a wireless monitoring device using these modules can be also analyzed. 
All irradiated samples and their information in Experiment PART I are summarized in 
Table 10-3. 


























AD571  Analog Devices Bipolar 
AD674 Analog Devices CMOS 
AD1671 Analog Devices BiMOS 
Microcontroller 
P89V51RC2  NXP  CMOS 
PIC16F77 Microchip CMOS 
C8051F581 Silicon Labs TTL Logic 
Wireless 
transceiver 
RF2905  RF Micro Devices  Bipolar 
SX1278 Silicon Labs CMOS 




10.2.3 Experimental Results 
(1) Analog Signal Processing Circuits 
The outputs of the analog signal processing circuits with the input signal with 4~20 mA 
during 390 minutes under the high dose rate (20 K Rad/h) are listed in Table 10-4 and are 
illustrated in Figure 10-12. 
Table 10-4: Radiation responses of analog signal processing circuits during 390 






Output measurement (V) 
Sample-1 Sample-2 Sample-3 
0 min 
(0 K Rad) 
4  0.251 0.470 0.466 
10 0.735 1.070 0.977 
20  1.515 2.070 1.890 
30 mins 
(10 K Rad) 
4  0.252 0.470 0.465 
10  0.734 1.070 0.977 
20  1.530 2.080 1.890 
90 mins 
(30 K Rad) 
4  0.250 0.470 0.468 
10 0.730 1.060 0.977 
20  1.470 2.070 1.890 
150 mins 
(50 K Rad) 
4  0.250 0.484 0.451 
10  0.730 1.080 0.963 
20  1.460 2.080 1.850 
300 mins 
(100 K Rad) 
4  0.646(incorrect) 5.0 (Failed) 5.0 (Failed) 
10  0.984(incorrect) 5.0 (Failed) 5.0 (Failed) 
20  1.780(incorrect) 5.0 (Failed) 5.0 (Failed) 
390 mins 
(130 K Rad) 
4  4.25 (Failed) 5.0 (Failed) 5.0 (Failed) 
10  4.25 (Failed) 5.0 (Failed) 5.0 (Failed) 




Figure 10-12: Radiation responses of analog signal processing circuits during 390 
minutes under a high dose rate condition 
Experimental results have shown that when total doses are less than 50 K Rad, each 
circuit works well with the complete function for different current inputs. At 50 K Rad, 
sample-2 and sample -3 (LM108 and UA741) still work well. However, when the total 
dose is 100 K Rad, the output of Sample-1 becomes incorrect and Sample-2 and Sample-
3 have permanently failed. At 130 K Rad, all irradiated samples are permanently failed.   















































Irradiated samples with different current inputs under a 20 K Rad/h condition
0 min 30 mins 90 mins 150 mins 300 mins 390 mins
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Table 10-5: Status of the failed analog signal processing circuits 
Irradiated 
Devices 
Functions Components Output Test Result 
Sample-1 
-5V reference LT1611 0.296 V Failed 
Amplifier 
circuit 
CLC502 - - 
Sample-2 
-5V reference MAX660 -5V Functional 
Amplifier 
circuit 
LM108 0V Failed 
Sample-3 
-5V reference LM2662 0.046V Failed 
Amplifier 
circuit 
UA741 - - 
 
(2) Analog-to-Digital Converter 
The conversion outputs of ADC chips with the output of analog processing circuits 
during 390 minutes at high dose rate (20 K Rad/h) are listed in Table 10-5 and are 
illustrated in Figure 10-13. The ADC inputs are the outputs of signal processing circuits 
with 4~20 mA signals. 
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Table 10-6: Measurement conversion outputs of analog-to-digital converters during 




















0.251 0020 / 32 0.470 0490 / 1168 0.466 00D0 / 208 
0.735 0050 / 80 1.070 0530/ 1328 0.977 0290 / 656 




0.252 0020 / 32 0.470 0490 / 1168 0.465 00D0 / 208 
0.734 0050 / 80 1.070 0530 / 1328 0.977 0290 / 656 




0.250 0020 / 32 0.470 0490 / 1168 0.468 00D0 / 208 
0.730 0050 / 80 1.060 0530 / 1328 0.977 0290 / 656 




0.250 0020 / 32 0.484 0490 / 1168 0.451 00D0 / 208 
0.730 0050 / 80 1.080 0530 / 1328 0.963 0280 / 640 

































































Figure 10-13: Radiation responses of analog-to-digital converter modules during 
390 minutes under a high dose rate condition 
The drive capability of ADC I/O port (output voltage) during 390 minutes under a high 
dose rate (20 K Rad/h) is shown in Table 10-7. 
Table 10-7: the drive capability of ADC’s output port during 390 minutes under a 
high dose rate condition 
Irradiated time 
(total dose) 
Drive capability (V) 
Sample-1 Sample-2 Sample-3 
0 min (0 K Rad) 5.01 5.03 4.97 
30 mins (10 K Rad) 5.01 5.03 4.96 
90 mins (30 K Rad) 5.01 5.03 4.96 
150 mins (50 K Rad) 4.95 5.04 4.96 
300 mins (100 K Rad) Failed Failed Failed 















































Irradiated samples with different current inputs under a 20 K Rad/h condition
0 min 30 mins 90 mins 150 mins 300 mins 390 mins
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The experimental results have shown that all ADC circuits work well with full functions 
when total dose is less than or equal to 50 K Rad. Their drive capabilities and conversion 
outputs for different voltage inputs are same with those as before. However, all devices 
are permanently failed after irradiated 300 mins (100 K Rad). Hence, radiation-tolerances 
of all selected analog-to-digital conversion circuits seem to be between 50 K Rad and 100 
K Rad. 
(3) Microcontroller Module 
The output voltages of GPIO during 390 minutes under a high dose rate (20 K Rad/h) 
condition for diversified microcontrollers are illustrated in Table 10-8. 
Table 10-8: Output voltages of microcontroller’s GPIOs during 390 minutes under a 
high dose rate condition 
Irradiated time 
(total dose) 
Output voltage of GPIO (V) 
Sample-4 Sample-5 Sample-6 
0 min (0 K Rad) 5.05 5.01 3.25 
30 mins (10 K Rad) 5.05 5.01 3.25 
90 mins (30 K Rad) 5.05 5.01 2.81 
150 mins (50 K Rad) 5.02 Failed Failed 
300 mins (100 K Rad) 5.28 Failed Failed 
390 mins (130 K Rad) Failed Failed Failed 
 
Several memory types of microcontroller are considered in this test: (1) Type-1, directly 
addressable internal data memory; (2) Type-2, indirectly addressable internal data 
memory; (3) Type-3, external data memory; and (4) Type-4, program memory. The 
performance of the memory on three samples during 390 minutes under a high dose rate 
(20 K Rad/h) condition is listed in Table 10-9.  
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Table 10-9: Performance of the memory in microcontrollers during 390 minutes 





Error units / total tested units 
Sample-4 Sample-5 Sample-6 
0 min 
(0 K Rad) 
Type-1 0 / 32 0 / 32 0 / 32 
Type-2 0 / 32 0 / 32 0 / 32 
Type-3 0 / 32 0 / 32 0 / 32 
Type-4 0 / 16 0 / 16 0 / 16 
30 mins 
(10 K Rad) 
Type-1 0 / 32 0 / 32 0 / 32 
Type-2 0 / 32 0 / 32 0 / 32 
Type-3 0 / 32 0 / 32 0 / 32 
Type-4 0 / 16 0 / 16 0 / 16 
90 mins 
(30 K Rad) 
Type-1 0 / 32 0 / 32 0 / 32 
Type-2 0 / 32 0 / 32 0 / 32  
Type-3 0 / 32 0 / 32 0 / 32 
Type-4 0 / 16 0 / 16 0 / 16 
150 mins 
(50 K Rad) 
Type-1 0 / 32 
Failed Failed 
Type-2 0 / 32 
Type-3 0 / 32 
Type-4 0 / 16 
300 mins 
(100 K Rad) 
Type-1 0 / 32 
Failed Failed 
Type-2 0 / 32 
Type-3 0 / 32 
Type-4 0 / 16 
390 mins 









The programming performance of diversified microcontrollers during 390 minutes under 
a high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h) is illustrated in Table 10-10. 
Table 10-10: Program performance of microcontroller during 390 minutes under a 
high dose rate condition 
Irradiated time  
(Total dose) 
Sample-4 Sample-5 Sample-6 
0 min (0 K Rad) Program OK Program OK Program OK 
30 mins (10 K Rad) Program OK Program OK Program OK 
90 mins (30 K Rad) Program OK Program OK Program OK 
150 mins (50 K Rad) Program OK Failed Failed 
300 mins (100 K Rad) Program OK Failed Failed 
390 mins (130 K Rad) Failed Failed Failed 
 
The accuracy of Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) frequency during 390 minutes under a 
high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h) for diversified microcontrollers are illustrated in 
Table 10-11. 
Table 10-11: PWM output of microcontrollers during 390 minutes under a high 




Sample-4 Sample-5 Sample-6 
0 min 
(0 K Rad) 
50.0 50.0 50.0 
30 mins 
(10 K Rad) 
50.0 50.0 50.0 
90 mins 
(30 K Rad) 
49.8 50.0 50.0 
150 mins 
(50 K Rad) 
49.8 Failed Failed 
300 mins 
(100 K Rad) 
49.8 Failed Failed 
390 mins 
(130 K Rad) 
Failed Failed Failed 
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The functions of UARTs during 390 minutes under a high dose rate condition for 
diversified microcontrollers are illustrated in Table 10-12.  
Table 10-12: UART function of microcontrollers during 390 minutes under a high 




Sample-4 Sample-5 Sample-6 
0 min 
(0 K Rad) 
OK OK OK 
30 mins 
(10 K Rad) 
OK OK OK 
90 mins 
(30 K Rad) 
OK OK OK 
150 mins 
(50 K Rad) 
OK Failed Failed 
300 mins 
(100 K Rad) 
OK Failed Failed 
390 mins 
(130 K Rad) 
Failed Failed Failed 
Experimental results have shown that all performance parameters (voltage output, 
memory testing, programming capability, PWM, and UART) are correct before the total 
dose reaches the limitation of the microcontroller. However, the total dose limitations of 
three microcontrollers are different. Sample-4 (P89V51RC2) can work well at 100 K Rad 
and it fails at 130 K Rad; both Sample-5 (PIC16F77) and Sample-6 (C8051F581) can 
work functionally when the total dose is less than or equal to 30 K Rad, but they fail at 50 




Table 10-13: The status of typical functions in failed microcontroller circuits 
Irradiated Device Function Output Result 
Sample-4 
Crystal 20 MHz Functional 
GPIO 5.05V Functional 
UART OK Functional 
PWM 49.8 Hz Functional 
SRAM OK Functional 
EEPROM Program failed Failed 
Sample-5 
Crystal No responses Failed 
GPIO 0.0 V Failed 
UART No responses Failed 
PWM No responses Failed 
SRAM No responses Failed 
EEPROM Program OK Functional 
Sample-6 
Crystal No responses Failed 
GPIO 1.7 V Failed 
UART No responses Failed 
PWM No responses Failed 
SRAM No responses Failed 
FLASH Program failed Failed 
(4) Wireless Transceiver Module 
Several transceivers are involved to measure their communication performance, they are 
shown in Figure 10-14. Communication performance is evaluated through re-measuring 
the error rate and the loss rate during 2 minutes, frequency, and RSSI after wireless 
transceiver circuits expore in ionizing radiation for a specific period of time (30 mins, 90 




Figure 10-14: Pictures of the developed devices to measure the performance of 
irradiated wireless transceivers using in Experiment Part I 
The output voltage of IO port (drive capability) during 390 minutes under high dose rate 
conditions of diversified wireless transceivers are illustrated in Table 10-14. 
Table 10-14: The output voltage of IO port of wireless transceivers during 390 
minutes under a high dose rate condition 
Irradiated time 
(total dose) 
Output voltage of GPIO (V) 
Sample-7 Sample-8 Sample-9 
0 min (0 K Rad) 4.60 5.03 3.15 
30 mins (10 K Rad) 4.48 5.03 3.15 
90 mins (30 K Rad) 4.48 4.58 2.74 
150 mins (50 K Rad) 4.55 Failed 2.73 
300 mins (100 K Rad) 4.48 Failed 2.74 
390 mins (130 K Rad) 3.65 Failed 2.73 
(a) Measurement unit for Sample-7 (b) Measurement unit for Sample-8 
(c) Measurement unit for Sample-9 
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Communication performance parameters (packet error rate, packet loss rate, frequency, 
RSSI) of three wireless transmission circuits during 390 minutes under a high dose rate 
condition are illustrated in Table 10-15. 
Table 10-15: Communication performance of wireless transceivers during 390 
minutes under a high dose rate condition 
Irradiated durtion 
(total dose) 
Parameter Sample-7 Sample-8 Sample-9 
0 min 
(0 K Rad) 
Total packets 60 60 60 
Packet error & rate 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Packet loss & rate 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Frequency 913.243MHz 433.225MHz 433.225MHz 
RSSI -67.43dBm -6.90dBm -7.90dBm 
30 mins 
(10 K Rad) 
Total packets 60 60 60 
Packet error & rate 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Packet loss & rate 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Frequency 912.973MHz 431.261MHz 431.261MHz 
RSSI -79.56dBm -17.8dBm -23.80dBm 
90 mins 
(30 K Rad)) 
Total packets 60 60 60 
Packet error & rate 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Packet loss & rate 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Frequency 912.973MHz 431.261MHz 431.261MHz 
RSSI -80.94dBm -34.3dBm -22.80dBm 
150 mins 
(50 K Rad (Si)) 
Total packets 60 Failed 60 
Packet error & rate 0 (0%) Failed 0 (0%) 
Packet loss & rate 0 (0%) Failed 0 (0%) 
Frequency 912.973MHz Failed 431.261MHz 
RSSI -94.44dBm Failed -17.30dBm 
300 mins 
(100 K Rad (Si)) 
Total packets 60 
Failed 
60 
Packet error & rate 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Packet loss & rate 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Frequency 913.784MHz 431.261MHz 
RSSI -79.43dBm -24.30dBm 
390 mins 
(130 K Rad (Si)) 
Total packets 60 
Failed 
60 
Packet error & rate 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Packet loss & rate 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Frequency 914.730MHz 433.090MHz 




Comparison of wireless signal performance of three wireless devices used in Experiment 
Part I is shown in Figure 10-15.  
 
Figure 10-15: Comparison of wireless signal performance of three wireless devices 




















































Based on the experimental results and studies, the following summary can be drawn from 
Experiment Part I: 
(a) All irradiated circuits can work normally under the radiation condition with total 
dose as long as it is less than 30 K Rad.  
(b) When the total dose is more than 30 K Rad and less than 50 K Rad, for analog 
signal processing circuits, all irradiated samples remain working. For analog-to-
digital converters, all irradiated circuits work well. For microcontrollers, Sample-
5 and Sample-6 have failed for all tested functions. But Sample-4 still works well 
and it’s all functions are normal. For wireless transceivers, Sample-7 and Sample-
9 work well and their communication performance does not degrade, but Sample-
8 has failed. 
(c) When the total dose is more than 50 K Rad but less than 100 K Rad, for analog 
processing circuits, the output sample-1 is incorrect, Sample-2 and Sample-3 
failed permanently. For analog-to-digital converters, all irradiated circuits have 
permanently failed. For microcontrollers, Sample-4 still remains working. 
Wireless transceiver Sample-7 and Sample-9 also work well. 
(d) When the total dose is more than 100 K Rad but less than 130 K Rad, all analog 
signal processing circuits stop working. All analog-to-digital converters also 
failed. Microcontroller Sample-4 still works well with full functionalities. 
Wireless transceiver Sample-7 and Sample-9 also work well. 
(e) After testing samples are irradiated 390 minutes, the total dose reaches130 K Rad 
(Si), Sample-4 stops working. Wireless transceiver Sample-7 and Sample-9 still 
work well. All communication parameters have no changes except RSSI. 




Table 10-16: Radiation resistances of irradiated circuits under a high dose rate 













Sample-1 Bipolar 100 K Rad 50 K ~ 100 K Rad 
Sample-2 CMOS, BiCMOS 100 K Rad 50 K ~ 100 K Rad 





Sample-1 Bipolar 100 K Rad 50 K ~ 100 K Rad 
Sample-2 CMOS 100 K Rad 50 K ~ 100 K Rad 
Sample-3 BiCMOS 100 K Rad 50 K ~ 100 K Rad 
Microcontroller 
circuits 
Sample-4 CMOS 130 K Rad 100 K ~ 130 K Rad 
Sample-5 CMOS 50 K Rad 30 K ~ 50 K Rad 




Sample-7 Bipolar - > 130 K Rad 
Sample-8 CMOS 50 K Rad 30 K ~ 50 K Rad 
Sample-9 TTL Logic - > 130 K Rad 
 




Figure 10-16: Estimated radiation resistances for irradiated simples testing used in 
Experiment Part I 
The following conclusions apply to this total dose test: 
(a) Experimental results have shown that all irradiated devices have no the significant 
degradation of electrical parameters before they fail. All functions are correct 
until the total dose reaches the limitation. This discovery agrees well with the 
effects of total ionizing dose in Chapter 2. 
(b) According to the estimated radiation resistances shown in Figure 10-16, 
microcontroller modules may be more susceptible to high dose rate radiation than 
other modules. 
(c) Some selected COTS components can survive when the cumulative total dose is 
more than 100 K Rad, such as P89V51RC2, RF2905, and SI4463. They may have 
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Total dose tests in this study are conducted to investigate the radiation vulnerability in a 
typical wireless monitoring system under a variety of operating conditions. However, 
there are same limitations that can be addressed in the future: 
(a) Online methods may be a better solution to obtain up-to-date responses of 
irradiated circuits and also to measure their limits of total dose in a more timely 
manner; and 
(b) More investigations for modern semiconductor devices and circuits need to be 
carried out in the future. 
10.2.5 Summary 
In this Section, total dose tests with 60Co gamma source to investigate radiation 
vulnerability in the developed wireless monitoring devices have been performed. Those 
modules are conducted with diversified COTS semiconductor devices. Experimental 
results have shown that all the irradiated devices perform correctly before the total dose 
are more than their limits. According to the estimated radiation resistances, 
microcontroller modules are more susceptible to high level of radiation than other 
modules. Under a high dose rate condition, devices built with bipolar semiconductor 
technology have high level of radiation resistances than those with other semiconductor 
technologies. 
Furthermore, experimental results have shown that all selected semiconductor devices 
can work normally at total dose 30 K Rad and radiation resistances of some modules and 
circuits are up to 130 K Rad. It has proved that the method of component selection in this 
work is correctness and effectiveness. It has also shown that the definition of total dose 




10.3 Part II: Evaluation of Six Industrial Wireless 
Transceivers and Networks in a Radiation Environment 
Wireless monitoring techniques have been used in a wide variety of applications in past 
decades. A number of wireless transceivers and networks have been designed to acquire 
data from environment on physical processes. A design for a wireless monitoring system 
depends on the requirements of a specific application. To be used in a high level radiation 
environment, it will be benefited in the selecting of the wireless transceiver and network 
if radiation responses of those wireless transceivers and networks are known. However, 
so far, the investigation of this topic is very limited. In this Section, behaviors of six 
commonly used in industrial wireless transceivers and networks are investigated under a 
radiation environment with a high dose rate. The experimental results will provide a 
reference to design wireless monitoring systems to be used in high level radiation 
environments. 
Six industrial wireless sensor nodes are chosen to undergo irradiation test in this Section, 
they are: CC2530 (2.4GHz ZigBee standard), CC2520 (2.4GHz WirelessHART 
standard), CC2530 (2.4GHz ISA100.11a standard), SX1278 (433MHz LoRa network), 
SI4463 (433MHz point-to-point network), and RF2905 (915MHz point-to-point 
network).  Tests are conducted until each unit has a functional failure under a dose rate 
condition (20 K Rad/h). The behaviors of those devices and networks, e.g., 
communication performance (packet loss rate, packet error rate), wireless signal 
performance (frequency and RSSI), and survival time (lifespan), are continually online 
monitored throughout the tests.   
This Section starts with an introduction to selected six industrial wireless sensor networks 
and nodes currently available on the market. Subsequently, the implementation of each 
wireless network and the related network configuration in this test is explained in detail. 
Then, the experimental setup and investigated parameters are presented. Finally, 
experimental results are also analyzed. Based on experimental results, several technical 




10.3.1 Introduction of Selected Industrial Wireless Systems 
(1) Wireless Transceivers and Networks 
In a typical wireless sensor network system, radio frequency (RF) signals are used to 
transfer the data from one node to another or a base station. Several distinct frequency 
bands have been assigned for wireless sensor networks in industrial applications, such as 
433 MHz, 868 MHz, 915 MHz, and 2.4 GHz, etc. In the past few decades, a number of 
wireless transceivers have been developed to implement various communication 
functions. On the other hand, wireless sensor network standards define the functions and 
protocols for sensor nodes to integrate with a variety of networks. In recent years, many 
wireless sensor networks have also been developed to for various industrial applications, 
such as IEEE 802.15.4, ZigBee, WirelessHART, ISA100.11a, IETF 6LoW-PAN, IEEE 
802.15.3, and Wibree (Yick et al., 2008).  Hence, a designer of industrial wireless 
systems faces many choices of wireless transceivers and network standards. However, if 
the application of these systems is within a high level radiation environment, further 
attentions have to be paid. Unfortunately, there are only limited resources available about 
radiation hardness of wireless transceivers and networks in the literature. Hence, the 
investigation of behaviors of wireless transceivers and networks is not only significant 
but also necessary.  
In this Section, six industrial wireless devices and networks are selected as irradiated 
samples to investigate their behaviors under a high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h). 
They are summarized in Table 10-17. 
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Table 10-17: Selected wireless transceivers and networks to be irradiated in 
Experiment Part II  
Sample Network Protocol Transceiver  Controller Unit Frequency 
Sample-1 ZigBee CC2530 AVR ATMEGA 328 2.4 GHz 
Sample-2 WirelessHART CC2520  2.4 GHz 
Sample-3 ISA100.11a CC2530 STM32L486 2.4 GHz 
Sample-4 LoRa SX1278 PIC16F77 433 MHz 
Sample-5 Point-to-point SI4463 C8051F581 433 MHz 
Sample-6 Point-to-point RF2905 P89V51RC2 915 MHz 
Pictures of irradiated wireless devices used in Experiment Part II are shown in Figure 10-
18.
 
Figure 10-17: Irradiated wireless devices used in Experiment Part II 
(2) Network Setup in Experiment PART II 
This experiment is to be conducted in such a way that its performance is being monitored 
continually until the unit fails. Several wireless networks have been setup to online obtain 
radiation responses of wireless devices. The detailed information of each network and 
selected transceivers is introduced next. 
➢ ZigBee network 
Sample-2 Sample-3 Sample-4 Sample-5 Sample-6 Sample-1 
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ZigBee network supports Star, Tree, and Mesh topologies, and the star topology is often 
the best choice for industrial applications. Typical Star structure of ZigBee network for 
industrial application is illustrated in Figure 11-19 (Wang and Jiang, 2016). According to 
the role in network, devices are separated to three types: Coordinator, Router, and End 
Device. A Coordinator is used to initialize, maintain, and control the network, Router is 
responsible to route messages, and an End Device executes whatever actions associated 
the application (Wang and Jiang, 2016). 
 
Figure 10-18: Typical Star topology of ZigBee network for industrial application 
(Wang and Jiang, 2016) 
In this test, E800-DTU (Z2530-485-20) manufactured by Ebyte Electronic Company is 
used as Router and Coordinator, and E18-MS1PA1-IPX is considered as the transceiver 
of End Device, which is also manufactured by Ebyte Electronic Company. In addition, an 
AVR ATMEGA 328 is selected as the controller of End Device. Pictures of ZigBee 
devices using in Experiment Part II are shown in Figure 10-20. End Device sends one 
message to Router and Coordinator at a period of two seconds. The messages will then be 




Figure 10-19: ZigBee devices used in Experiment Part II 
➢ WirelessHART network 
Basic elements in a WirelessHART network include: Field Devices, Gateway, Access 
Point, Network Manager, and Handled Devices, which is shown in Figure 10-21 (Wang 
and Jiang, 2016). A Field Device is connected to the industrial process and also has the 
router function. An Access Point is used to connect Field Devices with Gateway. The 
network manager is used to configure the network, schedule and manage communications 
among WirelessHART devices (Wang and Jiang, 2016). 
 
Figure 10-20: WirelessHART network for industrial applications (Wang and Jiang, 
2016) 
(b) Router & Coordinator (a) End device 
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In this test, Awia Warrior 220 manufactured by AwiaTech Company is considered as a 
Field Device. WirelessHART device communicates with WirelessHART Gateway, which 
connects to a router. HART Server installed on the Control Workstation is selected to 
configure WirelessHART network. The communications are performed by 
WirelessHART network with proper standard protocols and HART IP between 
WirelessHART Gateway and the Control Workstation. Pictures of WirelessHART 
devices used in Experiment Part II are shown in Figure 10-22. 
  
Figure 10-21: WirelessHART devices used in Experiment PART II 
The menu of displaying value of chosen sensor in HART Server is shown in Figure 10-
23. The connection will be disconnected when the irradiated Field Device is damaged by 
radiation. The tester needs to refresh this menu each a fixed period of time (5 minutes). 




Figure 10-22: Menu of displaying value of chosen sensor in HART Server 
➢ ISA100.11a network 
A typical ISA100.11a network includes two type devices: Field Device and Infrastructure 
Devices. The former includes Routing Device, I/O Device, and Handheld Device. The 
latter includes Backbone Router, Gateway, and System and Security Manager (Wang and 
Jiang, 2016). The typical structure of ISA100.11a network for industrial applications is 
shown in Figure 10-24. 
 




In this test, VN210 manufactured by Company is considered as Field Router and IO 
Device. VersaRouter 900 is selected as Backbone Router and Gateway as hardware 
support for the infrastructure components, which also perform the functions of System 
Manager, Security Manager, and System Time Source. A web application called 
Monitoring Control System is developed to remotely check and configure ISA100.11a 
network, which is installed in VersaRouter 900 through Ethernet to communication with 
the Control Workstation. The user can use Internet Explorer to operator the web 
application at the Control Workstation. Pictures of ISA100.11a devices used in 
Experiment Part II are shown in Figure 10-25.  
 
Figure 10-24: Pictures of ISA100.11a devices used in Experiment PART II 
The web application installed in ISA100.11a Gateway is shown in Figure 10-26. The 
detailed device information is given in this application. Statistics of transmitted and 
received packets are also presented and analyzed in this web application. The Gateway 
cannot continually receive messages when irradiated ISA100.11a device is damaged by 
radiation. In the test, the tester needs to refresh this web application each a fixed period of 
time (5 minutes). 




Figure 10-25: Web application installed in ISA100.11a Gateway  
➢ LoRa network 
LoRa devices and wireless radio frequency technology is developed proposed by 
Semtech, which is a long range, low power wireless platform for Internet of Things (IoT) 
applications (Georgiou and Raza, 2017). LoRa network includes three type devices: End 
Device, Gateway, and LoRa NetServer. The typical structure of LoRa network for 
industrial application is shown in Figure 10-27 (Centenaro et al., 2016). 
 
Figure 10-26: Typical structure of LoRa network in industrial application 
(Centenaro et al., 2016) 
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In this test, E19-433MS1W (SX1278-based) manufactured by Ebyte Electronic Company 
is considered as LoRa device. A microcontroller PIC16F77 is selected to control and 
setup LoRa transceiver (SX1278). A gateway for LoRa, 433 MHz and 915 MHz 
networks shown in Figure 10-28 is also developed to obtain messages and then send them 
to the Control Workstation though RS232 protocol. 
 
Figure 10-27: Pictures of gateway for LoRa, 433 MHz & 915MHz networks using in 
Experiment PART II  
➢ 433MHz & 915MHz point-to-point network 
A point-to-point network is the simplest arrangement in a communication system. It 
usually consists of two nodes. Typical structure of point-to-point network is shown in 
Figure 10-29. 
 
Figure 10-28: Typical structure of point-to-point network 
SI4463 manufactured by Silicon Labs Company is a high-performance and low-current 
transceiver. It is designed to be compliant with 802.15.4g and WMbus smart metering 




network and C8051F581 manufactured by Silicon Labs Company is selected as its 
controller. 
RF2905 manufactured by is developed for linear or digital applications in different 
frequency bands. It is conducted with bipolar semiconductor technology. In this test, 
RF2905 is considered as the transceiver of 915 MHz point-to-point network and 
P89V51RC2manufactured by NXP Company is selected as its controller.  
10.3.2 Experimental Setup 
In this part, samples are placed in the 6-inch diameter Co-60 irradiator tube.  The gamma 
irradiator generates a dose rate of 20 K Rad/h on the samples. A potentiostat located 
outside the irradiator is connected to wireless measurement and transmission units as 
power supply with 30 ft wires. A DC-DC converter is used to generate +5 power supplies 
for all irradiated samples and installed at the top of the elevator. A lead shielding is used 
to mitigate radiation damages on the DC-DC converter. Picture of experimental setup for 
2.4 GHz wireless networks used in Experiment Part II is shown in Figure 10-29. 
 
Figure 10-29: Experimental setup for 2.4 GHz wireless networks used in 














Picture of experimental setup for LoRa, 433 MHz, and 915 MHz wireless networks used 
in Experiment Part II is shown in Figure 10-30. 
 
Figure 10-30: Experimental setup for LoRa, 433MHz, and 915MHz wireless devices 
and networks used in Experiment Part II 
A software tool installed in the Control Workstation is developed to collect wireless 
messages of LoRa network, 433 MHz and 915 MHz network and to analyze their 
communication performances. Picture of the developed software tool used in Experiment 
Part II is shown in Figure 10-31. 
Irradiated Devices 
Wireless Gateway 









Figure 10-31: The developed software tool to collect wireless messages and analyze 
the communication performance used in Experiment PART II 
10.3.3 Experimental Results 
(1) Survival Time 
According to Eq. (10-1), survival times and radiation resistances of irradiated wireless 
devices under a high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h) are summarized in Table 10-18. 
Table 10-18: Survival times and radiation resistances of irradiated wireless devices 
































64 16.7 20 40 26 114 
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Radiation resistances of six industrial wireless transceivers and networks used in 
Experiment Part II are shown in Figure 10-32. 
 
Figure 10-32: Radiation resistances of six industrial wireless transceivers and 
networks used in Experiment Part III 
(2) Performance of Wireless Communication 
Experimental results of communication performance of ZigBee device and network, as 
well as ISA100.11a device and network under both a normal condition and a high dose 
rate condition, are summarized in Table 10-19 and Table 10-20, respectively. The 
evaluation is performed through measuring its communication performance during a 

































Wireless Transceivers and Networks
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Table 10-19: Experimental results of communication performance of ZigBee devices 























30 150 0 0.000 0 0.000 2.405 -43.00 
60 150 0 0.000 0 0.000 2.406 -32.00 
90 150 0 0.000 0 0.000 2.407 -53.50 
150 150 0 0.000 0 0.000 2.404 -35.00 
180 150 0 0.000 0 0.000 2.406 -48.00 
20 K 
Rad/h 
30 150 0 0.000 0 0.000 2.411 -22.50 
60 150 0 0.000 0 0.000 2.411 -53.50 
90 149 1 0.670 0 0.000 2.410 -45.50 
150 150 0 0.000 0 0.000 2.409 -35.50 
180 150 0 0.000 0 0.000 2.409 -39.50 
192 Failed 
 
Table 10-20: Summary of communication performance of ISA100.11a devices and 























30 119 0 0.000 0 0.000 2.406 -33.50 
60 1375 0 0.000 0 0.000 2.403 -50.50 
20 K 
Rad/h 
30 117 2 1.709 0 0.000 2.403 -45.00 
60 1368 9 0.658 0 0.000 2.403 -51.00 
62 Failed 
Experimental results of communication performance of WirelessHART device and 




Table 10-21: Experimental results of communication performance of 

















30 131874 11.90 49.50 % 2.402 -49.00 
60 131874 11.90 49.50 % 2.407 -48.50 
20 K Rad/h 
30 131874 11.90 49.50 % 2.402 -48.00 
50 131874 11.90 49.50 % - - 
51 Failed 
 
Experimental results of communication performance of LoRa device, 433MHz device, 
and 915MHz device under both a normal condition and a high dose rate condition are 
summarized in Table 10-22, Table 10-23, and Table 10-24, respectively. 
Table 10-22: Experimental results of communication performance of LoRa devices 





















30 903 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 433.204 -10.40 
60 1804 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 433.204 -18.40 
90 2704 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 433.204 -11.90 
120 3606 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 433.204 -10.40 
20 K 
Rad/h 
30 900 1 0.11% 0 0.00% 431.261 -17.80 
60 1801 2 0.11% 0 0.00% 431.261 -18.40 
90 2698 4 0.15% 0 0.00% 431.261 -34.80 





Table 10-23: Summary of communication performance of 433MHz devices and 





















30 902 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 433.204 -10.90 
60 1802 2 0.11% 0 0.00% 433.204 -18.90 
90 2702 3 0.07% 0 0.00% 433.204 -18.90 
20 K 
Rad/h 
30 902 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 431.261 -23.80 
60 1798 1 0.06% 0 0.00% 431.261 -22.80 
78 2332 6 0.26% 0 0.00% - - 
79 Failed 
Table 10-24: Experimental results of communication performances of 915MHz 





















30 897 0 0.00% 2 0.22% 915.756 -82.41 
90 2689 0 0.00% 3 0.11% 915.069 -82.91 
150 4481 0 0.00% 6 0.13% 916.168 -82.40 
240 7169 0 0.00% 12 0.17% 916.305 -81.90 
300 8963 0 0.00% 13 0.14% 916.306 -82.90 
20 K 
Rad/h 
30 897 0 0.00% 3 0.33% 912.973 -82.40 
90 2686 2 0.07% 19 0.70% 912.973 -80.94 
150 4477 4 0.09% 19 0.42% 912.973 -94.44 
240 7080 11 0.16% 19 0.26% 913.784 -79.43 





Based on experimental results and studies, the following summaries can be drawn from 
the current study: 
(a) Radiation resistance: under a high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h), all irradiated 
samples can only survive several hours. Survival time of Sample-6 (915 MHz 
device and network) is higher than that of other samples.  Radiation resistance of 
Sample-6 is more than 100 K Rad. Hence, its radiation level can reached Class R 
in Radiation Hardness Assurance illustrated in Table 1-1. On the other hand, 
radiation resistances of WirelesHART and ISA100.11a devices are only 16.7 K 
Rad and 20 K Rad, respectively.  
(b) Communication performance: packet loss rates of four samples have a little 
increase and that of ZigBee device has no obvious increase under a gamma 
radiation environment. In addition, packet error rates of all samples have no 
significant changes under that condition.  
(c) Wireless signal performance: frequencies of all samples have no obvious changes 
under a gamma radiation environment. RSSIs of all samples have significant 
changes. However, due to many parameters can affect RSSIs, such as distance 
between the transmitter and the receiver, physical obstacles, antenna used, 
transmitted power, etc. Those changes of RSSIs may be caused by working 
condition instead of radiation. Moreover, those changes do not significant effects 
on communication performance. 
The following conclusions apply to this total dose test: 
(a) The performance of wireless communication, e.g., packet loss rate and packet 
error rate, has no significant degradation under a high dose rate condition.  
(b) The parameters of wireless signal, e.g., frequency and RSSI, also have no 
significant effects by gamma radiation. 
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(c) Wireless communication systems with a complicate hardware and software 
implementation, e.g., WirelessHART, ISA100.11a, may be not good solutions to 
be used in high level radiation environments. 
10.3.5 Summary 
In this Section, total dose tests with 60Co gamma source to investigate radiation 
tolerances of six industrial wireless devices and networks have been performed. The 
experimental results have shown that both the performance of wireless communication 
and the quality of wireless signal have no significant degradation before the device stops 
working under a high dose rate condition.  
On the other hand, the experimental results have shown that wireless system with a 
complicate hardware and software implementation, e.g., WirelessHART, ISA100.11a, 
may have no higher radiation resistances in a high dose rate condition. In addition, one 
solution of wireless communication system (RF2905 915MHz network) with the high 
radiation resistance (at least 100 K Rad) has been reported in this total dose test. 
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10.4 Part III: Evaluation of Diversified Wireless Monitoring 
Devices in Radiation Environments at both High and 
Low Dose Rates 
Unlike other industrial accidents, in the event of a severe nuclear accident, a significant 
amount of radiation can be released due to failure of protection layers. Moreover, 
radiation levels of distinct stages in an accident and radiation condition of various areas 
in the plant are different. However, modern monitoring instruments are usually built with 
semiconductor-based electronic components, which are susceptive to distinct levels of 
radiation. These monitoring instruments have to work well in both high and low dose rate 
conditions. The objective of the experiment part III is to investigate behaviors of 
diversified non-redundant wireless monitoring devices in both high and low dose rate 
conditions. A total dose test has been performed to real-time continually measure the 
responses of three non-redundant wireless monitoring devices while they are being 
directly irradiated under gamma radiation environments at both high and also low dose 
rates separately. Specially, those three devices can independently complete the functions 
of both measurement and transmission and are conducted with diversified semiconductor-
technologies. Four type parameters are reported in this study to reflect behaviors of 
developed wireless monitoring devices under both low and high dose rate conditions: (1) 
survival time; (2) measurement accuracy for 4~20 mA current signal; (3) communication 
performance, such as loss packets rate, and error packet rate; and (4) wireless signal 
parameters, such as frequency shift, received signal strength indicator (RSSI). The results 
of those tests will provide guideline to design wireless monitoring systems to be used in 
complicate radiation environments, as well as to validate the effectiveness of the 
diversified design. 
This Section starts with an introduction of irradiated wireless devices used in this test. 
Subsequently, an experimental setup is developed to continually evaluate the behavior of 
three non-redundant wireless devices under two dose rates: a high dose rate (20 K Rad/h) 
and a low dose rate (200 Rad/h). These tests are performed through monitoring of 
measurement accuracy for a 4~20 mA signal and analyzing the wireless communication 
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performance. Experimental results are presented, and several technical discussions are 
carried out. Some potential limitations are identified. 
10.4.1 Introduction of Irradiated Devices 
As previously discussed, to implement a typical measurement and transmission unit, even 
though there can be many different components and circuits, the common building blocks 
are: signal processing circuit, analog-to-digital converter, microcontroller, and 
transceiver. However, those subsystems can be still built with different semiconductor 
technologies, different components from different manufactures. The understanding of 
radiation responses of these devices under different radiation conditions is not only 
important but also necessary to design a wireless monitoring system to be used in nuclear 
power plants under severe accident conditions.  
Referring to radiation test data published by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, a 
number of semiconductor components listed in Chapter 4 are selected to build those 
functional blocks. Three non-redundant wireless measurement and transmission units are 
involved in the test, which are built with diversified semiconductor technologies. The 
specifics of three circuit compositions are illustrated in Figure 10-33. 
 
Figure 10-33: Block diagram of three diversified single-channel wireless monitoring 
units  
In this test, through the comparing of parameters of three non-redundant wireless devices 


















a high dose rate radiation, the behavior of those irradiated wireless devices can be 
analyzed. The parameters include the accuracy of measurement unit, performance of 
wireless communication, and survival time. Based on the experimental results, a designer 
can choose the most suitable semiconductor technology and system for a specific 
radiation environment. The three non-redundant wireless monitoring devices used in 
Experiment Part III are summarized in Table 10-25. 
Table 10-25: Summary of irradiated monitoring devices used in Experiment Part III 
Type Parameter Sample-1 Sample-2 Sample-3 
Wireless 
parameter 












Bipolar CMOS BiCMOS 
Microcontroller CMOS CMOS TTL Logic 
Wireless 
transceiver 
Bipolar CMOS TTL Logic 
10.4.2 Experimental Setup 
In this test, wireless measurement and transmission devices have been placed in a 6-inch 
diameter Co-60 irradiator tube. They have been separated into two parts: measuring 
radiation responses while the device is being irradiated with 20 K Rad/h dose rate until 
all irradiated devices loss their functions; and measuring radiation responses of the device 
under a low dose rate condition (200 Rad/h) for a period of 14 hours. A potentiostat 
located outside the irradiator is used as power supply to wireless units using 30 ft wires. 
A DC-DC converter is installed over a lead shielding to provide +5V power for the 
irradiated devices. A current source is used as sensor input to generate 4~20 mA signal. 
A multi-meter is used to measure the generated 4~20mA current signal on-line. A 
wireless receiver and a laptop, also located outside the irradiator is used to receive data 
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through antennas connected to the irradiated units. A picture of the experimental setup 
used in Experiment Part III is shown in Figure 10-34.  
 
Figure 10-34: Picture of experimental setup used in Experimental Part III 
An overview of the test setup used in Experimental Part III is shown in Figure 10-35. 
 
Figure 10-35: An overview of experimental setup used in Experimental Part III 
Irradiated Devices 
Wireless Receiver Voltage Source 





















A wireless receiver is developed to collect data from irradiated devices online and also to 
transmit to those data to the laptop as the Control Workstation through RS232 protocol. 
The developed wireless receiver is built with three wireless channels and three serial 
ports. The picture of the developed wireless receiver used in Experiment Part III is shown 
in Figure 10-36. 
 
Figure 10-36: Picture of the developed wireless receiver used in Experiment Part III 
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A software tool developed in Visual Studio C++ shown in Figure 10-37, which is used to 
receive wireless data online and to record history data. The tool is installed at the Control 
Workstation. It receives wireless data from the wireless receiver through three RS232 
serial ports. 
 
Figure 10-37: Interface of the developed software tool to receive and to record 
wireless data used in Experiment Part III. 
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Pictures of those three non-redundant wireless devices of before-irradiated and after-
irradiated 20 hours under a high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h) are shown in Figure 10-
38. 
 
Figure 10-38: Pictures of the device before-irradiated and after-irradiated 
10.4.3 Experimental Results 
(1) Normal condition 
The results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for non-redundant 
wireless devices under normal conditions are listed in Table 10-26. 
Before-irradiated                      After-irradiated 
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Table 10-26: Results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for non-
redundant wireless devices under a normal condition 
Channel Parameters 0 ~ 60 mins 
61 ~ 120 
mins 
121 ~ 180 
mins 
181 ~ 240 
mins 
Sample-1 
Input signal 11.50 mA 11.50 mA 11.50 mA 11.50 mA 
Value-1 
/Count 
006C/262 006C/252 006C/244 006C/236 
Value-2 
/Count 
0070/1474 0070/1670 0070/1496 0070/1501 
Value-3 
/Count 
0074/55 0074/45 0074/46 0074/40 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.618539 1.496598 1.550059 1.513845 
Sample-2 
Input signal 11.50 mA 11.50 mA 11.50 mA 11.50 mA 
Value-1 
/Count 
0560/1381 0560/1507 0560/1478 0560/1491 
Value-2 
/Count 
0570/424 0570/295 0570/325 0570/308 
Standard 
Deviation 
6.784891 5.921795 6.152103 6.028701 
Sample-3 
Input signal 11.50 mA 11.50 mA 11.50 mA 11.50 mA 
Value-1 
/Count 
02E0/1298 02E0/1344 02E0/1394 02E0/1416 
Value-2 
/Count 
02F0/463 02F0/428 02F0/364 02F0/356 
Value-3 
/Count 
0300/10 0300/9 0300/10 0300/10 
Standard 
Deviation 
7.327906 7.118259 6.815247 6.746642 
 
The results of experiment evaluation of communication performance for non-redundant 
wireless devices under a normal condition are listed in Table 10-27. 
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Table 10-27: Results of experimental evaluation of communication performance for 
non-redundant wireless devices under a normal condition 




896 1801 2689 4481 6970 7866 
Packet loss 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Loss rate 
(%) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Packet error 2 3 3 6 11 13 
Error rate 
(%) 






915.069 916.168 916.305 




902 1804 2704 4508 7209 8109 
Packet loss 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Loss rate 
(%) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.012 
Packet error 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Error rate 
(%) 






433.204 433.204 433.204 




902 1802 2702 4499 6985 8992 
Packet loss 0 2 3 7 14 18 
Loss rate 
(%) 
0.000 0.111 0.111 0.155 0.200 0.199 
Packet error 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Error rate 
(%) 






433.204 433.204 433.204 
RSSI (dBm) -21.90 -12.40 -10.90 -18.90 -19.90 -20.90 
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(2) High dose rate 
The results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for non-redundant 
wireless devices under the condition with a high dose rate (20 K Rad/h) are listed in 
Table 10-28. 
Table 10-28: Results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for non-
redundant wireless devices under a high dose rate condition 
Channel Parameters 
0 ~ 60 
mins 
61 ~ 120 
mins 













0058/144 - 0060/235 
Value-2 
/Count 













































The results of experimental evaluation of communication performance for non-redundant 
wireless devices under the condition with a high dose rate are listed in Table 10-29. 
Table 10-29: Results of experimental evaluation of communication performance for 























897 1793 2686 4477 7080 8610 
Packet loss 0 0 2 4 11 24 
Loss rate 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.09% 0.16% 0.28% 
Packet 
error 
3 19 19 19 19 19 
Error rate 0.33% 1.06% 0.70% 0.42% 0.26% 0.22% 
Frequency 
(MHz) 
912.973 912.973 912.973 912.973 913.784 914.730 




900 1802 2698 3602 
Failed Failed 
Packet loss 1 2 4 4 
Loss rate 0.11% 0.11% 0.15% 0.11% 
Packet 
error 
0 0 0 0 
Error 
rate 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Frequency 
(MHz) 
431.261 431.261 431.261 - 




902 1798 2332  
Failed at 78 
Failed Failed Failed 
Packet loss 0 1 6 
Loss rate 0.00% 0.06% 0.26% 
Packet 
error 
0 0 0 
Error rate 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Frequency 
(MHz) 
431.261 431.261 - 
RSSI -23.80 -22.80 - 
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(3) Low dose rate 
The results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for non-redundant 
wireless devices under the condition with a low dose rate are listed in Table 10-30. 
Table 10-30: Results of experimental evaluation of parameter measurement for non-
redundant wireless devices under a low dose rate condition 
Channel Parameters 




































































10 mA 10 mA 10 mA 10 mA 10 mA 10 mA 10 mA 
Value-1 
/Count 









































































































The results of experimental evaluation of communication performance for non-redundant 
wireless devices under the condition with a low dose rate are listed in Table 10-31. 
Table 10-31: Results of experimental evaluation of communication performance for 



















3580 7201 10801 13228 
Failed Failed Failed 
Packet loss 0 0 0 0 
Loss rate 
(%) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Packet error 0 0 0 0 
Error rate 
(%) 




3560 7119 10681 14242 17803 21364 24926 
Packet loss 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Loss rate 
(%) 
0.000 0.014 0.019 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.008 
Packet error 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Error rate 
(%) 




3600 7196 10791 14392 18005 21605 25174 
Packet loss 5 14 21 26 34 42 49 
Loss rate 
(%) 
0.138 0.194 0.194 0.180 0.188 0.194 0.194 
Packet error 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Error rate 
(%) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Based on experiment results listed in Table 10-26 to Table 10-31, comparison of the 
measurement accuracy, communication performance, and signal performance of each 
wireless device (Sample-1, Sample-2, and Sample-3) under three different radiation 
conditions is shown in Figure 10-39 (a), (b), (c), Figure 10-40 (a), (b), (c), Figure 10-41 




Figure 10-39: Comparison of measurement accuracy of non-redundant wireless 



































































Figure 10-40: Comparison of communication performance of non-redundant 































































































































Figure 10-41: Comparison of wireless signal performance of non-redundant wireless 

















































































































Under radiation conditions with different dose rates, radiation resistances of all irradiated 
devices are summarized in Table 10-32. 
Table 10-32: Survival times of non-redundant wireless monitoring devices under 




Parameter Measurement Wireless Communication  
High dose rate 
(20 K Rad/h) 
Sample-1 2h37m28s 5h42m53s 
Sample-2 Not available when it fails 2h2m18s 
Sample-3 Not available when it fails 1h18m 
Low dose rate 
(200 Rad/h) 
Sample-1 7h20m58s 7h20m58s 
Sample-2 
Still working after 
irradiated 14 hours  
Still working after 
irradiated 14 hours 
Sample-3 
Still working after 
irradiated 14 hours 
Still working after 
irradiated 14 hours 
 
The following observations can be made: 
(a) For Sample-1, under a high dose rate condition, after irradiated 2 hours 37 
minutes 28 seconds, the function of parameter measurement has failed. The 
function of wireless communication has failed at 4 hours 12 minutes 20 seconds. 
Removing its power and waiting 2-3 minutes, the function of communication will 
recover. It then permanently failed after irradiated 5 hours 42 minutes 53 seconds. 
On the other hand, under a low dose rate condition, the function of wireless 
communication has failed only after irradiated for 7 hours 20 hours 58 seconds.  
(b) For Sample-2, under a high dose rate condition, after irradiated 2 hours 2 minutes 
18 seconds, the function of wireless communication has failed and the function of 
parameter measurement still works. Interesting, under a low dose rate condition, 
after irradiated 14 hours 11 minutes 8 seconds, all functions still work as normal. 
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(c) For Sample-3, under a high dose rate condition, after irradiated for 1 hour 18 
minutes, the function of wireless communication stops working and the function 
of parameter measurement still works. Further, under a low dose rate condition, 
after irradiated for 14 hours 11 minutes 8 seconds, all functions still work as 
expected.  
Based on the experimental results under three different radiation conditions: normal 
condition, high dose rate condition, and low dose rate condition, the following 
conclusions can be drawn about accuracy of parameter measurement and performance of 
wireless communication: 
(a) For Sample-1, before it fails, the accuracy of parameter measurement does not 
suffer from significant degradation. Furthermore, the performance of wireless 
communication also has no significant degradation. Under three different 
radiation conditions, packet loss rate is and packet error rate is 0.000%, 0.280%, 
0.000%, and 0.165%, 0.220%, 0.000% separately.  
(b) For Sample-2, before it fails, the accuracy of parameter measurement has no 
significant degradation. On the other hand, the performance of wireless 
communication also has no significant degradation. Under three different 
radiation conditions, packet loss rate is and packet error rate is 0.012%, 0.110%, 
0.008%, and 0.000%, 0.000%, 0.000%, separately. 
(c) For Sample-3, before it fails, the accuracy of parameter measurement has no 
significant degradation. On the other hand, the performance of wireless 
communication also has no significant degradation. Under different radiation 
conditions, packet loss rate is and packet error rate is 0.199%, 0.260%, 0.194%, 
and 0.000%, 0.000%, 0.000% separately. 
Based on the results of these total dose tests, the following conclusions are in order: 
(a) The experimental results have shown that all irradiated devices will fail without 
significant degradation of electrical parameters. All functions are correct when 
eventually the total dose is less than the limit. They fail when the accumulated 
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total dose reaches their limitations. This observation matches well with the effects 
of total ionizing dose. 
(b) Sample-1 has the higher radiation-resistance than that of other two samples. 
Hence, for a high dose rate condition, the design and component selection are 
most appropriate. However, this design is more susceptible to a low dose rate 
condition. 
(c)  For a low dose rate condition, Sample-2 and Sample-3 are the more suitable 
solutions. However, they cannot survive for too long under a high dose rate 
condition. 
(d) According to the experimental results, all wireless devices can only work several 
hours under the dose rate 20 K Rad/h. Radiation shielding protection has to be 
used to increase their radiation resistances. 
(e) Wireless devices built with different semiconductor technologies can be sensitive 
to different dose rate conditions. Hence, for a complicate radiation environment, 
the method of using diversified hardware can be useful to increase their ultimate 
radiation-tolerance. 
10.4.5 Summary 
In this Section, total dose tests with 60Co gamma source have been performed to 
investigate behaviors of diversified non-redundant wireless monitoring devices under 
different dose rate conditions. The experimental results have shown that the developed 
wireless devices can work for at least 2 hours under the radiation condition with 20 K 
Rad/h. It has proved that the method of component selection and the method of radiation-
tolerance assessment are correct.  
On the other hand, the experimental results have shown that both the performance of 
wireless communication and the accuracy of parameter measurement have no significant 
degradation before the device stops working. The experimental results have also shown 
that electronic devices built with different semiconductor technologies can be susceptible 
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to different radiation dose rates. For example, under a high dose rate condition, electronic 
devices built with bipolar semiconductor technology have the higher radiation resistance 
that that of devices built with CMOS technology. However, under a low dose rate 
condition with 200 Rad/h, the former is more susceptible than the latter. Hence, 
diversified hardware should be necessary for using a complicate radiation environment. 
In addition, all wireless devices can only survive several hours under the radiation 




10.5 Part IV: Evaluation of the Developed Radiation-Tolerant 
Wireless Device in a Radiation Environment 
In the design for a radiation-hardened electronic system, it is critical to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the proposed methods and techniques. This is usually performed by 
exposing the device and/or system to a radiation environment and measuring its 
performance parameters. In the previous work, several emulation experiments and 
calculation based radiation-tolerance assessment have been completed. However, these 
methods just focus on the correctness of those proposed techniques in a perceived 
radiation damage scenario.  
This Section focuses on the validation of the radiation-tolerant design proposed in this 
research experimentally. The investigation is done by exposing the designed wireless 
devices to an ionizing radiation environment and measuring their performance 
parameters. The validation is achieved through comparison of radiation responses of non-
redundant devices with that of the redundant device. Specially, this validation focuses on 
the system-level performance instead of component-level. Component damages are 
therefore not tested in depth in this part of experiment. Several distinct wireless 
measurement and transmission units built with off-the-shelf commercial electronic 
components are used: (1) three single-channel wireless devices, which are implemented 
by using diversified semiconductor components (bipolar, CMOS, and hybrid); and (2) a 
redundant wireless device protected with a radiation shielding layer. 
This Section starts with description of experimental approach, irradiated devices, and 
investigated parameters. Subsequently, experimental setup is presented in detail. Then, 
experimental results of radiation responses of all irradiated devices are presented and 
compared. Finally, based on those experimental results, some technical discussions are 
provided and potential limitations of the designed experiments are identified. 
10.5.1 Introduction of Irradiated Devices 
(1) Samples chosen of irradiated tests 
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Several wireless devices with different designs are summarized in Table 10-33. They are 
used in this experiment. 





Without using radiation-tolerant design and without any shielding 
protection, constructed with Bipolar semiconductor technology 
Sample-2 
Without using radiation-tolerant design and without any shielding 
protection, constructed with CMOS semiconductor technology 
Sample-3 
Without using radiation-tolerant design and without any shielding 
protection, constructed with hybrid semiconductor technology 
Sample-4 
Using radiation-tolerant design and with a designed shielding protection, 
constructed with diversified semiconductor technologies 
 
Sample-1 is made with bipolar components except the microcontroller, Sample-2 is built 
with CMOS components, and Sample-3 mainly consists of hybrid components. All three 
samples can complete the required functions of parameter measurement and wireless 
communication. Semiconductor components used in samples are summarized in Table 
10-34. 
Table 10-34: Summary of semiconductor components used in irradiated devices in 









CLC502 National Semiconductor 
AD571 Analog Devices 
RF2905 RF Micro Devices 
P89V51RC2 CMOS NXP 
Sample-2 








LM2662 BiCMOS Texas Instruments 
UA741 Bipolar STMicroelectronics 




SI4463 Silicon Labs 
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Sample-1, Sample-2, and Sample-3 are selected as 𝐴1/𝑆1, 𝐴2/𝑆2, 𝐴3/𝑆3, separately. 
Sample-4 is an implementation of the radiation-tolerant architecture proposed in Chapter 
6. In addition, considering gamma radiation source and the limitation of the size of dry 
tube, the shielding protection is a single layer of Lead, whose layout and size are 
illustrated in Figure 10-42. The radiation source is enclosure around the irradiated 
samples, the thinckness of shielding for 𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝐴3 is about 12.5 mm and that of 𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝑆3 
is about 2 mm. 
 
Figure 10-42: Top view of the shielding protection in Experiment Part IV 











Figure 10-43: Irradiated samples used in experiment part IV 
(2) Parameters Considered 
As previously mentioned, this experiment focuses on system-level instead of component 
level. Therefore, the main parameters of interest are the lifespan of the units and the 
performance of wireless communication systems. The former refers to as the survival 
time. The latter involves of packet loss rate, packet error rate, and shift in wireless 
frequency and RSSI. Based on the comparison of those test results for non-redundant 
wireless devices and that of the redundant device, radiation tolerance of each device can 
be obtained, the effectiveness of the developed defense techniques can also be analyzed, 
and any potential limitations are identified. 
10.5.2 Experimental Setup 
In this study, the gamma irradiator generates a dose rate of 20 K Rad/h on the samples. A 
potentiostat located outside the irradiator is used as power supply to the wireless 
measurement and transmission units by using a 30 ft wire. A wireless receiver and a 
laptop, also located outside the irradiator, are used to capture the data through antennas 
connected to the irradiated units. A picture of this experimental setup for non-redundant 
devices is shown in Figure 10-44. 
(a) single-channel unit                  (b) redundant device          (c) shielding protection         
Sample-4 Sample-3 Sample-2 Sample-1 




Figure 10-44: Experimental setup for the non-redundant wireless devices used in 
Experiment Part IV 
Pictures of this experimental setup for redundant device with a shielding protection are 
shown in Figure 10-45. 
 
Figure 10-45: Experimental setup for the redundant wireless device used in 
Experiment Part IV 
Irradiated devices 
Wireless receiver 












10.5.3 Experimental Results 
(1) Survival time 
According to the experimental results, survival time and radiation hardness of distinct 
irradiated samples are listed in Table 10-35. 
Table 10-35: Survival time and radiation hardness of the irradiated wireless devices 
Parameters Sample-1 Sample-2 Sample-3 Sample-4 
Survival time (h) 5h 42m 53s 2h 2m 18s 1h 18m 
21 without 
failure 
Radiation hardness  
(K Rad) 
114 40 26 > 400 
 
Comparison of radiation resistances of irradiated wireless devices used in Experiment 
Part IV is shown in Figure 10-46. 
 
Figure 10-46: Radiation resistances of irradiated wireless devices used in 




































After irradiated for 21 hours under a high dose rate condition (20 K Rad/h), the status of 
each channel in the developed redundant device is listed in Table-36. 
Table 10-36: The status of each channel in the developed redundant device after 
irradiated 21 hours under a high dose rate condition 
Channel A1 S1 A2 S2 A3 S3 
Status Functional Functional Failed Failed Failed Failed 
 
(2) Performance of wireless communication 
The comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-1 under different 
radiation conditions (normal, high dose rate) is listed in Table-37. 
Table 10-37: Comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-1 






















30mins 896 0 0.000 2 0.223 915.946 -80.41 
60mins 1801 0 0.000 3 0.166 916.486 -78.90 
90mins 2689 0 0.000 3 0.112 915.756 -82.41 
150mins 4481 0 0.000 6 0.134 915.069 -82.91 
240mins 6970 0 0.000 11 0.158 916.168 -82.40 




in 20 K 
Rad/h 
condition 
30mins 897 0 0.000 3 0.334 912.973 -82.40 
60mins 1793 0 0.000 19 1.059 912.973 -82.40 
90mins 2686 2 0.074 19 0.707 912.973 -80.94 
150mins 4477 4 0.089 19 0.424 912.973 -94.40 
240mins 7080 11 0.155 19 0.268 913.784 -79.43 




The comparison of wireless communication performance of Sampe-2 under different 
conditions (normal condition, high dose rate condition) is listed in Table-38. 
Table 10-38: Comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-2 






















30mins 902 0 0.000 0 0.000 433.135 -10.90 
60mins 1804 0 0.000 0 0.000 433.135 -18.40 
90mins 2704 0 0.000 0 0.000 433.204 -10.40 
150mins 4508 0 0.000 0 0.000 433.204 -18.40 
240mins 7209 1 0.014 0 0.000 433.204 -11.90 






30mins 900 1 0.111 0 0.000 431.261 -17.80 
60mins 1802 2 0.111 0 0.000 431.261 -18.40 
90mins 2698 4 0.148 0 0.000 431.261 -34.80 
120mins 3602 4 0.111 0 0.000 - - 
122mins Failed 
 
The comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-3 under different 
conditions (normal condition, high dose rate condition) is listed in Table-39. 
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Table 10-39: Comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-3 






















30mins 902 0 0.000 0 0.000 433.135 -21.90 
60mins 1802 2 0.111 0 0.000 433.135 -12.40 
90mins 2702 3 0.111 0 0.000 433.204 -10.90 
150mins 4499 7 0.155 0 0.000 433.204 -18.90 
240mins 6985 14 0.200 0 0.000 433.204 -19.90 






30mins 902 0 0.000 0 0.000 431.261 -23.80 
60mins 1798 1 0.056 0 0.000 431.261 -22.80 
78mins 2332 6 0.257 0 0.000 - - 
79mins Failed 
The comparison of wireless communication performance of Sample-4 under different 




























30mins 885 0 0.000 1 0.113 432.955 -15.60 
60mins 1773 0 0.000 1 0.056 432.775 -17.10 
90mins 2662 0 0.000 1 0.036 433.045 -14.90 
150mins 4437 1 0.023 3 0.068 432.865 -20.10 
240mins 7100 1 0.014 3 0.042 432.865 -25.60 









30mins 901 0 0.000 9 0.999 914.414 -71.42 
60mins 1801 0 0.000 16 0.888 913.243 -85.93 
90mins 2701 0 0.000 23 0.852 916.126 -88.40 
150mins 4501 0 0.000 38 0.844 914.865 -87.42 
240mins 7201 0 0.000 63 0.875 914.775 -88.42 
300mins 9001 0 0.000 93 1.033 915.766 -87.91 
Comparison of communication performance of Sample-1(S1) and Sample-4(S4) under a 




Figure 10-47: Comparison of communication performance of Sample-1(S1) and 
Sample-4(S4) under a high dose rate condition 
Comparison of communication performance of Sample-2(S2) and Sample-4(S4) under a 
high dose rate (20 K Rad/h) condition is shown in Figure 10-48. 
 
Figure 10-48: Comparison of communication of Sample-2(S2) and Sample-4(S4) 






























































































Based on experimental results, with respect to the effectiveness of the developed defense 
techniques, the following discussions apply to this total dose test: 
(a) For radiation resistance, under the same radiation condition with a high dose rate 
(20 K Rad/h), the lifespan of Sample-2 is increased from 122 minutes to 287 
minutes by using the proposed defense techniques. Sample-4 can survive at least 
21 hours but Sample-1 only works 342 minutes. 
(b) For communication performance, packet loss rate has a significant improvement 
by using the proposed defense techniques. On the other hand, packet error rate of 
the redundant wireless device has not been improved. 
(c) For the performance of wireless signal, both frequency and RSSI have no obvious 
improvement by using the proposed defense techniques. However, its 
performance is satisfied to the function of the wireless communication.  
The proposed total dose test is to identify the performance of the developed wireless 
devices for a variety of operating conditions. However, there are a number of limitations 
that must be addressed in the future. There limitations include: 
(1) Single particle effects test does not involve in this test, the effectiveness of the 
developed fault-tolerant techniques has not been identified; 
(2) The test does not measure the exact radiation resistance of the developed 
redundant wireless device. After irradiated 21 hours, the test is stopped.  
10.5.5 Summary 
In this Section, total dose tests with 60Co gamma source have been performed to 
investigate the effectiveness of the proposed defense techniques. Experimental results 
have proved that the system can work effectively under a high dose rate condition. 
Radiation resistance has been significantly improved by using the radiation shielding 
protection. Moreover, it can be more improved by increasing the thickness of shielding 
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protection. It shows that the developed shielding protection can be used to mitigate the 
effects of total dose. 
On the other side, single event effect test is not involved in this test. Hence, the 
effectiveness of fault-tolerant design has not been investigated. It needs to be performed 




In this Chapter, a number of total dose tests for the developed distinct wireless devices 
with 60Co gamma source is presented to investigate their radiation tolerances and to 
validate the effectiveness of the proposed methods and systems. The following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
(1) The experimental results have concluded that the proposed method of the 
component selection is correct and effective. All selected semiconductor devices 
can survive at least 1 hour under the radiation condition with dose rate at 20 K 
Rad/h. 
(2) The experimental results have proved that the developed wireless monitoring 
device can work in a radiation environment with accumulated total dose at least 
400 K Rad. 
(3) The experimental results have confirmed that the wireless device built with 
bipolar semiconductor components has higher radiation resistance than those 
devices built with CMOS components. However, they are susceptible to radiation 
with low dose rate. 
(4) The experimental results have indicated that the complicate solutions for wireless 
communication systems may not be suitable for high level radiation 
environments. 
(5) The experimental results have shown that microcontroller/microprocessor module 
may be the most weakness part in a wireless monitoring system for using in high 
level of radiation environments.   
(6) The experimental results have indicated that RF2905 wireless device has the 
highest radiation resistance among all tested wireless devices.  
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(7) The experimental results have demonstrated the proposed defense techniques and 
methods are effectively to prolong the life of the COTS-based electronic system 
in high level radiation environments.  
The results of these tests will provide guidelines to design wireless monitoring systems to 
be used in high level radiation environments. These results are significant and important 
references to analyze radiation-induced responses of irradiated wireless devices and 
circuits. They can also help other researchers and engineers to design and produce more 




Chapter 11  
11 Summary, Conclusion, and Future Work  
11.1 Summary 
In this research, based on the literature survey, the conventional approach to design 
electronic systems with high radiation tolerance is to use rad-hardened components, 
which are prohibitively expensive and are not available for many new data processing 
algorithms and communication technologies. In this research, several methods and 
systems have been investigated to deal with different aspects for allowing COTS-based 
electronic systems in high level radiation environments. In this research, the investigation 
can be divided into five primary components: 
(1) A method has been presented to analyze radiation responses of circuits and 
electronic systems. The circuit analysis method for post-irradiation developed in 
this research can be used to obtain the responses of electronic systems for post-
irradiation. This method can be also applied to analyze and to design radiation-
hardened circuits with the robustness of radiation effects. 
(2) Several radiation-tolerant techniques have been developed to mitigate radiation 
effects on electronic system and to prolong its lifetime. They are:  
• A method of component selection and a multi-layer are developed to allow 
COTS-based electronic systems using in high level radiation environments. 
• A radiation-tolerant architecture developed in this research is very useful to 
involve all functions in a complete communication system, such as 
measurement, source decoder, modulation, transmission, etc. The developed 
architecture and the reconfigurator mechanism can be also applied in the fault-
tolerant system without additional detectors and/or hardware voters. The 
diversified architecture and techniques proposed in this research can be used 
to avoid the common-damage in the redundant system.  
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• An online detection mechanism developed in this research can be used timely 
to detect and to locate the damages in redundant channels.  
(3) A wireless monitoring system has been implemented in this research. The 
developed wireless monitoring system can be a potential solution for high level 
radiation environments in NPP applications. Related methods and techniques 
developed in this research can be used to implement similar monitoring systems 
for high level radiation environments. It also validates the correctness of the 
proposed methods and techniques.  
(4) A method has been proposed to evaluate the performance of the developed 
methods and systems without repeated destructive physical tests in the design 
phase. The emulation method developed in this research through external circuits 
to mimic radiation responses can be used to validate the proposed algorithm and 
systems. The hardware emulation bench built in this research is very useful to 
debug and to validate the proposed methods and systems in the design phase. The 
assessment method developed in this research can also be applied to select COTS 
components and to evaluate the radiation-tolerance of the whole system in the 
design phase. 
(5) Several total dose tests have been performed to validate the developed devices 
and system.  
• The irradiation experimental scheme proposed in this research can be used to 
validate the radiation-tolerance and to evaluate the performance of the 
developed system.  
• The experimental results provide the fundament to judge whether the 
developed system satisfies the design requirements.  
• The investigation of radiation vulnerable of each module is critical to improve 
the radiation-tolerance of the developed wireless device.  
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• The results of radiation responses of different type measurement units and 
wireless transceivers can be used in the component selection for applications 
with different radiation conditions.  
• The experimental results can be is a reference for other researches in the 
design of wireless monitoring applications using in radiation environments. 
11.2 Conclusions 
The conclusions of this research are listed as follows: 
(1) Investigated alternative ways to analyze, to design, and to evaluate rad-hardened 
electronic systems. 
A method is presented in this research to obtain radiation responses of devices and 
circuits and to accurately analyze their behavior under the high level of radiation. 
Validation results show that the following objectives have been achieved: 
• Several mathematical models of semiconductor device for post-irradiation can 
be investigated from the proposed technique. Those models can be applied to 
analyze circuit responses of post-irradiation. 
• The proposed technique can be used to design circuit robust ionizing radiation 
effects without repeated physical radiation tests. 
A multi-layer radiation protection is developed in this research to mitigate radiation 
damages of total ionizing dose and to avoid the common-mode damage in redundant 
systems, as well as an evaluation method of radiation shielding protection. Simulation 
study results show that the following objectives have been achieved: 
• The developed multi-layer radiation protection can be applied to effectively 




• The evaluation method of radiation protection can be used to calculate the 
required shielding thickness. 
A radiation-tolerant architecture is proposed in this research to allow COTS-based 
electronic system using in high level radiation environments. The following properties of 
the architecture are demonstrated by the experimental studies. 
• The proposed scheme can be applied to design redundant systems without 
additional detection units and/or hardware voters. 
• The developed diversified protections and enforcing differences can be used to 
avoid the common-fault in redundant system. 
• The proposed decision algorithm can effectively generate reconfigurator 
suggestions when radiation damages occur in redundant system. 
• The developed reconfigurator scheme is effectively to power-off the device if it 
encounters radiation damages.  
An online scheme based on build-in-test (BIT) technique is studied in this research to 
timely detect radiation faults in redundant systems. The numerical studies support 
conclusions that: 
• The proposed fault analysis model can be used to identify radiation damages in 
electronic systems. 
•  The developed online detection mechanism is effectively to detect radiation 
faults in redundant systems. 
• The developed diagnosis mechanism can be used to locate radiation faults in 
redundant systems. 
The hardware emulation bench has successfully supported the research in several 
methods and systems. It is observed that: 
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• The test bench allows independent access to process the tolerant logic, to 
implement detection mechanism, and to construct analysis algorithm. 
• Single fault and multiple faults can be effectively simulated and injected by 
logical emulation and external circuit emulation. 
• Emulation methods through external circuits to mimic radiation responses can be 
used to validate the proposed detection mechanism and algorithm. 
An assessment method based on reliability analysis is studied in this research. The 
numerical studies support conclusions that: 
• Assessment model developed in this research can be used to analyze the reliability 
of redundant systems for post-irradiation. 
• Radiation degradation factor proposed in this research is effectively to describe 
the radiation response of an item under the given radiation dose. 
• The developed assessment method can be applied to evaluate the radiation-
tolerance of the whole electronic system without repeated destructive physical 
tests. 
(2) Investigated the developed methodologies to design, to implement, and to validate a 
wireless monitoring system for post-accident environments in NPPs. 
A wireless monitoring system for high level radiation environments in NPPs has 
successfully been implemented and constructed. It is observed that:  
• The developed monitoring system can be effectively used to collect the up-to-date 
information and to transmit them to remote monitoring station. 
• The developed monitoring system satisfies the design requirements and can be 
used in nuclear applications.  
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Irradiation experimental validation shows that the investigated scheme has several 
desirable features. 
• The proposed irradiation experimental scheme can be used to validate the 
investigated methods and systems. 
• The developed monitoring system can work in high level radiation environment 
(at least 400 K Rad (Si)). 
• The experimental results have proved that the investigated methods and systems 
in this research can be effectively used to increase radiation resistance of 
electronic systems. 
• A number of observes in total dose tests provide significant references for other 
researches in the design of wireless monitoring applications using in radiation 
environments 
In other words, the objective of this research is to design rad-hardened systems without 
using rad-hardened components for high level radiation environments. The investigated 
methods and systems in this research have achieved those objectives. 
11.3 Future Work 
This research encompassed multiple areas related to radiation-tolerant design without 
rad-hardened components. Even though the principles and effectiveness of the several 
proposed methods and systems have been demonstrated within the scope, there are 
interesting issues that can be further investigated. Some possible topics include: 
• To investigate radiation-hardened design from network-level, such as wireless 
frequency, network protocol, etc., to build a diversified wireless network for high 
level radiation environments.   
• To investigate radiation-hardened techniques from circuit-level, for example, to 
design diversified self-healing circuits to accomplish communication functions of 
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wireless monitoring systems, and to analyze radiation responses on more devices 
and related circuits. 
• To investigate more radiation shielding protection for neutron radiation, as well as 
simulation studies for various radiation particles with high level energy by using 
various simulator. 
• To investigate radiation sensors to accurately measure critical parameters in high 
level radiation range, such as neutron sensor, gamma sensor, etc. 
• To investigate radiation resistances of more semiconductor devices and circuits in 
the modern digital communication system through physical radiation tests. 
• To investigate other communication techniques for high level of radiation 
environments, for example, using optical fiber as the sensor and/or the transceiver 
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Appendix A: Hardware Emulation Bench 
In this research, a hardware emulation bench, as illustrated in Figure A-1, is developed to 
evaluate the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed methods and systems. The 
bench houses a combination of fault injection techniques, which consist of two emulation 
methods: logic emulation and circuit emulation. Logic emulation is used to mimic 
radiation effects on semiconductor devices. It is based on software-implemented fault 
injection, and uses injection commands to forcibly control and/or stop system functions. 
Circuit emulation is based on hardware-implemented fault injection, using external 
circuits to mimic circuit responses under radioactive conditions.  
 
Figure A-1: The architecture of the developed hardware emulation bench. 
The developed hardware emulation bench includes four parts: a redundant wireless 
device, a wireless gateway, emulation circuits, and a control tool. The emulation bench is 
built with two communication buses: bus #1 (915MHz network) is used to 
transmit/receive the normal communication data; and bus #2 (RS485) is used to 
transmit/receive commands/reports for fault injection. In addition, the fault injection unit 
is connected to the control computer by an Ethernet network. A software tool for fault 
injection is installed on the control computer to control, to collect, and to display the 
diagnostic information, which is developed in Microsoft Visual C++.   










Figure A-2: Picture of the developed hardware emulation bench 
The detailed hardware implementation is listed in Table A-1. 
Redundant wireless devices 






Emulation circuit  





Table A-1: The implementation of the hardware emulation platform 
Function Sub-function Component Manufacture 
Redundant 
system 
Analog signal processing LM741 Texas Instruments 
Analog-to-digital converter AD7689 Analog Devices 
Microcontroller P89C51RC2 NXP 
Wireless transceiver RF2905 RF Micro Devices 
Receiver 
Microprocessor i.max 285 NXP 
Ethernet LAN8720A Microchip 




Microprocessor i.max 285 NXP 
Ethernet LAN8720A Microchip 
RS485 MAX487 MAXIM 
Emulation circuits 
EU2-5NU KEMET 
LM741 Texas Instruments 
The screen shot of the software tool in the control computer is shown in Figure A-3. 
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